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Introduction
This study seeks to explain how Botswana's largest programme for
development of arable farming developed into an ineffective and costly
modernzation effort. The Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP)
was launched in 1985, and terminated in 1990. It will be described briefly
below, and in the subsequent chapters be the main topic. The analytical
framework applied is one that focuses on the interplay between
administrative organizations, political authorities and target groups,
assuming that in most public policy development all these factors and the
interplay between them will influence how a policy is shaped.
The main relevance of the present analysis lies in the importance of the
ARAP programme itself. It was a major programme, and it is an important
topic in the debate on Botswana' s development problems. However, the
chosen analytical framework will also allow for a discussion of the
relevance of alternative models for explaining rural development policy in
Botswana.
The Programme in brief
ARAP was a set of subsidies intended to encourage arable farming among
all groups of farmers engaged in rainfed arable production. The design of
ARAP was to give grants in cash to the farmers who destumped, ploughed,
row planted and weeded their fields. The amount of cash paid to
paricipating farmers increased with increasing field size, up to 10 hectares.
In addition, seeds and fertilizers were distributed for free to the farmers,
and 85 per cent of costs for fencing of fields were covered by the
Government. Farmers could utilize one, a few or all of these assistance
components according to their own choice. These offers were provided to
farmers repeatedly for 5 years, from the 1985/86 season to 1989/90.
The objective of the programme can be summed up as an attempt to
commercialize the arable farming of Batswana farmers.i Historically,
arable farming had predominantly aimed at the subsistence needs of the
i The word Tswana is the core of a variety of forms. Botswana is the name of the country,
while Setswana is the name of the Tswana language. A person of Tswana origin is
labelled a Motswana, while the plural form of Tswana persons is Batswana.
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households, and in many households crop production was even below
subsistence needs. ARAP was designed to encourage the farers to expand
their arable production by means of improved methods, improved inputs
and expansion of arable field sizes. In combination, this should give
household faring a decisive assistance: Adoption of all the methods and
inputs provided by ARAP would enable farers to produce a surlus that
could be marketed and generate cash incomes. This surlus, it was
envisioned, would enable farers to reinvest in continued commercial
arable farming. Ministry of Agriculture's stated objectives were to increase
arable production to a level of national food self-sufficiency, to increase
rual incomes generated from arable production and to optimise rual
income distribution (MOA 1988: 1).
ARAP was open for all farers, and as most farers in Botswana are
rather poor, ARAP became a major means to alleviate poverty problems in
the rual sector. All farmers were given the opportunity to escape poverty
by entering commercial crop farming. During its implementation period,
ARAP was by far the largest programme for arable agriculture
development, and reached more poor farmers more than any other
programme.
ARAP did reach all farmers with assistance, but the developmental
effects of the programme are rather doubtful. According to a sector study
cared out for NORAD in 1986, it is "doubtful whether ARAP contributes
significantly to the development of the arable sector" (Øygard et aL. 1986).
As a modemization effort, ARAP sought to influence and change the
production profiles of Batswana farmers. However, most participating
farmers used the programme as a subsidy of their established system and
level of production, and continued mainly in the same type of low input
production, which does not even cover subsistence needs for most farmers.
The main change caused by ARAP was that average field sizes increased,
but in most households the increase was definitely not enough to expand
production beyond subsistence leveis. Finally, without ARAP, field sizes
are likely to become smaller again.
The Ministry of Agriculture states that "crop yields despite the very
favourable 1987/88 cropping season (of good rainfall) are still very low to
sustain arable production" and furthermore, "household income has not
be en significantly improved (by ARAP) nor is it likely to be sustained"
(MOA 1991: 20-21). Those farmers who had already adopted improved
methods and production input continued to apply them, but the adoption
rates did not increase significantly among ARAP beneficiaries (Farngton
1987; Rashem 1987). The changes achieved were thus modest, and their
sustainability without continued ARAP support is questionable.
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Even if it was clearly popular among farmers that the governent
financed farming operations for which they would normally have to car
the costs themselves, the group benefiting most was the wealthiest farmers.
This small group of farmers of ten own tractors. ARAP subsidized
ploughing also when the ploughing was done by a contractor, which opened
up a huge and profitable market for tractor owners.2
The modest achievements were reached at a very high financial cost. 3
Furhermore, ARAP has had negative side effects. Scarce implementing
capacity was concentrated upon ARAP, and other presumably important
programmes suffered (Farington 1987; Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 238,
240). ARAP has hastened long term developments of deforestation and soil
erosion, and accelerated the movement of arable faring westwards into
more fragile areas of mixed grazing and farming land (Eskeli 1989; Stange
et aL. 1990: 7-8).
The analytical approach
It is generally recognized that the civil service plays a crucial role in the
making of public policy. The analytical perspective has to account for this
and focus on what factors determine civil service action and attitudes. Not
least the Botswana civil service is of ten pointed out as a key actor in policy
making processes. Gunderson makes this a central point to the extent that
he labels Botswana "The Administrative State" (1970), in which the civil
service in reality is unchallenged in its influence on public policy' s
objectives and means. Also Polhemus (1983) underlines the bureaucratic
dominance in policy making processes of Botswana.
However, any attempt to explain agricultural policies in Botswana should
take into account the political importance of the rural, agriculturally
dominated areas. The Botswana Democratic Pary (BDP) which has won
every election since 1965, has the rural population as the core of its
electorate. It is important for the regime to demonstrate that it has the
welfare of the rual poor in mind (Holm 1988b: 198). The welfare services
for the poor that have be en developed are an important component in this
strategy of mobilizing political support in the rural areas. Increasingly,
2 Over the years 1985 to 1989, approximately P60 mil. were spent by the Government
on ploughing subsidies (PL = NOK 4.0 1985). A large proportion of this ended up as
income for tractor owners, acting as ploughing contractors.
3 The total costs reached about NOK. 400 millon over the five years ARAP was
operational, calculating 1 Pula to about NOK 4.0. (Granberg and Parkinson 1988; MOA
1991) .
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agricultural modernization programmes for the poor farmers have also
played a role for purposes of political stability. The extraordinary economic
growth Botswana has experienced has not reached the rual peasantry very
significantly, and this is increasingly becoming a political problem.
It is commonly acknowledged that implementation processes of ten
changes the content of programmes and projects. If money, personnei,
expertise and techncal equipment are not provided it will change the policy
or at worst, it will prevent the policy from materializing at alL. Furthermore,
most policy statements, guidelines and directives that the implementing
agencies receive from decision makers as orders to implement are open to
many interpretations. It can of ten be interpreted in many ways what
emphasis to place on various elements in the policy, how to combine
elements that are partially inconsistent, and what things really mean. These
interpretation processes are significant factors that affect the outcome of
policy implementation. FinaiiY, there is the problem of mobilizing the target
groups. Hyden (1983) talks about the "uncaptured pe as antry" , pointing to
the experience that the peasantry is difficult to engage in modem structures
of state and market, both because they of ten do not perceive such
engagement as attractive, and because they have an alternative economy to
base themselves on. Even if his theory about peasant autonomy is a
controversial one, it refers to the central problem that implementation
depends on the target group' s perceived rational interests, and the choices
they make according to these interests and rationalities.
Finally, the influence of donors is an important factor when analyzing
how public policy is made in Third Wodd countries. Donors are heavily
engaged in Botswana, and might well have a considerable influence on the
planning and implementation of programmes in which they engage.
An analytical perspective is needed to account for how policy making is
influenced by the complex structures and processes indicated in the above
sections.
The policy making process that developed ARAP has not been examined
by other writers. But many observers in Botswana offered their opinions
about why ARAP became as outlined abóve. Two ideas seemed to
dominate. The first was that contrar to how policy is normally developed,
in the case of ARAP, the ruling elite of politicians and civil servants acted
in too much of a hur and did not plan things as well as they should and
could have done. The other explanation was that ARAP was not really
meant to be a modernization effort, but was solely meant as crisis relief
since there was a severe drought in Botswana from the early eighties. This
explanation argued that to look for the modernzation achievements of
ARAP would be to expect it to be something else then it really was. Both
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of these explanations have a grain of truth, but they can not explain ARAP,
and on some points they are wrong.
These two perceptions about why ARAP went wrong are based on
vareties of a ruling elite perspective. In the first version the ruling elite did
not perform effectively enough, whereas in the latter version, it did perform
effectively when considering its "real" intentions.
The idea of a ruling elite in control of public policy is aquite widespread
one in Botswana, and major scientific works are elaborations of it.
Gunderson (1970) and Picard (1980; 1987) have formulated the c1earest
general ruling elite models for the case of Botswana, and the ruling elite
idea permeates much of the debate on Botswana politics in general. This
model focuses on a ruling elite of power holders, and examines its interests,
strategies and consequent actions. The ruling elite model tends to con sider
the administrative organizations as mere tools, implying that they are
neutral and can be put to use for any politically defined purose, which is
not a realistic assumption. Furthermore, the ruling elite model tends to
ignore that the ruling elite members are themselves members not only of
an elite, but also of institutions, and influenced by this. In the concluding
chapter, these problems of the ruling elite model will be discussed, based
on the case study of ARAP.
The structure of the report
In chapter 1, an analytical framework along the lines sketched in the above
will be outlined, drawing on the works of Knut Dahl Jacobsen (1964;
1967). In chapter 2, methods of research and the data material will be
described. The rural economy, the role of agriculture within it and a
description of agriculture itself will be the topics of chapter 3. An outline
of agricultural policies since in the years prior to ARAP will also be given.
Chapters 4 to 6 will outline the administration's influence on ARAP (ch.
4), the political interventions in the planning process (ch. 5) and the
implementation of ARAP (ch. 6). Chapter 7 will discuss somewhat more
broadly the effects ARAP has had. Chapter 8 will sum up the analysis and
go on to discuss the implications of it for the agricultural sector, and the
case study will be related to the ruling elite model that will be presented,
suggesting some added dimensions to that mod e of analysis.
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1. Theoretical framework. Political-
administrative system, policy-making
and implementation
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an analytical framework will be elaborated upon, drawing
on Knut Dahl Jacobsen's works (1964; 1967). The motivation of this choice
of perspective is to enable the analysis to examine the interplay among
administrative actors, the political authorities, and the target groups.
Conceptualizations of these principal elements as well as of the
relationships between them are needed.
1.2 Open systems
Jacobsen' s approach to the explanation of public policy focuses on a three-
component structure; administration, political authority and c1ientele
(Jacobsen 1964: 3-10). The point of departure in Jacobsen's model is the
concept of open systems, where the environment gives support and makes
demands on the system. This concept applies at different leveIs. The
political-administrative system, or the state, is in need of support and
therefore it has to respond to demands. Not least the political authorities are
important at this level.
Also the administration as such is seen in the same perspective; as open
and dependent on support. The support needed has to come from the
political authorities, but also the clientele and donors might be important
here. This open perspective links Jacobsen's model to the tradition within
organization theory focusing on organizational dependencies and their
capabilities to adapt to a changing environment (Scott 1981).
1.3 Governmental administrative organizations
Jacobsen rejects the idea that administrative organizations are neutral tools
that can be put to usefor any decided purose. On the contrar,
administrative organizations are basically political phenomena. He makes
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it a general point that the interests of social groups are best attended to by
the state when they are made routine considerations in administrative
organizations (1964; 1967). This is so because administrative organizations
are, in most cases, biased in their perceptions of what are important
problems, tasks, values and what are acceptable solutions. This bias leads
to attention to the interests of some groups and to the ignorance of others.
Jacobsen labels these perceptions problem structures with corresponding
models of actions, underlining their stability and structured occurence.
The problem structures and models of action are important in policy
analysis because of the influence administrative organizations have in
determining public policy. In most cases, the tasks that the administration
has to solve are general objectives set by political authorities, and these
goals normally have to be operationalized and specified by a professional
administration. The problem structures and models of action determine the
administrative organization's specific action to solve any task it is told to
solve. Agreed, general goals will be specified into concrete public policy
by the administration, and the way this is done will imply further political
choices. Politics is, in Jacobsen' s perspective, about who has their interests
attended to in administrative organization's stable problem structures and
models of action.
Most administrative organizations are biased, but they are so in a rather
disguised way. Even though the organization' s views are presented as
technical and neutral premises, in most cases these premises are selectively
biased to the benefit of some social interests and to the detriment of others.
This does not imply a rejection of administrative organizations' ability to
activate in what is perceived as clearly political matters. Here, however, we
are concerned with the political implications of what is framed as
professional and administrative issues. Professional assessments and views
are ofte n presented as correct, according to professional standards, but they
of ten imply political choices. Or to use another formulation, administrative
organizations have an interest profil e relative to society implied by their
professional approach. The terms to conceptualize this politicized
professional approach are problem structure and models of action.
The models of action and problem structure are interrelated. Problem
structures will influence what are se en as appropriate means. But available
means might also of ten influence problem structures so that the
administrative organization's means become relevant.
Organizational units as such do not have problem structures and models
of action, but the people who populate organizational units do. The
incumbents of organizations are the carers of problem structures and
models of action. However, problem structures and models of action are
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maintained by organizational means. Socialization and organizational
control reinforce and reproduce them (Lægreid and Olsen 1978; Njoroge
1983). The individual actors of the organization will then behave in ways
strongly influenced by these organizationally maintained problem structures
and models of action. If the civil servants in an administrative organization
depend on this organization for their careers, i.e. do not want to leave or
have no alternative career path, the strength of these factors controlling
individual behaviour will most likely be increased. Thus, problem structures
and models of action are not easily changed as theyentrench the whole
organization. Furhermore, when definitions of problems and appropriate
actions are framed as professional values, it is not legitimate to change
these when the reasons for such a change are not professional, but
demanded by outsiders.
Jacobsen suggests a connection between problem structures, models of
action and organization structure, in p articul ar, how the administrative
organization organizes its relationship to the clientele. We will retum to this
in section 1.6. But the general point should also apply for the structuring
of the other parts of the organization. In Jacobsen's analysis of the
Norwegian agricultural administration in the last centur, the administrative
organization is fairly small at the centralleveL. In the case of Botswana's
Ministry of Agriculture, we face a much more complex organization, and
this has consequences for the understanding of the concepts introduced
above. Some concepts will be presented in order to facilitate the analysis
of Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) intern al mode of operation and the
impacts this had on ARAP.
Egeberg (1984) points out two basic features in the structuring of modem
government al organizations: specialization and coordination. He points out
that hierarchy is the most common coordinating mechanism in
govemmental organizations. I will use the concept of administration in this
somewhat wide sense: the specialized and hierarchical formal govemmental
administrative organizations of professional civil servants, biased in their
professional approach to outside problems and tasks.
Specialized organizational units concentrate their attention on a limited
set of problems in the organization's total task environment. Within
organizations there are thus formed specialized sets of perceptions of
problems and ways to handle problems. Influenced by formally defined
goals and means, formal rules, profession, experience, organizational history
and by adjustments to the environment, problem structures and models of
action are developed in a semi -autonomous way in various parts of the
organization, and they might be more or less consistent (Egeberg 1978).
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In the case of planning major programmes, the se will of ten be of a
complex nature, affecting many different issues on the administrative
organization's agenda. Consequently, major programmes will affect the
tasks of quite a number of organizational sub-units. If a programme is not
designed and planned in an adaptive way to various issues seen as
important, the programme might have negative consequences for issues
deemed important by the organization or pars of it. The linking together
of various organizational units in a coordinated process thus becomes a
means to secure effective policy making and planning.
Coordination is more than a mere question about time, capacity and well
designed planning routines. We have seen that the organizational units that
have to be coordinated may have interests and values at stake that are
difficult to combine. Coordinating policy-making processes is of ten difficult
because it requires compromises and trade-offs.
Some actors might find that the best way to solve the tasks they are in
charge of is to avoid cooperation with others. Or they might find that
problem resolution requires controlover what others do. Thus the
coordination in specialized organizations is influenced by tactical
considerations. The ability to control who is linked to decision-making
processes or de-linked from them gives one power to influence the contents
and interest profiles of policy-making.
Coordination, i.e. linking and de-linking, is of ten attempted through
hierarchical means, like formal rules of participation and procedures to link
units together in decision-making processes. Such a control of an
hierarchical organization will of ten have limited effects. First, it will hardly
ever be complete, there will normally be some room for choice at lower
administrative leveis. Secondly, hierarchical control has a limited ability to
facilitate mutual trust, cooperation, innovation and joint problem solving.
When a policy is decided upon and ready for implementation, new
problems of control arise: the ability to control the activities in the
implementing parts of the organizations. Often hierarchical control
measures are applied. Reporting procedures and evaluations are important
tools. Control of the careers of lower level staff is also an important control
mechanism.
The administration, according to Jacobsen, is dependent on support and
it faces demands from the environment. The support from the political
authorities will be important for most administrative organizations. But also
the clientele is a category that administrative organizations depend upon.
The 8uccess of administrative organizations depends on their ability to
realize their objectives, which are of ten dependent on certain clientele
responses. In many Third Wodd countries, the peasantry is not a potent
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national political actor. This may ease the administration' s problems, as
there are no articulated demands to adjust to, but it may also make it more
difficult for the administrative organization to perform effectively, because
a clientele that is not well understood is also difficult to manipulate for
change.
Donors are also important actors in the environment, of ten administrative
organizations depend on donors for funding and expertise.
This does not mean that administrative action is determined by the
environment. The professional ministry will be powerful itself, because of
its expertise, capacities and responsibility for the sector. It might be the
most powerful actor in the policy-making process. But still, it is dependent
on support and will have to adjust to demands.
1.4 The political authorities
In an open system perspective, the political leadership is dependent on
support from many sides. When discussing Third Wodd countries,
international dependence is of ten focused on. For instance, international
capital and the Republic of South Africa are forces of strong significance
in the case of Botswana. The processes of demands, pressure and support
involving Botswana and its international environment are, however, not the
key interest here.
Within these limits, the political authorities attempt to generate support
from society. In Botswana the formal framework of these processes of
meeting demands and mobilizing support is a form of multi-party system,
with regular elections.
The mechanisms for mobilizing support are many, they include appeals
to ethnicity, to tribal loyalty and to class. They include the building of
patron-client networks, and finally they include delivering public policy that
people want, in return for electoral support (Polhemus 1983; Holm and
Molutsi (eds) 1989). It follows that major programmes like ARAP are
critical for the political authorities because such programmes affect the
level of support for the regime.
One might well analyze the political leadership in terms of problem
structures and models of action. The political authorities also face a
complex and ambiguous environment, which needs simplifying in order to
be handled. Political authorities develop experience and routine about what
means will solve what problems. However, their perception of society, its
problems and potential may be quite different from the perception held in
the administration.
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1.5 The political - administrative relationship
Jacobsen (1967) places quite some political dynamic in this relationship and
the conflicts and tensions that develop between politicians and
administrative leaders.
Basically, the relationship is one of interdependence. The administration
is in need of support from the political leaders who are their formal
superiors as wel1 as the source of legitimacy for the administration's
decisions. The political authorities are dependent on the administration in
order to act in society.
The relationship is also, within the norms of the Westminster model
inherited by Botswana, one of division of work. There are some tasks that
the political authorities should decide, like setting goals and guidelines for
the administration's activity. Some issues are of specialized, technical
nature and should be left to the professionals in the civil service.
n might be envisioned that one or both of the two actors do not accept
these norms for division of work. The civil servants might in some contexts
engage in what is commonly seen as political decisions. Or, the political
authorities might interfere in the specific, obviously technical considerations
of the administration. Many authors see the latter situation as the most
pressing problem. Hyden, for instance, labels this the "supremacy of
politics", referrng to a situation where the political leaders see political
considerations as the only legitimate ones, and thus undermine the
professional performance of the administration by intervening too much in
technical aspects and byenforcing unrealistic objectives. However, the
distinction between political and administrative considerations is difficult
to define clearly.
According to Jacobsen, how this relationship should be balanced and
what degree of administrative autonomy should be allowed will never be
solved once and for all. n is not an issue that can be objectively defined,
and it is not very fruitful to try to define the optimal balance. Rather, we
should focus on the dynamic processes that in varous situations influence
how varous actors set the distinction.
In Jacobsen's model, to what extent the political authorities try to control
the administration will var over time. Increasing political control he labels
contraction. Easing control and leaving more discretionar power to the
administration he labels as detraction.
As long as the administration is seen as responsive to political demands
detraction will tend to remain, whereas in the case of dissatisfactory
adjustment to political demands, contraction will of ten result in one form
. or another. Contraction will of ten take the form that the political authorities
interfere in what the professional civil servants see as their professional
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domain of how to define means in the policy, and what policies are
realistic. Contraction processes thus of ten result in tensions and conflict
which may lead to changes in the problem structures and models of action
of the administration. However, contraction attempts may lead to deadlock
and deteriorating relationships. It is a continuous process of power and
adjustments.
Several factors constrain the ability of political authorities to influence
policy-making and implementation. The magnitude of public policy makes
it problematic to exercise political controlover all programmes. And a
number of programmes are planned and implemented without much
political guidance and interference. But also for the large and politically
most significant programmes there will probably be constraints on the
political authorities' ability to direct processes. The administration's
monopoly on expertise of ten gives it a very strong power in policy-making,
especially when political parties do not have any alternative or counter
expertise. However, if the political authorities direct their limited capacity
towards a specific policy making process, they will most likely have a
strong influence.
1.6 The clIentele
In chapter 3, I outline in some detail the development of the rual economy
where most dwellers derive parts of their livelihood from agriculture. The
economic strength of the rual population is very varied, and the social
structure is quite complex with many partly competing interests. Public
policy affects the various interests that the rural citizens have in the rual
economy.
Analyses of interests of ten distinguish between objective and subjective
interests. Many development programmes have encountered the problem
that target groups define their interests in ways that are not objectively
correct. Lack of knowledge, superstition and the like are well known
problems for development programmes. On the other hand, the professional
development assistance officer does not always possess the objective truth
about what is rationaL. Suffice it here to underline the point that target
groups ' interests are not obvious nor unambiguous, they are interpreted and
defined, and might deviate from how they are expected to be.
Socio-economic structures are complex. The situation and context for the
individual client are complex as well, consisting of varieties of ways to
manage in a structure that both provides options and constraints. The notion
of farming system is an attempt to conceptualize how a farmer is not only
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a producer of a given type of output, but is engaged in continuous and
complex processes of choice and adjustment (0yhus 1991).
When faced with a policy, the clientele makes choices adjusted to the
multi-faceted situation its members face at that point in time. Choices
concern both whether to relate to the policy at all, and how to relate. It is
an obvious point, but of ten ignored by policy makers. Hyden (1983) makes
this point forcefully when arguing that African traditional farmers have the
possibility to exit from interaction with state and market and retreat to the
economy of affection. They make rational choices, and they have the option
of making choices. The semi -autonomy provided by the economy of
affection is a controversial issue. But that does not alter the point that
farers make choices, according to what seems ratio nal for them according
to the interpretation they make of their situation.
Thus, as pointed out by Hyden, mobilizing farmers to interact with state
or market is a difficult taske It is difficult to predict what varous groups
will see as a rational action. Or more precisely, it is difficult to predict
when farmers' interests and perceptions are not ariculated and included in
policy making processes - which is ofte n the case in African countries.
One reason why farmers ' premises and interests are not adequately
considered is that political and administrative decision makers do not have
identification with the clientele groups. Such an identification, and the
ability to interact with clientele groups and to perceive and accept their
premises are of ten missing, and problem structures that do not have
clientele premises as one of their sources will be rather blind regarding
what is rational and relevant from the clientele's perspective. Many public
policies therefore face problems in mobilizing target groups.
As noted, Jacobsen makes the point that administrative organizations
develop problem structures and models of action, which correspond to some
social interests to the detriment of others. These problem structures
manifest themselves in public policy. Furthermore, they also manifest
themselves in the organizational structures. Over time, there will be a
correspondence between organization structure and problem structure. One
aspect of this is the organizing of implementing agencies. If, for instance,
an administrative organization has problem structures corresponding to
wealthy farmers ' needs and interests, this will be reflected not only in
officials' professional values and in the organization's policies, but also in
the organizing of the structure through which clientele members are
reached. One dimension of this will be the implementing officers' social
relation and attitudes to various groups. But also other matters are
important. For instance, who initiates the interaction for assistance? If the
c1ientele member has this responsibility, then very of ten better-off clientele
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members predominate. What are the requirements for assistance and who
can in practice fulfil seemingly neutral requirements? Another aspect is the
capacity of an implementing agency, and the ability to be accessible, for
instance, in Botswana' s sparsely populated rual are as.
Implementation thus depends on several factors. First, that
implementation capacity is available and that it can be controlled by policy
makers who set goals and define the ways to achieve goals. Secondly, that
the policy is seen by the clientele as providing something of relevance and
that the implementing agency is accessible.
1.7 Decision-making proeesses
Public policy is of ten made only gradually. And its phases can var from
case to case. From one phase to the next, actors in the administration,
political authorities and clientele may vary in participation and influence.
The structure of a decision-making process refers to how individuals
paricipate in the differing phases of such a process. Paricipation cannot
always be predicted in advance. In some cases participation is strictly
regulated in rules of participation rights. But rights are not always used;
potential participants might abstain. Participation may also be defined as
obligatory for some actors, but duties are not always respected and duties
might well lead to formalism, i.e. formally fulfilling duties but not really
participating. Of ten there is room for choice both concerning participating
at all, but also to what degree and in which phases. Paricipation in
decision-making processes is thus only partly influenced by rules and
formal set-ups. The investigation of such processes has to bear this in mind
(March and Olsen 1976).
Various actors in a specialized political-administrative system of ten view
problems and strategies differently according to the tasks and problems they
regularly work on, according to routines for problem solving and according
to professional approach. Various routines and problem structures have an
interest profile. And when the different individual parts of a political
administrative system var according to what their problem structures are
it makes a difference for social interests how political and administrative
actors are active or not in a decision-making and planning process. Politics
and influence are about what problem structures are linked to a decision
making process, and about what interests are favoured by a specific
understanding of a problem. Implementation further influences policy
forming in many cases. Resources, clarity and realism are important factors
here, but it is also important to see implementation in the light of how
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problem and organization structures fit client problems, interests and
rationalities.
In this chapter, some concepts for the policy making analysis have been
introduced. The topic for the next chapter on methods is how these can be
operationalized, and the data material that has been available to assess these
key concepts.
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2. Methods of research
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will first make some comments on the case study
approach. Next, I will discuss some main concepts used for the study of the
ARAP case and outline the kind of data material that will be us ed to
discuss these concepts. I will distinguish between qualitative and
quantitative data material, and then go into more detail on the varous kinds
of data that will be used for various puroses.
Qualitative data make up a large part of the data materiaL. Such data are
of ten difficult to represent correctly for the reader to control the use of
them on all points. To some extent, this is inherent in all use of qualitative
data. In order to counteract this problem, this chapter is relatively detailed
and in addition I have presented in an appendix the technical aspects and
practical problems of collecting interview data in open, personal interviews.
2.2 The case study approach
By the term case study approach I mean the in-depth analysis of one object
of study, in this case, the shaping of a development programme. A case
study approach implies the examination of as broad a varety of varables
as possible. Not all dimensions and variables will prove equally relevant in
the final analysis, some will be reduced to footnotes, others will gradually
gain in importance. Such flexibility is one of the advantages of a case study
approach.
The case study approach offers considerable flexibility not only in the
identification and selection of variables, but also in the development of
ways to measure variables. I have not found many organization studies
from Botswana, which makes it very difficult to select the relevant
varables in advance. More important, the lack of such studies increases the
problems of how to measure variables. The case study approach offers a
degree of flexibility regarding these issues that is important. Variables can
be gradually identified, their nature, the relationship between them and
valid ways to measure them can be more clearly understood and developed
in due course.
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The case study approach also underlines the need to analyze the case in
a wider context. In this case, it is especially necessary to relate the policy-
making process to characteristics of the policy making organizations in
general, and to the environment, especially the target groups, donors and
the political authorities. A contextual analysis is also understood as one in
which historical development is important. The case should be seen as a
stage in a development. Not necessarly a rigid evolution, but a
development in which experience is interpreted and related to.
Case studies are of ten criticized for not being representative of any larger
population. On the other hand, norms of representativity should not be
equally rigidly understood in all cases. A case might be of outstanding
importance in itself. As a major development effort in Botswana during the
late eighties, it is the argument that ARAP is such a case, one that it is
important to have some knowledge about.
However, the case of ARAP will also, as indicated in the Introduction,
be applied for the discussion of problems that are of wider scope than
ARAP only, for instance, how ARAP was a step in the dynamic
development of agricultural policies.
Finally, the ARAP case will be used for a discussion of whether the
ruling elite model is a fruitful one for explaining public policy making in
Botswana. Such a discussion requires not that ARAP is representative for
any population of policies, but that the case is one which the ruling elite
model is supposed to explain. ARAP is such a case, as will be argued in
chapter 8.
2.3 Qualitative and quantitative data
In this study, qualitative and quantitative data are used in combination.
When done cautiously, and providing we are always aware of the
implications of the varing representativity of the different kinds of data,
this seems a fruitful approach.
The term qualitative data covers a variety of data and data collection
techniques. A clear definition of the concept is difficult to find. Grønmo
argues that in addition to the variety of techniques applied, what
characterizes qualitative data is that they are collected under conditions of
closeness to the object under study (1982: 24-25). Kirk and Miller
emphasize the interaction with people on their own turf as the critical
aspect of qualitative data (1986: 12). The ideal of closeness points to the
need to examine a phenomenon gradually over a certain time span, and to
be open for surprises. It also points to the need to understand the
underlying meaning of actions, concepts, values and relations. Qualitative
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data are therefore quite time consuming to collect, and relatively few units
can be examined.
Emphasizing the case approach as one of gradual understanding will
demand flexibility and adjustments with regard to focus as well as
reconsidering what specific data are relevant and how they can be collected.
This can more easily be done with qualitative data, as they allow more for
adjustments regarding the varables to look for and how to measure them
than quantitative data.
The term quantitative data refers to data that are collected about many
objects. The information generated about certain varables of the objects is
thus comparable and quantifiable, i.e. it can be represented in numbers.
These numbers can in turn be analyzed and pattems and tendencies can be
discovered (Hellevik 1977: 8). Quantitative data are most ofte n generated
from a representative sample of a population, or in rare cases, about a
whole universe when this is possible. This approach requires in most cases
a predetermined focus, and predetermined and precise instruments for
measurng values of selected varables. This kind of data allows
representativity, but it is not easy to make adjustments later.
The concept triangulation refers to the combination of different methods
to analyze a problem (Jick 1979). Combination of various methods here
means generating varous types and sets of data. The combination of
methods can strengthen the data from which conclusions are drawn, and it
can give a better and more detailed understanding of a problem.
Such triangulation can have several forms. It can be a combined use of
qualitative and quantitative data about the same variable. This is to some
extent done in the present analysis, as the understanding of the quantitative
data is enriched by interviews, and by the judgements made by authors of
evaluation reports and varous documents.
Also within the qualitative and quantitative analyses, triangulation is a
strategy that can reinforce the basis for conclusions. In the case of the
effects of ARAP, several sets of sample surveys can be compared and give
a stronger data basis for the discussions.
The most important combination of data, however will be the
combination of qualitative interview data and qualitative document analysis.
In the case of the analysis of the planning process, documents and
interviews of ten give only a partial picture of actions and their background.
In these cases comparisons strengthen and enriches the understanding.
Various kinds of informants, Le. with different organizational affiliation,
view things differently and should be combined, as argued above.
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Jick also refers to the use of contextual data as a kind of triangulation,
and this is not least important when the ambition is to understand ARAP
in the light of a historical development.
2.4 Process and action
The representativity problem is not the main challenge here. Rather, the
problem is to reconstruct the process in terms of paricipants, interactions
and behaviour. The approach must be gradually to identify these factors.
The problem regarding the paricipation in the process is to reconstruct
action and interaction in the planning and implementation of ARAP. Whose
paricipation to look for and in what forms cannot be decided in advance.
The examination of participation in the decision-making process, Le. action
and interaction, had as one starting point the formal structure and
formalized procedural rules for planning and implementation. A sec ond
staring point was a focus on the specialized units in the ministry whose
working tasks were probably affected by ARAP. This approach also gave
an overview over the ministries of Agriculture and Finance & Development
Planning as well.
As participants were thus gradually identified, knowledge of who they
interacted with and about what gradually facilitated the reconstruction of
the planning process.
A picture emerged of a centralized process, and thus the collection of
data about the rationale and way of thinking on which ARAP was based
could be concentrated on relatively few persons at the higher levels of the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning. The varous actors who could have been expected to paricipate
but who did not, were approached to find out why.
The data on paricipation in the decision making process are mainly
interviews with actual or potential paricipants. Some of these were
transferred to other positions, but a sufficient number of participants could
be traced again and interviewed. With only a few exceptions, they were
willing to be interviewed.
The next element in reconstructing a process, the information on what
participants meant and did, was harder to acquire and to interpret.
ARAP was at the time of this field work under heavy criticism, see for
instance NORAD's country study (Granberg and Parkinson 1988). Most
actors would only reluctantly be associated with the ARAP programme.
Besides, as the planning process had been influenced by intervention from
political leaders, and there had been diverging opinions, ARAP was a
sensitive issue for many civil servants. The triangulation thus became
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important in order to avoid these problems. Data were scattered, in the
sense that informants gave only parial information on specific issues. For
instance, the question of why the Minister of Agriculture played the role he
did, could only be answered by combining data from several sources. First,
no one had a complete and authoritative answer. Second, views of ten
differed. Third, sources of ten divulged only pars of what they knew. An
analysis of the question required the putting together of many pieces of
data. This requires a qualitative approach to get data at all, and it requires
a careful use of several sources to put things together. As a rule, no data
are used that cannot be supported by several sources.
A further triangulation was to ask for written documents in interviews.
The access to these was difficult, but quite a number of reports, memos and
the like were obtained. The use of these in combination with interviews
gives a more solid base for conclusions.
It should be emphasized that the combination of data from various
interviews and documents of ten gave different images, pointing in several
directions. In a qualitative data set, and as underlined in the theoretical
perspective, chapter 1, in what way various actors think differently about
the same problem, event or solution is of considerable interest. There is,
except for some information that consist of hard facts, no single objective
truth, but many. A main achievementwas when these could be identified.
The problems of data reliability are considerable in a case like this.
Time is a crucial issue. When asking questions about what happened
several years ago, not all selectivity is organizationally determined. Things
can be remembered wrongly because of the lapse of time, and because of
this, control questions can be important on questions about facts, for
instance, on points of time for specific actions.
When informants have interests at stake in the matter asked about, or
when they for other reasons remember things selectively, this can also
cause information to be withheld, and it can lead to after-rationalization.
Some informants are more open than others, and it is necessar to assess
this. The tone and way in which things are said can contain information,
thus substantiating the ideal of closeness in qualitative research. Closeness
is difficult to achieve, especially when studying civil servants, but the
personaL, open interview techniques applied here (see Appendix 1)
nevertheless resulted in closer interaction than quantitative research could
achieve.
The principal solutions to these problems are first, a flexible approach
whereby data are continuously interpreted and compared, and secondly,
what is here labelled triangulation.
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It is also important to understand the character of interaction. What is
interaction about, how is it initiated, who dominates and why? There is a
risk that asking civil servants about interactive pattems will yield normative
answers. A qualitative approach is better suited to assess the difference
between norms and reality. Interactions can be viewed differently by
different actors. What the Ministry of Finance regards as problem-free
coordination of line ministries, (see 6.4), can be seen by any of these as
problematic interference in its business. These differences are important to
detect, and qualitative data are suitable for that purse.
2.5 Problem structures and models of action
One of the independent variables in this study comprises the characteristics
of the actors in the political-administrative system, which influence their
actual behaviour. These are conceptualized as problem structure and models
of action. Contrasted to the process of planning ARAP, this type of
variables refers to the characteristics of the administrative organizations and
political authorities in general, as well as variations within these. One might
argue, then, that all civil servants and politicians should be interviewed and
a representative survey measuring these factors made.
Apart from the practical problems involved, it should be noted that
typical attitudes in an organization do not necessarly correspond exactly to
the critical problem structures and models of action. We are primarily
interested . in the problem structures and models of actions of those who
make decisions and influence actual policy. For this, and for practical
reasons, interview data on these issues are based on a limited number of
civil servants, 8 persons in 14 interviews. This includes civil servants
involved in the case of ARAP, and it involves 2-3 more that obviously are
of ten influential even if they were not active participants in the case of
ARAP. Even if centralization varies somewhat from case to case, MOA is
obviously a very centralized ministry, and successfully identifying key
elements of the problem structures and models of actions held by these key
individuals made a quite strong data base.
The study of problem structures means mapping perceptions of problems,
goals and solutions. Of ten these perceptions are expressed in core concepts:
for example, the concepts of social justice, self-sufficiency, risk-avoiding
farmers and the like. The identification of key elements of models of
actions and problem structures focused on how values and concepts like
these were operationalized and understood. The key concepts in public
documents and in the informants' vocabulary proved to be good starting
points for the collection of problem structure data in interviews.
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The data used are a combination of qualitative interviews and document
analysis. The documents consist of various major policy documents, the
National Development Plans and various reports. Naturally, when
examining the historical roots of present ways of thinking, the documents
will be a more important source. On some points, literature could help here
(Picard 1987; Veenendaal and Nolefi year unknown; Purcell 1982).
Documents.4 Documents are usually secondar data; they are
representations of ideas and meanings, they are representations of what has
be en done, and they represent evaluations and judgements. Documents are
written for specific puroses and reflect the perspectives of those who write
them; they are thus a reflection of the varous problem structures and
interests that can be found in the political and administrative system of
Botswana. However, being only reflections, they cannot be read as explicit
and concise expressions of opinions and values. They tend to underplay
conflicts and problems and they are of ten quite normative.
The documents used for this analysis are vared. They include relatively
general policy documents, such as the National Food Strategy, a policy
document on Economic Opportunities, and National Development Plans. I
have also acquired some printed speeches, for instance the Minister of
Agriculture' s presentation of ARA P to the National Assembly. Furthermore,
documents describing specific projects and programmes have be en used,
project memos, evaluation reports and National Development Plan
descriptions of projects. Implementing units report routinely on the progress
of programmes, and some of these reports have be en available. In most
cases, it is known who has written the documents, at least which
organizational unit the author belongs to.
2.6 Organization structure
The formal structure is a point of deparure. In varous reports and in NDPs
the formal hierarchy and specialized tasks are outlined briefly. However, it
is important to know in more detail what these units are actually doing, to
whom they relate and what their actual tasks are - this concerns both
ministerial headquarers and the Field Service at various leveis.
As regards MOA headquarers, interviews are an important source. In
total, 20 MOA civil servants were interviewed, some of them several times.
4 All documents I got hold of were written in English, and as I do not have any
knowledge of Setswana, this was an advantage.
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All of them were asked to define their task, what they did in order to fulfil
their task, whom they cooperated with and about what. This gradually
formed a quite broad knowledge of the MOA's working system related to
crops especially, but also personnei working on livestock and environmental
issues were included.
The Field Service is large and geographically spre ad and could not be
covered in the same way. However, a surey of some aspects of the field
staff's tasks and situation was presented in Eskeli (1989). The main source
in addition to Eskeli's report comprised statistics and reporting of what the
personnei did and what problems they had, etc.
Varous data sources are drawn upon, mainly documents. National
Development Plans and evaluations of programmes durng the last 20 years
will give insights into tasks and the ability of the Field Service to fulfil
them. In addition, annual reports have been available, presenting a review
of the Deparment of Agricultural Field Services and the Division of Crop
Production and their activities for one year. Unfortunately, these reports are
not produced regularly.
2.7 The implementation of ARP
When it comes to the actual operation of the transactions between clientele
and the implementing Field Service in the case of ARAP, the data basis is
quite good. Farmers' knowledge of and interests in ARAP can be examined
and the problems of implementation can be analyzed quite deeply. Like
most implementing agencies, also the Field Service implementing ARAP
reported each month to the ARAP coordinator in the Department of
Agricultural Field Services, MOA headquarters, Gaborone. These reports
are processed and commented upon by the ARAP coordinator. These
reports have been available, and they give quite good data.
These data sources are us ed in combination with documents and
interviews, especially interviews with civil servants working in the
Deparment of Agricultural Field Services. The documents include first,
annual reports on ARAP prepared by the ARAP coordinator, and second,
evaluations. of ARAP. The Ministry of Agriculture had an evaluation
carred out by a consultant in 1988 focusing on environment al effects of the
destumping component. This report also includes a survey of field staff
problems. The Ministry of Agriculture also had three smaller evaluations
cared out in 1986/87. They were made by MOA personneI. An executive
summar was made of these three. A study was also commissioned by
NORAD when NORAD assessed the programme to decide whether it
should be supported. The team NORAD engaged was led by G.Øygard. The
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guidelines for ARAP, prescribing the procedures to follow and the tasks of
the field personnei were also important data. These data were understood
better after interviews, but a shortcoming is the lack of interviews with
field service personnei on the regional, district and locallevel which could
have improved understanding of varous issues, by enriching the
interpretation of the statistical materiaL.
As is of ten the case in African countries, statistics are generally not of
very high precision. But the ARAP coordinator' s statistics give major
trends and patterns. Eskeli's report is based on a representative and
stratified sample both in terms of socio-economic indicators, gender and in
terms of location in Botswana. The evaluation reports carried out by MOA
personnei seem to be based on somewhat more arbitrar, and smaller
samples. To some extent, I have attempted to use the evaluations in
combination. The MOA evaluations cover all ARAP components, but with
a low representativity. To some extent the improved representativity of the
Eskeli report can be used as a cross-check. The largest problem of the
ARAP Coordinator' s statistics is that these operate with too wide categories
of farmers. A more accurate categorization of beneficiaries on socio-
economic dimensions would have improved the analysis. The consultancy
report data are broken down like that, and so are those of the three MOA
evaluations.
These data have to be used with caution, and only to analyze major
trends. The detailed comparison of numbers is problematic with the
available materiaL. Still, it enabled me to analyze major implementation
issues, and the statistics available are quite good, compared to the problems
experienced in countries with a less efficient administration than
Botswana's.
24
3. The political and socio-economic context
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, some crucial aspects of the political and economic
development of Botswana will be outlined. Emphasis will be put on a
description of the rual economy and the importance of agriculture in it.
Furhermore, it is important to examine the historical roots of the rual
economy. This background chapter is necessary first to understand the
problems that agriculture and thus agricultural policies encountered, and
second, to understand what interests were affected by ARAP.
3.2 Resources for agriculture
Even if Botswana has a large territory and a small population, resources for
agriculture are not abundant. Large parts of this semi -arid country are not
suited for agricultural production at alL. Some areas are suited for pastoral
production, if water can be supplied. And some tracts of land, especially in
the eastem part of the country, can be utilized for crop production (Arntzen
and Veenendaal 1986).
The country is best suited for cattle production (Isaksen 1984).
Botswana' s only comparative advantage in agriculture is large grazing
areas. The national herd of cattle counted 3 million animals in 1984. Beef
and hides count for 20 % of exports, and the sector, including the abbatoirs
in 1984 counted for 20 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (Isaksen 1984).
The introduction of borehole technology early in this century facilitated
access to new grazing areas for herds of cattle, and the cattle industry has
expanded steadily for several decades, with some set-backs from prolonged
droughts.
Even in areas where crop production is widespread, the land is not
particularly well suited for crops. The soils are not very fertile, lacking
minerals, and rain is ofte n inadequate. Arable agriculture is mainly rainfed
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agriculture, with some smaller areas where irrigated agriculture is
possible.5
The low rainfall is a basic problem and makes crop production in
particular risky. On average, annual rainfall vares between 350 and 650
mm (Cook 1978). Rainfall is not only low, it is also unstable. Rain may
come in one area and not in another. Furhermore, rain is needed first for
ploughing and then throughout the growth period. If the rain is not
distributed over the season the harest will be lost. Low rainfall is a
problem also for cattle. But the preservation of grazing land is not as
dependent on the distribution of rain throughout the year as the arable fields
are (Vierich and Shepperd 1980). Only when a long lasting drought comes
do grazing lands deteriorate so much that losses of cattle increase. Thus,
livestock production is more robust than arable production.
In the traditional agriculture, land is communal. Arable land is allocated
to the farming household by the Land Boards. There are also communal
grazing lands which all farmers can use. After the Tribal Grazing Land
reform (TGLP), however, large tracts of grazing lands have been leased to
wealthy cattle owners, giving this group an exclusive right to the use of
these areas.
Under customar law, any tribe member had the right to land and this is
still the rule. As noted, resources for agriculture are not abundant, and there
are few reserves left for increasing the area for agricultural puroses. As
experienced under the land reforms of the seventies, there are no reserve
grazing areas (Parson 1981). As regards grazing land, this resource is
scarce, and overexploited (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986).
The situation is somewhat different for arable land. New land is
increasingly allocated in the grazing areas. As long as this possibility exists,
there will be no acute shortage of arable land (Arntzen and Veenendaal
1986). But land in the grazing areas is of ten less suited. There are of ten
higher costs to cultivate it due to transport, fencing and distance to welfare
service centres in the cases where people move to be near their fields. Even
if the grazing land thus cultivated is a relatively small portion of the total
grazing area, it is taken from grazing lands under pressure. Moreover, it
might well be that the grazing area thus cultivated is more valuable as
grazing land than the areas still open for grazing. Still, Arntzen argues that
in 20 years, arable expansion has taken over only 3 per cent of the total
grazing area in the Kgatleng district (Arntzen 1980).
5 The potential for irrgated agriculture is limited, among other factors due to limited water
resources and the huge capital requirements involved.
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Ecological pressure and degradation are mainly a problem related to
overgrazing. The national herd is growing, new and more vulnerable areas
have been opened up for grazing as a result of borehole technology.
Especially in the eastern pars of Botswana, grazing land resources are too
heavily exploited (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986). Ecological problems are
also related to land management and land tenure. Not owning the grazing
lands, farers have no individual responsibility for the management of it,
and economic needs cause farers to over-exploit grazing land resources.
Some would argue that if farers owned their land, they would manage
resources better. However, the grazing areas leased by the large cattle
owners, and thus disposed of by one farmer only, are also of ten poorly
managed.
Near larger settlements in particular, ecological problems apar from
overgrazing are increasing. Pressure on wood resources is too strong, both
because wood is used for energy puroses, and because new land is cleared
for arable farming. Arable land is also increasingly located further west, in
more vulnerable areas where removal of vegetation makes these new fields
vulnerable to erosion. Local reports indicate erosion as an increasing
problem (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986). Another ecological problem is
related to traditional methods in arable agriculture. These are adapted to a
situation where large amounts of land of relatively low quality were
available. Thus, fields could be abandoned after a period and a new field
allocated. But this system of land use has gradually been undermined.
Because of population increases, arable land is no longer easily available
near the villages. New fields are allocated in the grazing areas with the
disadvantages this entails. Therefore, especially the poor farmers keep their
fields longer. Erosion and exhaustion of soils are increasingly becoming a
problem in arable agriculture.
3.3 Historical developments
The Tswana tribes became linked to the monetar economy of the
Europeans relatively early, through trade and later through migrant labour
and sale of cattle. Gradually the autonomous tribal economies became
linked to the South African economy as a labour reserve, leaving the rural
areas in stagnation. These processes can be traced back to the period before
the British established the Protectorate, but they were accelerated by formal
colonialization.
Independence has brought impressive changes in many fields, but the
rual sector has not benefited very much from modernization. Even if there
have been processes of basic change, there are also stfong elements of
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continuity when it comes to structures of political and economic power. A
general tendency is that political and economic elites have become delinked
from the ordinar citizens in the rual are as , who are left behind in
dependence and powerlessness.
3.3.1 Pre-colonial Tswana society
The present day inhabitants of Botswana make up only a minority of the
Tswana population in Southem Africa, the majority lives in the Republic
of South Africa. Previously, also the tribes now residing in Botswana lived
there, but for centures they were pressed back, and steadily closer to the
marginal lands on the fringe of the Kalahari desert. First the Boers, and
later the British caused this pressure.
In pre-colonial Tswana societies, the economic basis was a diversified
one. Control of economic resources was centralized in the hands of the
chief and the nobility, but made available to all by systems of exchange
and dependence (Duggan 1983).
As regards agriculture, agro-pastoralism was the dominant mode of
production. Cattle had a number of functions economically, socially,
politically and culturally. The elites, I.e. the chief and the royal clan, owned
most of the cattle. Cattle was made available to those who did not have any
through informal exchange systems, for instance the Mafisa system. Under
this system, cattle owners lent cattle to those who had only a few or none.
The cattle was at the borrower' s disposal, and he could use them for milk
supplies, or as draft power (Gulbrandsen 1980: 163). This system provided
people with cattle, and the elites used this system to build and maintain
support among their followers.
The economy was based on abundance of land for hunting, grazing and
crop production. The tribes were mobile and moved within larger areas.
Larger projects, like clearance of land, were done at the chief's orders by
age-regiments. These regiments also had important functions in warare and
hunting. Hunting played an important role, both for the tribes' own needs,
and it provided commodities for trade. The Tswana tribes also traded crafts
and products produced in the tribe (Tlou and Campbell 1984).
Through trade, the tribes' relationships with the outside world were early
monetarzed. Trade was controlled by the chief and the royal clan. Hems
bought were luxury items, tools, guns and grains. But the relationships
within the tribe remained un-monetarzed. Exchange of resources was more
flexible this way. Rich and poor were linked together in networks of trust,
favours to be received or given as compensation for other favours (Duggan
1983). The common people depended on the elites for resources, notably
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cattle. but the elite also depended on the common people. The latter
provided labour for tending cattle, cultivation and elearng of land, for
hunting and warare. This was labour for which the economic elites
depended. The economic structure is described by Duggan as one of mutual
dependence, organized in informal exchange systems.
The economy was thus quite diversified. Hs structure was built on
concentration of resources in the hands of the chief and the royal elan, and
resources were made available for the tribal followers. In times of crisis the
reserves controlled by the chief made him able to support the commoners,
for instance by buying food.
In pre-colonial Botswana, people were organized in large, centralized and
autonomous tribal societies. The centre in such chiefdoms was a major
village, with as many as 10 000 inhabitants. This was the seat of the chief.
Smaller villages and even smaller settlements in the kingdom were led by
local headmen who were loyal to the chief. The political control in these
societies was in the hands of the chief and the royal clan, and the core of
political control was to secure the loyalty of headmen at lower levels -
that is the loyalty of all sections of the elite, and through them, the loyalty
of the commoners. The basis for this power was diversified. The chiefs'
political control rested to a large ex tent on the control of land, cattle and
trade (Gulbrandsen, lecture 1989; Tlou and Campbell 1984). The resources
at the chiefs' disposal, notably cattle were used to build patron-client
relationships. Notables on lower levels had the chiefs' cattle at their
disposal in retur for politicalloyalty and they secured the chief control
over local communities in his kingdom. Moreover, the reserves generated
through trade and cattle also made the chief able to support his commoners
when needs appeared and thus loyalty could be ensured.
The chief was chief by inheritance. In some cases chiefs were removed
by rivalling clans and the new chief could redefine ancestral lines to suit
the new rule (Gulbrandsen, lecture 1989). The strong material basis of the
chief was linked to responsibilities for his commoners in times of crisis, i.e.
war, droughts. Ignoring these responsibilities could in some cases
undermine the chiefs' legitimacy. Political power was justified in religious
terms, and the traditional authority of these elite clans has remained strong
until the present day.
The common people in the tribal societies had some countervailing power
to use against their leadership in the kgotla institution. This was ameeting
place for the tribe, where decisions were made based on consensus. That
is, the chief made the final decision but it was his duty to listen to what his
followers' opinions were. In addition to its function as an arena where the
chief could con sult his people, the kgotla was also the judicial institution.
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All free men of the tribe had access to the kgotla meetings. The chief
probably dominated the decision-making in the kgotla, since the headmen
leading the varous sections of the tribe were dependent on the chief and
secured the support of the tribe, but they were also powerful advisors to the
chief. A chief who did not adjust to advice could, in extreme cases, be
removed. In other cases, opposing fractions left the tribe to form their own
or to be taken into another tribe.
Important aspects of the Tswana traditions are concentration of both
political and economic power, but within both spheres there were strong
elements of mutual dependence between elite and followers.
3.3.2 Colonialization
As indicated, the Boers of South Africa came into contact with the Tswana
tribes as they trekked to the north and east, and this together with trade
routes crossing Tswana land meant that the Tswana tribes were linked to
the European economy to some extent before the protectorate was
established.
The British colonialization was not a result of British interest in
Bechuanaland itself. 6 Rather, it was a necessar step for securing South
Africa and its links to the north. The Germans pressed on from Namibia,
and to the East, the Portuguese were expanding too towards the interior,
threatening to close the road to the North from South Africa. The motives
for the colonization were thus not any interest in the Protectorate' s
resources. Bechuanaland was therefore not developed as a separate
economic entity.
When the British established the protectorate in 1885, much of the
powers of the traditional elites were left intact, and they became the link
between the colonial administration and Tswana society (Gunderson 1970).
The British protectorate administration in Mafeking was quite small and the
tribal chiefs became the lower level in the administration. This contributed
on one hand to give the chief a more independent position vis a vis the
common people, and he could no longer be removed by his tribe. In cases
of conflict the chiefs of ten had British backing. Furhermore, the chiefs also
received payments as administrators of the protectorate administration. The
chiefs got a small salared administration of clerks and assistants, in the
tribal administration. On the other hand the British gradually reduced the
chiefs' powers, for instance their judiciar powers, and thus weakened their
6 The protectorate that later became Botswana was named Bechuanaland by the British.
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role. The British also put the chiefs in a difficult position when unpopular
decisions were implemented through them, for instance taxation. The chiefs
remained the central power-holders in the districts, but constrained by the
British. Gunderson describes this system as a-political; the chiefs and the
nobility gradually ceased to be decision makers, and became constrained
administrators under British control (1970).
The lack of British interest in developing the terrtory meant that no new
economically strong groups developed. In contras t to many other British
colonies, there was no modem group of entrepreneurs such as plantation
owners, mining entrepreneurs or large export cash crops producers, de-
linked from the traditional economy in Botswana at independence. The
policy of the British regarding economic and social development was one
of neglect. Infrastructure and welfare services were largely ignored. Some
very modest agricultural extension efforts were started, and the cattle
owners were assisted with veterinar services, breeding programmes and at
a late stage with an abattoir that was established in the protectorate (Tlou
and Campbell 1984: 188-191).
The cattle owning elites became involved in commerce relatively early,
as they became linked to the South African economy as producers of beef.
They were also able to utilize borehole technology, and the British started
early to provide services for cattle production (Parson 1981). As the large
cattle owners became sellers in a cash economy, they gradually de-linked
from the traditional non-monetary system of exchange, and became more
economically independent. Resources previously accessible for all based on
Mafisa and other exchange networks became increasingly scarce (Duggan
1983). The chiefs and the rural elites in general became sellers of cattle in
a cash economy. Parallei to their ìncreasing political independence outlined
above, there was a growing independence relative to the peasants also in
economic terms.
An important consequence of Britain's establishing the protectorate was
the development of Botswana into a labour reserve for the South African
economy (Cownie 1984). The notion of a labour reserve refers to a pool of
labour that can be activated to the extent needed from time to time. It is a
reserve in the sense that it has an independent reproductive base and thus
does not have to be employed permanently. This reproductive base also had
the function of keeping wages at a low leve L. Colonial policies were to a
large extent geared towards necessitating labour migration from
Bechuanaland to South Africa, while maintaining the reproductive base in
the rual Bechuanaland. Several features of colonial policies contributed to
this development.
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* Tswana tribes were pushed back from the relatively better areas for crop
production. First by the Boers and later both by British settler policy and
expropriation of land. The best arable land was expropriated by the
British to the railway company, and for white settler farers. The
pressure into more marginal areas thus went on over a long time.
* Taxes were introduced for every household, creating a need for cash.
This could mainly be met through migrant labour. Other cash generating
activities, notably trade, were regulated so as to keep the Africans out of
it. Local trade was further undermined by competition from imported
products. Wildlife based commodities became the Africans' main
commodity. And as pressure on wild life increased, the resource basis for
this trade was reduced. This left the Africans with two main options for
acquiring cash: selling cattle and migrant labour.
* The chiefs maintained their position, as noted above. They also had
important functions in the labour reserve structure as they acted as
mobilization agents, recruiting workers in their tribe for the mines. As
such, and as paid tax collectors, they also made profit for themselves.
In traditional society, crop production was one component in a multi-
activity strategy. The result of the colonial impact was that crops became
one component in a multi-activity strategy composed in another way. The
male labour withdrew from the activities of livestock, hunting and
gathering, crafts and trade. Instead, they became wage earners in South
Africa. Only the wealthiest citizens stayed with their families, having an
economic basis in cattle. Later, when formal employment in Botswana
became an option, it was the members of the wealthiest households that got
these jobs. The reason was that they could afford the necessar education.
For most households, the male head worked seasonally as a migrant
labourer, and provided some needed cash. The payments were low, and
employment unstable, thus his family had to remain in the rural districts
and cultivate food for the household s subsistence needs. If the household
had some cattle this would strengthen the household ' s economic basis but
only a very small portion had sufficient numbers of cattle to rely on this
means of livelihood. Furthermore, the capacity to invest in small herds of
cattle, which also facilitated crop production, depended on cash incomes.
Arable agriculture was left to women and children. The availability of
labour for the farm was thus limited, keeping arable production marginaL.
Male labour for crops was, and still is, mainly ploughing and clearing of
land (destumping) (NORAD 1989: 7). For the household, it was more
rational that the male labour took employment elsewhere, because this was
less risky and more profitable than crop farming.
32
It should be noted that these developments are complex, and that, for
instance, cultural preferences also contributed to this development. The
central point is that arable production was not a main activity for any
household, its function was to provide the household with food for
subsistence. The labour of women and children, with minimum levels of
investments in implements and other inputs, did not give a higher output
to provide any surplus. This minimum arable faring in combination with
some cattle, crafts and migrant labour made up a combined strategy for
surivaL.7
The main problem which gradually made this a strategy of poverty for
many households, was the increasing lack of components in the strategy
that could be combined with crops. Employment in South Africa has never
been a secure income source for all Batswana, and gradually the proportion
of the male labour force working in South Africa has been reduced while
the development of alternative jobs has not kept up with needs. Cattle have
never been equally distributed, and many Batswana owned no cattle. As the
cattle owners gradually delinked from the traditional economy, cattle could
not as easily as before be disposed of by other means than ownership. The
households without cattle and without wage labour entered into a vicious
circle of poverty. Crops dep ende d on other sources of income, in paricular
livestock. Thus, for those left with only crops, it became extremely difficult
to produce. As commercialization of livestock developed, exchange systems
deteriorated and cattle became less available for the majority of farers.
Without cattle as draftpower, crop production became very difficult.
The poverty problems and the stagnation of arable farming in Botswana
as outline d here are still some of the basic problems in Botswana
agriculture. An additional problem when compared to pre-colonial times
was that the Tswana tribes were now pressed back into the fringes of the
Kalahari, areas in which arable farming was increasingly costly and risky.
Family labour was increasingly insufficient in order to produce, also draft
power and ploughs were needed, due to lower yields per hectare.
At independence, Botswana's economy was above all a rual economy.
The rural economy was characterized by a small minority of large cattle
holders partly engaged in commerce with cattle, and by a majority of rual
7 In the 19th century, the plough was brought to Botswana by the Europeans. Arable
production in Botswana had always required large fields, and even more so as the tribes
were pressed into more marginal areas for crop production. Thus, the p10ugh freed
labour and provided draft power. This might have contributed to the increase in migrant
labour.
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dwellers marginalized within agriculture. Those relatively best off among
these could supplement their incomes with migrant labour and some cattle.
3.4 Independence
Britain granted independence in 1966. Crucial for the understanding of
Botswana' s development is the fact that there was no real nationalist
liberation movement in Botswana. Few really believed that a viable state
could be based on the Bechuanaland protectorate for a long time to come.
The BDP leadership which took over power when the British withdrew had
not fought for the state they received political responsibility for.
3.4.1 The post colonial regime
Gunderson (1970) describes the BDP regime as a group of young men,
originating from among the wealthy cattle owners (1970: 334-336). They
had received education, and they worked at lower levels in the colonial
administration. They had advanced as far as Africans could in the colonial
socialorder. At independence, they assumed control of the state and thus
they got an independent power base. They became the national power elite.
They did not represent any social movement or broad group. Gunderson
treats them as a quite autonomous group, and not as the mere
representatives of the cattle owning traditional elite from which they
originated. There was no liberation movement, and according to Gunderson
even the later BDP leader had doubts conceming whether independence
was realistic only a few years before it was actually granted. The absence
of a mobilized rank and file, and of significant mobilization at all, is a
phenomenon that has remained. One might expect that this would give the
new regime considerable freedom to develop a political programme of their
choice.
However, not representing a genuine political movement, they had very
few impulses and grievances upon which to form a political and economic
project or platform. They had for their own part distinct economic interests
related to employment in government positions and cattle investments, but
that does not make a political project, at least not one of social change and
transformation. The contrast to other African countries is striking. The BDP
did not have any real political project, except for taking over the state that
had been established upon the British withdrawal (Polhemus 1983).
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When Botswana became independent, the new men in control of BDP
took over power as they had won an election a year earlier (Picard 1987).
One important reason why this party became the strongest was active
British support given to it (Gunderson 1970). But the very basis for this
electoral success, that has been repeated in subsequent elections, was the
electoral mobilization of a conglomerate of interests. First, the rual
majority. A key resource for the BDP in mobilizing them was its leader
Seretse Khama' s appeal as de facto chief for the largest Tswana tribe. The
traditional rural elites were partly for the same reason mobilized in support
of BDP. Equally important, the chiefs came to regard the BDP as having
a more favourable attitude to their own position than the Botswana People's
Par, BPP (Gunderson 1970: 345). Only later did some opposition re-
appear among the chiefs. An opposition that was in most cases co-opted or
controlled. Furthermore, fearng the more radical BPP ideas on racial issues,
the white community also supported BDP. This community was small, but
influential. Notable in this group were the leaders of the governmental
administration. The protectorate administration was led by expatriates, and
supporting BDP was also career maximizing, in addition to the promising
prospects of BDP' s moderate profile on development strategy - or more
precisely, BDP's lack of a new programme for economic transformation
that could compete with ideas and strategies held by the administration.
Support from the financial and organizational resources of the
administration gave BDP a decisive advantage in securing support in the
electorate.
It can be said, roughly, that BDP has gradually come to mobilize support
on both its traditional appeal and on a more modem appeal, i.e. delivering
goods and services in exchange for votes. However, these two forms of
securng political support from the commoners are not easy to distinguish.
Traditional Tswana culture sees support for the political leadership as
something which is conditioned by the politicalleaders' willingness to take
on the responsibility for the welfare of their followers. Still, BDP did, in
the Bamangwato tribal areas especially, mobilize people by asking for their
loyalty to the rightful heir to the tribe's chieftainship, who happened to be
Khama. In the remaining tribes, however, BDP's appeal is more to argue
that tribal discrimination will not occur under BDP. In fact, BDP has been
so eager to make sure that no tribes are favoured, that inefficient resource
allocation has sometimes resulted.
The skilful mobilization of various groups by different appeals is
important to understand the relatively stable support for BDP. The white
community, whose members were important as long as they controlled the
bureaucracy, was mobilized on a policy of continuity and moderate policies,
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especially on racial issues. The core of the bureaucracy's support for BDP
was that they in re turn kept the responsibility for development strategies
and modernization, and that africanisation proceeded slowly.
One reason for BDP's ability to maintain the support from a majority in
the electorate is the inadequacy of the alternatives for political mobilization
and ariculation. The other political parties are hardly developed as
organizations, and in elections, these paries are weakly organized
especially in the rual areas. Many candidates for parliament are relatively
wealthy and to a large extent they organize and finance their campaigns
themselves; these wealthy candidates are usually BDP candidates.
The absence of real competition to BDP is explained not only by the
opposition paries' limited organization and resources, but also by their
inability . to develop an elaborated alternative political platform.
Nengwehkulu argues that opposition parties do not challenge the existing
political and social order, but mere ly attempt to replace the elite persons in
power positions (Nengwehkulu, unpublished). Botswana National Front
(BNF) has gradually become the most important opposition party, trying to
develop a profil e of more equal distribution of resources. But even if BNF
was strengthened by a chief in 1969, BDP managed to strengthen its
position in the 1974 general elections. The BDP has its stronghold in the
rural areas whereas the BNF has be en more competitive in the urban areas,
making the rural electorate even more important for the BDP.
Traditional institutions, like the kgotla and the headmen, have a potential
as channels for popular political articulation, but they remain local in scope.
Govemmental representatives meet people in kgotla meetings where
opinions might be voiced. However, as the example of TGLP (Tribal
Grazing Land Policy)8 shows, the kgotla institution is not necessarily used
for hearing opinions (Picard 1987). Rather, it is an administrative tool for
the government, enabling it to inform and mobilize people, rather than to
listen. Other political institutions at the local level, like Village
Development Committees, have problems mobilizing people. There are few
if any mass mobilizing, extra-party organizations.
A basic political problem for the new regime after independence was
how to handle the potentially competitive power of the chiefs. The strategy
towards them was partly to reduce their power, parly to give economic
compensation in retum for loyalty and to coopt them into the modern state
system. The power of the chiefs was gradually built down as Land Boards
8 TGLP was a land reform launched in 1975. It was a very controversial one, and a
massive information campaign was launched, utilzing also the kgotla. However, it was
not really an attempt to open a debate. It was more a propaganda exercise.
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took over land allocation responsibilities. Further, the tradition that stray
cattle was the chiefs' property also ceased. A district administration was
established, and gradually it took over responsibilities from the chiefly
controlled tribal administration. A House of Chiefs was established in
which the chiefs have an advisory role only.
The economic compensation given to the traditional elites has mainly
been support to their interests as cattle owners. They have kept their large
share of the national herd, they have been decisively favoured by the TGLP
land reform, there is hardly any taxation on cattle and govemmental
services for cattle owners have been furher developed.
In short, the BDP's electoral strength has never been seriously
challenged. But it has also been carefully guarded.
3.4.2 The role of the bureaucracy
BDP's abstention from administrative reform and radical Africanisation,
from radical policy changes aiming at social transformation and from
experiments with the social order is explained, then, by the support from
and dependence on the Westemized and politically moderate civil service,
especially its higher leveIs, long dominated by expatriates. More recently,
the civil service has gradually become africanised, even if there are still a
significant number of expatriates. But the effect of recruiting Africans,
educated in the West, living in the Westernized capital and recruited and
socialized into a bureaucracy with exactly the values of moderate
modemization measures and Western values is not necessarily that marked.
The conservatism of bureaucracy and the institutionalization of values will
probably reduce the effects of Africanisation on norms and values in the
civil service. Thus, even if the expatriates no longer control the civil
service, the expatriates' problem structures and models of action have
remained quite stable.
Administrative continuity is one important reason why the administration
has maintained a relatively high standard. Corrption and mismanagement
are not as serious problems in Botswana as in ffany other African
countries. The administration has expanded. Both at the district level and
at the central level the number of administrative units has increased and so
has the number of governmental employees. In 1968, central and local
government employed 6975 persons, in 1980, 23 5009 (Peat 1984: 193).
9 These numbers do not inc1ude employment in education and community and social
services, which increased from approximately 2 600 in the early sixties to approximately
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The administration has also grown more complex with an increasing
number of specialized units, as demonstrated in our analysis of MOA's
planning of ARAP.
Financial conservatism is still a characteristic of budgetar policies.
During the years following independence govemmental revenues were still
very small and British financial assistance was necessary to balance the
budget. Later mineral revenues increased decisively but this has not led to
uncontrolled expenditure. Botswana is now in a good financial position.
One MFD P (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning) civil servant
expressed the view that financing programmes is not the largest problem
any more. Rather, the problem is the lack of implementation capacity.
MFDP has been frequently criticized for the strict principle of keeping
expenditure low and allowing exchange reserves to build up. However these
reserves give Botswana a freedom of action which is important, especially
when faced with market fluctuations for minerals, notably diamonds.
The administration is structured with the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning as the highest ranking ministry . It is referred to as
the senior ministry, with a coordinating responsibility and control of
government al expenditure and planning. The other ministries are of ten
referred to as line ministries. All their projects and investments have to be
accepted by MFDP. Normally, this is done as par of the planning process
of the National Development Plans (NDPs). The district administration is
under the supervision of Ministry of Local Government and Lands
(MLGL).
Detailed data are not available on the varous professions in the
administration. But an outstanding feature is the dominance of economist.
In every ministry there is a planning unit that coordinates and controls all
the ministry's projects. These planning units in most cases consist of
economists in positions as Planning Officers. They are hired and trained by
the MFDP, which regulates promotions too. MFDP determines working
procedures and professional standards for Planning Officers in voluminous
manuals. Planning Officers from all ministries meet regularly for
conferences, as the planning cadres. It is likely that this corps of economists
under the control of MFDP greatly strengthens MFDP's controlover
policies. It secures the prominence of MFDP premises and objectives at the
early stages of project planning. MOA is an exception as their Planning
Officers are outside this system. MFDP's control in agricultural policies
might thus be more fragile.
10 000 in 1980 (Peat 1984; 193).
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MFDP coordinates the planning system. Every fifth year a plan for
investments is made, and a mid-term review of the plan is undertaken.
MFDP gives both a financial framework for the line ministries and policy
guidelines for the forthcoming plan periode Line ministries make proposals
for projects in their sector for the plan period and present them to MFDP.
All projects in the plan have to be accepted by MFDP, and this is the
power that makes the MFDP coordinating efforts real. Thus, the NDP
presents all projects to be implemented in the period and how they are
related to policy objectives. The appraisals of projects made in MFDP
include many aspects - for instance how they fit policy guidelines, how
viable they are and whether they are financially sound. The effectiveness
of MFDP' s control through NDP is more difficult to assess. But for the line
ministries, acceptance for a project in the plan, or inclusion of extra
projects during the plan period is in most cases necessar in order to get
projects funded and implemented.
3.5 Post-colonial development strategy
When the BDP regime established itself, it did not have a well developed
political platform and it did not impose drastic policy reforms of any kind.
It was left to the administrative leadership not only to design specific policy
means, but also to develop a modernization strategy and the policy
objectives to fulfil this overall strategy. This was done in away
characterized by Gunderson (1970) as a continuation of the colonial policy,
a policy that maintained the stratification of society, leaving the poor rural
majority outside the developmental process. Here some general aspects of
post-colonial policy will be outlined,while a more detailed examination of
agricultural policy will be presented in chapter 4.
The Govemment's direct engagement in productive activities has been
low, the policy has been to improve services and infrastructure and to
encourage private enterprise. Both Socialism and Marism have be en
explicitly turned down as ideological guidelines (Polhemus 1983). In the
policy paper "National Policy On Economic Opportunities" (GOB 1982)
approved by the National Assembly, it is stressed that good results have
been achieved in developing infrastructure and social services, and that
within this framework, people themselves must be responsible for the
utilization of available resources to improve their living conditions. The
Government' s role is defined as one of giving "support to the private
sector" (GOB 1982: 6).
The emphasis placed on planning in the govemmental sector do not
imply a direct government engagement in the development of the
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production, but are limited to the planning of government' suse of
resources. Private enterprise is encouraged, and the state has not tried any
active, govemmental industrialization. Likewise, parastatals play a relatively
minor role. The principle underlying this restricted governmental role in the
development process is a belief in the market forces and in private
initiative. This, it is anticipated, will lead to the diversifying and further
growth of the economy. The government's task is to provide infrastructure
in a wide sense for private enterprise. This careful attitude to public
responsibility and public spending is commonly known as financial
conservatism in Botswana. One of its roots many argue, is the rather
extreme policy of Protectorate self-financing, maintained by the British
colonizers for many years. In a poor protectorate this led to rather careful
attitudes on public spending, attitudes that change only slowly.
At independence, Botswana was dependent on British grants to balance
its very limited budget. The later strength of public finances is mainly
based on mineral revenues. The potential for mineral exploitation required
heavy investment in infrastructure, and the Government took on heavy
costs, which left other sectors largely unattended to. This was justified by
the potential for later investments if the mineral sector could be developed
quickly and provide public revenue.
As public finances improved in the late seventies and eighties, based on
mineral revenues and beef export from large scale cattle industry, the
strategy for development was to invest in infrastructure, communication,
education, and health services reaching also the poor. The progress made
in these areas has been impressive, but development programmes have been
cared out carefully, the Government always taking care not to overextend
its obligations.
Even if public finances are strong, and welfare infrastructure relatively
well developed, the poverty problems have remained severe. Employment
for an increasing work force is a major problem, and in the latest NDPs,
stronger emphasis is laid on the development of productive activity
signalling a more active public policy towards this goal. The objective is
embedded in the concept of economic diversification. And some modem
sectors have expanded, especially construction and retail trade, but when
considering the magnitude of the poverty problems, the diversification is
simply not sufficient.
This is not to argue that a policy could realistically be conceived of that
would remove poverty problems quickly. But it remains a fact that it is
rather unclear how the rual poor in the rural areas can be employed outside
agriculture. Industrialization is a problematic option because of the
proximity to South Africa (see section 3.6).
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The main trends in agricultural policy to be furher outlined in chapter
4 are that resources were allocated to the strongest and commercially viable
agricultural enterprises. This includes large scale livestock production and
the very small number of commercial freehold fars. Agricultural extension
services, credit and veterinar services have been open for all, but very few
farers have used these means to improve production, and agriculture is
best described as stagnant in a labour reserve structure.
3.6 External relations of dependence
Botswana is in many respects a dependent country. It is dependent on South
Africa, on the world market for its few export commodities and on donors.
The dependence on South Africa is many-sided. Exports and imports are
dependent on transport through South Africa. Moreover , South African
companies are important in the mining sector. South Africa's powerful
position in the diamond markets is well known. Imported goods mainly
come from South Africa. Furthermore, a large number of Batswana are
dependent on employment in South Africa. The num ber of migrant workers
in South Africa has stayed around 20 000 (Peat 1984: 193). However, when
we consider the increase in the total labour force, the relative importance
has decreased, but is still large. The militar power of South Africa is a
threat especially as South Africa has prove d willing to use it also in
Botswana. io
Botswana has expressed clear criticism of South African aparheid and
is a Front Line state. But the power structures of the region and Botswana' s
dependence on South Africa have necessitated a rather carefulline on these
issues.
Dependence on South Africa is of course a very heavily felt problem, and
Botswana was among the initiators of the South African Development
Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which has an objective to reduce
economic dependence on South Africa. Botswana' s inability to impose
economic sanctions against South Africa illustrates its dependence.
Botswana is a member of the South African Customs Union (SACU),
where the Republic of South Africa is the strongest economic power. The
member states have no customs bariers between them, and customs from
imports to the SACU area are divided among the members according to an
agreed allocation key. The incomes from SACU are still important for
io On some occasions, South African miltary forces have extended their actions into
Botswana terrtory.
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Botswana even if mineral revenues have lessened the dependence. The
SACU agreement means that in practice, Botswana is included in the home
market of South African industry.ll SACU leaves limited options for
Botswana to build up a diversified industry for the home market protected
by tarffs. In addition comes the problem that the Botswana market is so
limited, that a Botswana producer of industrial goods will of ten need a very
large share of the market in Botswana to make a viable profit. This is one
main obstacle to economic diversification.
Botswana's two main export articles are beef and diamonds. Beef export
is based on an agreement with the European Communty. The agreement
gives Botswana higher prices than the world market would give. But it
makes Botswana dependent on the EEC. The other export commodity is
diamonds. The market prices fluctuate and the influence of South African
companies on Botswana' s diamond production and export is significant.
Also other minerals and soda ash are exported, but this does not change the
basic dependence on beef and diamond exports which are the corner stones
of Botswana's economy.
Donors are heavily engaged in Botswana. Their financial and manpower
resources make up a significant share of the total resource pool for
development efforts. NORAD has been engaged since 1972, and part of the
background for NORAD's engagement is the will to support a country
under pressure from South Africa, especially as Botswana is also a
democratic and non-discriminatory country.12 Another reason for the large
donor engagement in Botswana is of course the povert in the rual areas,
and perhaps even more important: the well administered projects. Most
donors find it easy to cooperate with Botswana authorities and donors have
less problems in Botswana than in many other countries. NORAD's
experiences in cooperating with Botswana authorities are good in most
sectors.
3.7 The agricultural sector
Botswana is a relatively rich country, measured in GNP per capita. In the
early eighties, this measure reached approximately US$ 1000 (Granberg and
Parkinson 1988). A basic problem is that wealth and economic growth is
11 Anyone who has been in shops and supermarkets in Gaborone and noted where products
are made wil have seen this.
12 The £lag of Botswana is designed to symbolize the peaceful coexistence of a black
majorityand a white minority (Tlou and Campbell 1980).
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limited to the modern sectors of the economy, dominated by government
and the mining sector. In 1982/83,47 per cent of Real Output came from
mining (Øygard et aL. 1986). Government and mining are sectors which
cannot employ sufficiently large proportions of the population (Isaksen
1982). Even if a significant number of Batswana still work in South
African mines, the number has decreased and the relative importance of this
employment is declining.
The concept of dualism refers to the relationship between the traditional
and the modem sector of the economy in under-developed countries like
Botswana, pointing to the lack of structurallinks between the two sectors.
In as far as such links are weak, the growth in the modern economy does
not spre ad to the economy as a whole. In the case of Botswana this varant
of the dualism thesis is not a very appropriate description. Botswana' s
traditional sector is not self -sustainable like this, on the contrary, it was
gradually restructured to be come a dependent labour reserve, and is
increasingly undermined by the scarcity of jobs. Most rual dwellers seek
employment in the modern sector of Botswana or in South Africa, as a
component in a combined strategy for making aliving.
Approximately 80 per cent of the population, or 130 000 households live
in the rural areas (Øygard et aL. 1986). The main productive activity there
is agriculture, even if a large proportion is not engaged in agriculture at any
significant level. An estimated 70 000 households are engaged in
agriculture. Among the rural dwellers, a large proportion is very poor. In
1974, 45 per cent of the population was under the Poverty Datum Line,
P679. In 1987, when the Poverty Datum Line was estimated to be P1937,
70 per cent were below it in a typical large vill age as Mahalapye (Granberg
and Parkinson 1988: 65).
3.7.1 Rural households
The production unit in traditional agriculture is the household. Household
multi -activity strategies are reflected in common division of work in rual
households. Cattle is a men' s domain and most of the work related to cattle
is done by them. The males are also those engaged in migrant labour.
Women look after the children and are of ten occupied in some crafts or
brewing. As regards arable production, women and children do an estimated
74% of the crop related work. The men do most of the work only in
destumping, land clearing, ploughing and planting (NORAD 1989).
Otherwise, the male head of the household works far away, or tends the
cattle.
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Those worst off in this structure are female headed households. In
general, a female headed household is left without the contribution of
money and labour from a grown-up male working in South Africa, in
Botswana' s urban centres or at the farm. Some of these women are mared,
but many husbands spend what they earn on their own pleasure and in
practice, the family has to be taken care of by the female.
The problem they face is mainly lack of labour, büth to seek employment
outside the farm, and to work on the household s fields. Which reduces
cash incomes and self -sufficiency in basic food. The absence of cash
incomes from migrant labour will prevent investments in cattle, which has
negative impacts on arable farming capacity. Apar from this, the general
discrimination of women in society and lack of govemmental support for
women in particular is a problem.
Approximately one-third of the rural faring households are female
headed. However, due to increasing povert and social changes, the
traditional family structures are bre aking apart. In practice, this means that
some households that might look as a solid unit are not so. First, it is a
problem that not all migrant workers spend their money on household
purposes, but consume most of it instead. Another problem, seen from the
households point of view, is that increasingly, the children in families are
unwilling to remain controlled by the household. Their labour and incomes
are to a lesser extent con trolle d by the head of the household, and this has
as a consequence that more than the 30 per cent are in reality in a similar
difficult situation.
3.7.2 Arable larming
Due to inadequate rainfall and poor soils, productivity is low within all
types of farming systems, when compared to similar systems under better
natural conditions (MOA 1991). The key problem for arable development
in Botswana, however is that arable farming is less productive than both
livestock and urban employment (Opschoor 1983: 161; Øygard et aL. 1986:
18; Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986: 77). It is thus rational for farmers to
spend labour and resources on livestock, migrant employment (which
necessitates investment in education for the children) (Solway 1986), crafts,
and seasonal labour for wealthy farmers. Arable faring has a lower
priority when the household decides how to spend resources and labour.
This tendency is accelerated by the fact that arable farming is also more
risky than livestock, employment, crafts and smallstock. All these activities
are vulnerable to inadequate rainfall, at least if it develops into a real
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drought, but arable farming is very vulnerable to even small varations in
rainfall.
Farmers therefore keep investments and labour input in arable farming
very low. At a very minimum, arable farming can be operated by the
households' women and children without much investment in implements
and input factors (NORAD 1989). Many farers limit arable faring to
this, some farers provide some implements or fertilizers to get more out
of the labour of women and children, but normally the resources that tools
and other input would cost are best spent for other purposes (Opschoor
1983; Vierich and Shepperd 1980).
Due to poor soils, and low-productive methods and few mechanical
implements, yields per hectare is low. At the same time, the hectarage that
can be managed by the household's women and children is limited, and the
hectarage they can handle is too small to produce a surplus. The average
field size of 4,5 hectares sounds huge, but it does not produce much in
Botswana' s traditional agriculture. Still, it is the limit of what can be
managed in small scale farming (Opschoor 1983: 160).
Production volumes are consequently extremely low. According to
Øygard (1986: 10-11), the average farmer has to increase the arable
production sixfold in order to meet the household's own subsistence needs.
In short, no farmer in the traditional rainfed arable agriculture in Botswana
makes a secure living based solelyon crops.13
Rather, arable faring has been and still is only one component in the
households' multi-activity strategies. The other components most of ten
included in the strategy are cattle, smallstock,14 migrant employment,
informal seasonal employment, crafts and brewing, and also various work
for food arangements (Vierich and Shepperd 1981). The increasing poverty
problems in rural Botswana do not principally stem from arable
deterioration, but from a shortage of the other components needed for a
multi-activity strategy. As mentioned above, the importance of migrant
labour to South Africa is decreasing both in absolute and proportional
numbers, and too few jobs are established in the other sectors of the
economy. Cattle production is difficult to engage in for those who have no
13 Traditional rainfed farming denotes farmng on communallands, which means most of
the arable farming households. There are only 2-300 freehold farms, and some floodplain
farms (molapo farming) .
14 Smallstock is predominantly for subsistence needs. The smallstock animals sold to the
BMC, the main buyer of animals for sale, make up a very small proportion of the
national smallstock herd (MFDP 1985:177).
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animals or other income generating activities, facilitating livestock
investments.
Arable farers producing crops are of mainly three kinds. One group
invests very little in arable farming because except for their own labour
they have very little to invest in any case. In these households, that are
of ten female headed, labour is also scarce as there is no male labour
available. The crop production in this group is non-existent or marginaL.
This is the group which occasionally drops out of agriculture, and sUfives
on government food hand-outs and "work for food" arangements. Crop
production is of ten more costly for the poorest households; if they have to
hire draft power this is a cost that cattle holding farers avoid (Opschoor
1983: 168).15
Critical for crop production is the availability of draft power for timely
ploughing. Some wealthy farmers have tractors, but for most farmers, teams
of cattle are the draft power. Vierich and Shepperd argued (1980) that, for
their sample, access to draft power was, besides rain, the main determinant
for the decision to plough. Eskeli (1989) reported that in his sample, the
main reason for farmers not ploughing was lack of draft power. The critical
herd size for the farmer to be able to plough with his own resources is at
least 20 animals, maybe as much as 40 (Vierich and Shepperd 1980). In
herds of this size there will be enough oxen to form a span of 6-8 oxen
(Vierich and Shepperd 1980; Øygard 1986). Some farers with smaller
herds have to borrow animals, or use some cows; such work reduces their
value, and might cause loss of calves. Those who are able to plough for
themselves have got the advantage of being able to plough immediately
when there is some rainfall. This is critical, and influences the harvest
greatly.16 In their sample, Vierich and Shepperd (1980) found only 15%
able to plough with their own draft power. 1 7 For those with insufficient
draft power, altematives have been available, where other farers lend
them draft power, against payment or labour or other favours. This reduces
the chances for timely ploughing. Solway (1986) reports that it is an
increasing problem that farmers having a commercial, large scale cattle
production are unwilling to lend out their cattle as this reduces the market
15 Cattle owners do have some costs of using their own animals, if these have to be
brought from far-away cattle posts, but the difference probably remains.
16 Observations in Botswana during field work ilustrated this. Two neighbouring fields
showed a very marked difference in growth. One had been ploughed at the right time,
the other not.
17 These numbers vary in different sources. But it seems clear that a majority of farmers
are not able to plough independently.
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value. The poor farmers, who have to rely on draft power from other
sources, get higher costs. Øygard also notes that being without cattle is
increasingly problematic for arable production as cattle owners become
more reluctant to lend out their cattle (1986: 7). In short, the stronger the
households economic basis is, the better are the possibilities to engage in
crop production. The poor farers who are unable to establish themselves
in livestock are as a consequence also unable to support any crop
production of significance.
The second group are those who have some amount of resources and
labour. But systematically, labour and resources are spent for other
purposes. Cattle, education, and crafts are less risky, and more profitable
investments. Off-far employment gives a better and to some extent less
drought prone income than self-employment on the households' fields.
Money that could be invested in implements, fertilizers and improved seeds
are better spent in livestock or education. Thus only the very minimum of
labour that is left in the household, I.e. women and children, is available for
arable farming, and only a minimum of resources are spent for the purpose
of rationalizing this use of labour (Vierich and Shepperd 1980; Øygard et
aL. 1986).
Even slight improvements in methods or in field size would require more
labour, and often also investments as well. It is not rational for farmers to
do that.
The term medium scale farmer does not denote a very high standard of
living. They are also generally poor, but better off than the first group.
The third group is very small; Øygard estimates them to be 4.7 percent
of the farming households. They cultivate with improved methods, and they
do so on large fields, 10 hectares and more. They are also cattle holders
with large herds, and have thus access to draft power, even perhaps tractors.
Investments in technical equipment is thus possible for this group.
This group produces crops with a higher productivity because improved
methods are combined with large scale economic benefits. In Botswana' s
semi-arid climate, only production on large scale combined with method
improvements is productive enough to compete for resources with livestock
and employment (Duggan 1983: 124-126). Øygard et aL. present data that
seem to support Duggan's point, even if statistics like this should be us ed
with caution. øygards data show that productivity makes a sudden jump
when field sizes pass 10 hectares. Holdings of 1 hectare make up 2.3
percent of the national cultivated area, and 2.1 per cent of the national
production. A similar pattem is evidenced for holdings of 1 -2 hectares, and
so on, up to 6-10 hectares. When the 10 hectare limit is passed, these
holdings make up 27 percent of area cultivated, but produce 42 percent of
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total harest. It is only when holdings exceed 10 hectares that productivity
makes a jump (Øygard et aL. 1986: 10).
For any farming household, investments in arable farming are limited to
the amount of resources and labour that can be risked. Wealthier
households can thus risk a larger absolute amount of resources, if they find
it worthwhile to invest beyond a way to use casual household labour. The
amount of resources that can be risked by wealthy farers is large enough
to pass the threshold of economies of scale. The amount of resources
needed is substantial, because in order to operate 10 hectares or more,
household labour is insufficient. Labour has to be hired, production has to
be mechanized, and the draft power constraint has to be overcome. In
addition there are the costs of fertilizers, fencing, and seeds. Only wealthy
farers fulfil these requirements.
The poor Batswana thus comprise the rual households who have been
unable to build a multi-activity strategy. And the modernization strategy in
Botswana, no matter how successful it has been on many points, has left
the poor peasantry behind in stagnation.
The distribution of resources is very skewed, and the key varable
determining distribution of resources and wealth is cattle ownership. First,
the cattle holding households are able to maintain a higher level of arable
production. Second, cattle holding and employment correlate. The incomes
from wage employment are of ten used to build up a herd, while the
children of cattle-holding households have better chances to get higher
education and thus the jobs in the formal sector. A pattern of cumulative
opportunities is evident, and cattle ownership is the key factor.
A small proportion of farers own about half the national cattle herd, 5
percent of the farmers have 34 percent of the national herd. The numbers
var with different authors, but the picture is clear. A large minority does
not have cattle at alL. 30 percent of farming households and 45 percent of
the rual population do not have cattle at all. Of those who have cattle, 50
percent have under 20 animals, 25 percent have between 20 and 40
animals.18
3.7.3 Drought
In normal years, rainfall is low and unstable, and for periods there are
regular droughts. They last from one year and up to 4 or 5 years, and may
18 These numbers are from Øygard (1986) and Selolwane (1986) Other sources might have
slightly different figures, but the main tendencies is the same.
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hit the whole country or only a few districts. In the early sixties there was
a long lasting drought. A new long lasting drought struck in 1981/82, and
lasted until the 1987/88 season when there were good rains again. In
addition come the shorter and more local ones. Droughts are a factor to be
reckoned with; it is not an extraordinar occurrence which may now and
then interfere in a normal, non-drought situation. According to Holm there
is drought of some kind in 7 out of 10 years, of which three are regarded
as severe (1985: 464). There are few years in which all the agricultural
areas in Botswana have adequate measures of rainfall. As noted above,
crops are most immediately hit by a drought. In addition, sources of income
in the traditional economy, mainly utilized by the poor are also hit very
quickly. Drought may affect employment for hetter-off farers, and
gathering of veId products. The better-off farmers, who are those holding
cattle and with access to stable formal employment, are hetter able to cope
with the effects of a drought.
Employment outside agriculture is not vulnerable to drought. Livestock
is hit severely only when the drought lasts for more than one year. The
effects of a drought are first se en in the deterioration of the crowded
communal grazing lands used by both large cattle owners and small ones.
Large cattle owners of ten have access to privately owned boreholes in areas
where this is a prerequisite for keeping cattle there, and in these areas
grazing resources last longer in an acceptable condition.
However, when a drought lasts long, all cattle holders are hit, they have
to seIl cattle to compensate for lost crops, and they lose animals that die
under drought conditions. This is more critical for households with a small
number of cattle. The off-take from a large herd does not reduce its
rebuilding capacity below critical thresholds, but equally important, the off-
take from a small herd means that the owner can no longer plough
independently. This leads to increased ploughing costs and/or less timely
ploughing when rain finally comes. Thus, droughts hit the poor hardest and
quickest, and tend to pull down again some households on their way to
establishing a more solid and diversified basis for an existence.
3.8 Summary
Resources are marginal and unreliable for arable agriculture. Large grazing
lands are the most important re source in Botswana' s agriculture in general.
Arable farming is risky, its productivity low compared to other types of
activities.
Varous groups relate differently to this. Most farmers spend some
resources and labour on arable .farming to cover more or less of the
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household's subsistence needs. This makes crop production an integral par
of a multi-activity strategy to make a living under harsh climatic conditions.
The poor farmers are of ten those dependent on arable farming alone, with
small opportunities to combine arable farming with other activities.
The development of this structure has been a long term process, and the
post colonial modernzation policy has not fundamentally changed this
major poverty creating problem.
The rual population has not been politically mobilized except at election
time, and has not been able to ariculate demands and grievances, even if
modemization policy has been allowed to develop in such way that the
rual poor do not really benefit.
However, increasingly, this uneven development has become a major
political problem; the ARAP programme should be regarded as the Ministry
of Agriculture' s respons e to demands for a better policy. This leads to the
next chapter, the initiation and planning of ARAP.
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4. The Ministry of Agriculture,
professional approaches and the
elaboration of ARAp19
4.1 Introduction
As has been indicated in chapter 3, durng the seventies, the problems of
rural poverty became more pressing for policy makers. The increased
attention to these problems are explained by both donor attitudes, increasing
differences between the prospering modern sector and the rual sector, and
by the need for public policies that could generate political support as
welfare infrastructure could not be expanded by new major investments.
There was thus a growing pressure for a change in agricultural policy,
aiming at more effective development of the small scale, traditional
agriculture.
The study of agricultural programmes in the perspective outlined in
chapter 1 directs attention to the administration itself, and to influences on
the administration from outside actors. In tbis chapter the former will be
discussed. What were the central problem structures in the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA)? How did they influence MOA's response to demands
for policy changes? To what extent was the MOA's response to new
demands suited to the needs of different target groups? To what extent did
the MOA manage to link its increasingly complex structure together in a
coordinated planning effort for the design of a complex, interventionist
policy?
ARAP has to be analyzed as an element in the MOA response to
demands for policy changes. ALDEP (Arable Lands Development
Programme), and ARAP were the key elements in a broad development
strategy for the modernization of the arable sub-sector, which was the
MOA's response to changed demands. The analysis will first present some
basic elements in the MOA's overall problem structure as it had developed
19 Throughout this chapter the various deparments, divisions and units in the Ministry of
Agriculture wil of ten be referred to. In Appendix 3, an organization chart is presented
which shows the formal structure of the mini stry. Conceming the abbreviations for
various units and departments, see the List of Abbreviations.
51
since the 1960s, and next show how this influenced both ALDEP and
ARAP. The planning process of ARAP will be discussed in more detail as
well, to show how the process became centralized and incapable of
handling effectively the complexities of such an ambitious intervention.
Certain pars of the Ministry dominate in the analysis; the Division of
Planning and Statistics, the Permanent and the Deputy Permanent
Secretares which are labelled the administrative top level of the Ministry
of Agriculture, and the Deparment of Agricultural Field Services with its
varety of specialized sub-units.
4.2 Ministry of Agriculture: Problem structures.
4.2.1 Problem structures and models of action20
MOA policy guidelines relate to the sector, to sub-sectors or to specialized
niches of production more than to varous groups in the sector . In, for
instance, all the published National Development Plans (NDPs), this is a
striking feature. There are very few references to the living conditions for
varous groups; policy goals are not formulated in terms of poverty and
welfare, but in terms of production types. This does not necessarily mean
that MOA officers are indifferent to poverty problems, but it is assumed
that if the various production sub-sectors can be made more profitable,
income and standards of living will benefit from it. The NDP 1976-1981,
Agricultural chapter, states that
Government' s policy in the lIvestock sector is to increase output and
assure the long term future of the industry but at the same time to try to
spread the benefits from the industry more widely (page i 43).
The following description of policies in the plan document then relates to
livestock production, and key problems in the sector. The only reference to
how poor people can benefit from this sector is that they can be employed
in abbatoirs and beef processing (MFDP 1977: 143-158). The plan does not
state that it is a goal for agriculture to fight inequality, only that
20 The following analysis is based on interviews and documents. The detailed references
to the data used are reduced, in order to ease the reading. Reference is made to chapter
2 and appendix 1.
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Government policy is to provide every rural household with an
opportunity to obtain some income from agricultural production (page
135).
But this thinking in sector terms has different implications for different
groups engaged in it, as will be shown below.
The overall goal for the sector is modemization, and modemization is
understood as the creation of efficient, independent and commercialized
production units The overall goal for the agricultural sector is defined by
informants in mainly one way. What will have a future within agriculture,
according to the civil servants interviewed, is a group of commercial, viable
and rationally run fars. In the future, civil servants expect that the heavy
use of subsidies will become unnecessar, as the farers will be rational
producers of surplus for sale. As expressed in the National Development
Plan:
Government support of the agricultural sector wil aim at promoting self-
sustained growth so that subsidies wil not need to be provided to
agricultural producers in the long term (MFDP 1987d: 187).21
Viable commercial agriculture will contain a diversified production, even
if livestock is expected to remain the most prominent sub-sector (see
below). In most policy documents, for instance NDPs, the level of
commercialization of various production types is discussed, and the
expansion of them set as a goal. How this will serve the various groups of
farmers is rather vaguely analyzed.
The problem is that the sector is not characterized by a dominance of
commercialized, profitable units. Most farms are small, unproductive and
produce too small volumes of output. What is lacking, according to the
informants, is infrastructure for commercial agricultural production.
Substantial efforts have been done in later years to redress this deficiency.
Furthermore, the informants contend, the farmers lack the knowledge of
modern, productive farming, the capital to invest in it, and the will and
interest to take risk and make efforts.
In principle, the farmers holding the viable units - those with a
commercial potential - could be of any socio-economic origin, according
21 The NDP's are made by the various line ministries, but under the coordination and
policy guidelines of MFDP. Thus, the statements made in the NDP are seen as a
reflection of viewpoints predominating in MOA, adjusted to the frameworks set by the
MFDP.
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to the civil servants interviewed. Everybody is seen as having the option to
develop within agriculture. Also the poor farmers are se en as having a
chance to make aliving within agriculture, if they are willing to work and
take the risks, and if they use the opportunities provided. However, many
of the poor farers are seen by MOA informants as not sufficiently
interested, and thus their prospects are limited. The informants constantly
referred to farers "willingness" to take risk and make efforts to develop.
The large-scale farmers, relying mainly on livestock, are already to quite
some extent developed as commercial producers in agriculture. The
question is, then, who can join or approach the level of this group in terms
of agricultural income. It is not expected that all farers will transform into
viable, commercial producers; many will find agriculture unpromising and
leave for employment elsewhere. What kind of employment that might be
is in principle not MOA's problem. Still, it is clearly an objective that the
group surviving within agriculture should be as large as possible, but it is
also realized that there will be fewer than the present number of farming
households. But it is not assumed that farers will be forced out, if they
really want to eng age in agriculture; it is envisaged that all those who wish
to do so can continue, provided that some find it sensible to leave.
Generally speaking, the MOA offer to farmers since the 1960s have been
information and training, that has been disseminated by the Agricultural
Extension Service. Credit facilities have also been aranged. Until the
policy changes that are the topic for this analysis appeared, the same offer
was given to all farmers. It was considered to be just to give all farmers the
same offer, even if their individual situation varied greatly in terms of
access to resources.
Botswana' s policy is of ten said to rest on four basic principles or values.
In the Introduction to the National Development Plan 1985- 1991, the Vice
President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning states that
The nation' s four development planning objectives of rapid economic
growth, sodal justice, economic independence and sustained development
... remain unchanged from NDP5 (MFDP 1985d).
These objectives are of ten referred to, and MOA informants were asked to
specify what this meant in agricultural policy. Regarding social justice,
most of them pointed out that the values of social justice meant that all
should have the opportunity to increase their standard of living. It was not
understood as an ideal of equality in income, nor that people's living
standard should be roughly equal but that all should have an opportunity to
improve their situation. Given differences at theoutset, to give everybody
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the same chances to improve their position will not change the relative
poverty. Rather, it implies accepting differences while trying to reduce
absolute poverty leveis. One high level MOA civil servant used ALDEP as
an example and stated that ALDEP was to give people a chance, and it was
the farmers' choice and responsibility whether or not to use this
opportunity. Furhermore, recognizing that farers differ in their use of
programmes, this was seen as a problem of interest and motivation. Not all
farers were interested in using the options that were available. The
MOA's task is thus not basically to remove povert problems as such, but
rather to offer a helping hand, and let the offer of assistance be available
to all farers interested in improving their own situation. The differing
points of deparure for varing farming households are recognized, but not
to be interfered wi the
It is realized that livestock is unevenly distributed. But even if cattle is
definitely the type of production best adjusted to Botswana' s natural and
climatic conditions, and even if livestock ownership affects the capacity to
produce crops very strongly, the skewed distribution of this asset is not
regarded as a problem to be acted upon. NDP 1985-91 (MFDP 1985d: 170)
describes the unequal distribution of cattle and in the same paragraph it is
noted that those with no cattle are also those who produce the smallest
amounts of crops. Still, this fact is not described in the plan as something
to change, and consequently, the project review of the plan does not present
any such project. In interviews, high ranking MOA civil servants stated that
the distribution of cattle was not to be interfered with. On the question of
what cattle-Iess farers should do in order to build up a herd, the MOA
Permanent Secretar answered that loans in the National Development Bank
would provide the means to proceed. Picard (1987) quotes from a policy
documeni22 stating that
... the living standards of all the population cannot be raised by
redistributing the assets of the few people that are relatively well off.
On the contrary, far from being a major problem, the existence of large
cattle holdings making good profits is seen as a major achievement. They
are viable, self -sufficient producers, able to make substantial profits and
contribute to the national economy. In fact, this group of large cattle
owners represents one of MOA's successes and the MOA is not willing to
do anything that would revers e what has been achieved here.
22 Picard 1987; 238. Quotations from Government of Botswana, Rural Development in
Botswana. Government Paper no 1. Gaborone, Government Printer 1972; 3.
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...we should, of course, do nothing which would make our cattle industry
less productive, or would reduce its income eaming capacity (see footnote
22).
Instead of trying to provide an option for more farmers within livestock,
which is obviously the most reasonable thing to do if farmer' s preferences
were to be the basis of public policy, the problem is father understood as
a too high dependence on and preoccupation with cattle. The problem is
how to make arable production more attractive for farmers as a main
enterprise instead of livestock. The National Food Strategy (NFS) document
states under the heading of "Commercial Farming Development" (MFDP
1985c :16) that
This Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme ... is intended to encourage
investment in commercial drland farming by farmers who might
otherwise prefer to undertake the generally less risky operations associated
with the livestock sector.
It is difficult to find a clearer expression that interests in the administration
and in the administration' s clientele are diametrically opposed. It is
commonly known that farers prefer cattle, not only for cultural reasons
but also for economic, rational reasons as argued in chapter 3.
In the standard analysis of the relative development of the arable and
livestock sub-sectors, as noted above, it is seen as a problem that farmers
systematically prefer the livestock sector. The arable sector thus lags
behind. The livestock sector, on the other hand, is quite well developed, but
"occupied"; overgrazing does not allow much further expansion of the
national herd. Even if there are still many improvements to be done within
cattle rearing, this sector is making good progress compared to the arable
sector. It has also generally had a higher priority within MOA expenditure.
As late as in the NDP 1976-81, livestock development investments took 73
per cent of MOA total investments (MFDP 1977). The livestock sector has
reached substantial results and has come very far, compared to the arable
sub-sector.
Increasingly, MOA has come to see it as a problem that the arable sub-
sector lags behind. The NDP published in 1977, states that
The Government' s aim of ensuring that all Batswana benefit from
development will not be achieved if arable farming is allowed to stagnate
(MFDP 1977: 158).
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This concern for the stagnation of the arable sub-sector is linked to the
decreasing self-sufficiency in staple food. Increasingly, the MOA has seen
it as a goal to increase national production volumes. In 1970, MOA stated
in its chapter in NDP that self-sufficiency in basic food crops was a
realistic objective, and that it was a problem that the self -sufficiency was
decreasing (GOB 1970: 33).
High imports required foreign exchange reserves, and in paricular, it
caused increased dependence on the aparheid regime in Republic of South
Africa from where food imports emanate.
Since the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the MOA was thus eager to
support arable agriculture, both because it was seen as a sector that could
expand and as a sector that would have to expand in order to let the cattle-
less farers improve their living standard, and finally, because the national
self-sufficiency was se en as too low. The NDP of 1970 stated that
there is an urgent need to increase arable production for the following
reasons:-
(i) to increase the real incomes of those farming families who are unable
to obtain areasonable living from their livestock holdings;
(ii) to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency in staple foods (GOB
1970: 33).
The standard understanding of the problems in arable farming are rather
vague on the reasons for the problems - arable agriculture is defined by
what it is not. Arable agriculture has been defined mainly in sector terms
as low-productive, with low levels of technology, receiving a small
proportion of household labour, as risky and at a subsistence level for most
farmers. The NDP 1968-73 focuses on low rainfall, on needs for
improvement of traditional methods (GOB 1968: 22). Research should
focus on improving economic return on labour and capital (p 26). In NDP
1976-81, the sector is described as suffering from low rainfall, lack of draft
power, unreliable availability of inputs, problems of crop protection and
lack of transport to the field. The need for new technology is also
emphasised (MFDP 1977: 158). NDP 1979-85 also addresses the low and
unreliable retums in arable faring, the need to increase productivity,
unfavourable soils and climate, low productivity stemming from the
inadequacy of traditional technology, and the lack of implements.
The reasons for these deficiencies are hardly discussed. When asked
about what are the major tasks for arable agriculture development, civil
servants typically answered by referring to harsh climatic and ecological
conditions, and to low levels of technology and input. The NFS document
refers to these main problem areas too, especially mentioning the low
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rainfall and poor soils, making arable rainfed agriculture a risky venture.
Yields are described as extremely low (MFDP 1985c: 3) and inputs of
capital and labour are described as minimaL. This is labelled a risk
minimizing strategy. The lack of access to draft power is also noted as a
problem. These are well documented problems to be found in any
description of Botswana arable farming. As pointed out above, the main
problems are defined as absence of knowledge of faring methods, lack of
resources to improve methods, and lack of will to try and take risks.
Seen against the background of all socio-economic studies made of the
traditional economy and on the reasons for low input in arable faring,23
it is striking how policy documents and descriptions of programmes avoid
an analysis of why farers do not have the resources to invest in arable
farming, and why they, even if they have resources, invest it for other
purposes. The close links arable faring has to livestock is well
documented, but somehow ignored in MOA's arable development
programmes.
Arable agricul ture and livestock have be en treated as the two main pillars
or sectors in agriculture, but they have been treated separately, by two
distinct sets of public policy that are only vaguely related to each other in
spite of the close interrelation between these two production types.
The formal set-up of the Ministry of Agriculture reflects the
institutionalization of this way of thinking. At all levels in the ministry -
Permanent Secretar and Deputy Permanent Secretar, the Planning
Division, the Deparment of Field Service and field staff at regional level
- the division of work is between livestock and crops specialists, who
make their own crops or livestock related programmes. There might be
arguments in favour of this arangement, but it is not consistent with the
inter-dependence between the two in multiple income-generating strategies
as operated by most farers. Only in re cent years have programmes trying
to treat these components as interrelated been initiated. The way National
Development Plans for Agriculture have normally been written also reflects
the division - the two sectors are described separately with few references
to their interconnectedness in project designs. Projects are presented as
related to crops or to livestock.
The arable development assistance that the MOA offered was the same
for all groups of farmers until the dem and came for extra efforts for the
poorer farers. The agricultural extension efforts, that started already
before independence, included the promotion of row planting instead of
23 See, for instance, Cownie (1987), Vierich and Shepperd (1980), Selolwane 1986 and
Parson (1981).
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broadcasting, more weeding, improved seeds, fertilizers, crop rotation,
winter ploughing and harowing. These ways of faring were promoted
mainly by training and information - that is, a standard extension model.
These are not very drastic changes, but they did require more input of
labour (weeding, added operations to ploughing, destumping of more land),
they required occasional investments (harows and row planters) and they
required annual investments (fertilizers, seeds) (Opschoor 1983: 160-161).
Until the seventies, arable farming assistance was mainly provision of
advice and training, in order to spread knowledge about new implements
available, and new methods. This is labelled the extension model. For this
purpose the Agricultural Field Service was established. Extension efforts
reached relatively few farmers. The centrepiece of extension activities in
NDP 1968-73 was the Pupil Farer Scheme. According to the plan
document, the number of farmers participating at the scheme's varous
levels totalled around 2000 (GOB 1968: 22). It was in fact consciously
designed to reach only a few farmers - destined to be progressive pilot
farmers, showing the way for the rest. Only in the mid-seventies was this
scheme abandoned; extension officers were now expected to serve all
farmers in their area, which proved highly problematic. "The ineffectiveness
of the new extension effort was a constant source of concem", according
to Harey and Lewis (1990: 96-97). This change in the extension model
was the first change in the MOA design of policy means, in order to
respond to the growing awareness of the rural povert problems.
But who had the resources to use this offer? These production changes
would increase yields per hectare; the question is whether these increases
would be large enough to make arable faring equally profitable with
livestock, when also increased risks were considered. Who could afford to
lose these substantial resources from time to time? And among those who
could, who would find it profitable?
For farmers to respond to this offer depends on two key assumptions or
conditions. First, it is assumed that farmers have resources to invest in
arable farming in the first place. Even if credit is available, it can hardly be
expected that all costs and investments can be covered that way. Besides,
credits are costly, and raise even further the demands for productivity. In
practice, resources for arable investment have to come from cattle or
employment. Secondly, it was assumed that if farmers adopted the
promoted methods and implements, and took on the increased costs and
investments promoted, productivity would increase sufficiently to make
arable farming an attractive option for farmers when compared to migrant
labour and livestock. If this condition could be met, farmers would find it
attractive to engage in arable farming, and make the necessar investments.
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The reasons for what is vaguely referred to as farmers' low"willingness"
to make efforts and take risks, are related to whether they have anything to
risk at all, and to the rationality of taking risks, which depends on the
abs ol ute amount of resources that can be risked. Most farmers could not
risk enough in arable farming to make risk pay off, and for most farmers,
the extension offer was not relevant for their perceived interests.
The first core assumption on which arable development programmes of
the extension type were based, held mainly for hetter-off farers. The
wealthy farmers were thus those who used this offer. Considering the
access to resources for both one-time and annual investments in arable
farng, cattle owners had resources to do so. The huge number of cattle-
less farers and small holders of cattle did not. Thus among these farmers,
such a surplus had to be generated from crop faring, an unlikely prospect,
if a sixold increase was needed to reach subsistence leveis. Besides,
generating resources for arable farming through a crop surlus will only
work in the years of good rainfaii.24 The problem of how to finance both
the initialone time investments (plough, row planter, draft power) and
annual purchases was left to the farer.
In practice, as regards the poor farmers, such implements could not be
purchased. Theywould have to be borrowed from neighbours, and thus
be come an annual cost to farers, which could only be covered by a crop
surplus, thus generating even higher demands for productivity of
investments and labour.
The next assumption is that improved methods will increase productivity
so much that arable farming becomes attractive. The technology, crops and
methods that would make arable farming that productive are not yet
developed, according to Opschoor (1983) and Selolwane (1986). Of course
the improved methods promoted by the MOA increases productivity, but
it does not make arable farming more attractive than livestock or
employment. In addition comes the problem that risks are still higher.
Opschoor points to the missing research results this far, and in its policy
document of 1991, MOA describes increased efforts in arable research as
a main task for the coming years, the reason being that the methods, crop
varieties and implements thus far developed are simply not enough in
Botswana' s semi -arid climate.
Why, then, should anyone eng age in arable faring at all, except at the
level that could be maintained by the labour of women and children, and
without much investment? The exception to the inadequate productivity
24 Unless irrgation is provided, which is not an option - the costs are too high and the
water resources too limited.
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increasing potential is when yields per hectare increases are combined with
large fields, and productivity can be increased further by economies of large
scale (Duggan 1983; Øygard et aL. 1986), as described in chapter 3 (3.7).
Who then, can run arable faring on a large scale, that is at least 10
hectares? In principle everybody, as land is communal and allocated to all
who apply for it. But to handle such large fields requires draft power, that
is substantial cattle herds or a tractor.
The amount of resources needed to run large scale arable farming with
improved methods can only be met by farers with substantial resources,
both for initial investments and for annual investments. Furhermore, it
requires a very strong re source base to be able to car losses of substantial
resources from time to time, due to risky rainfall conditions. The arable
farming on more than the average hectarage requires more than the manual
work of household members, it requires hired labour, or what is best, a
tractor to allow mechanization. It requires resources for investment. No
farmer would invest more in arable faring than what could be risked, and
it is mainly the farer who can risk large amounts of resources who will
get an output which is high enough to make risk pay off, because of
economies of scale.
Only the wealthy farmers could really use the extension model, and they
did so, for many years. The poor farmers did not have the resources to
invest, and if they had a few, they did not have enough to make risk pay.
And finally, they could not take on the large investments of arable farming
beyond what the household's manual labour could handle. Consequently,
the extension effort that was MOA's main arable development effort up to
the late seventies mainly mobilized the small number of wealthy farmers,
who could use it efficiently (Harey and Lewis 1990: 101-102).
One might ask why research efforts were not intensified in order to
improve productivity even more. The answer is probably that there was no
perceived need; those for whom the technology and methods advocated
were not beneficial had few if any spokesmen to ariculate their grievances.
It is illustrative that only in seventies was it discovered that a very large
number of farming households had few or no cattle at all (Selolwane 1986).
The organization structure of the MOA on several points suited this
problem structure and models of action. The basic division of work between
livestock and crops specialists referred to above discouraged the
development of integrated approaches to the farming in Botswana.
The Field Service is also an interesting aspect of this. At its lowest leveL,
where interaction with the clientele took place, it consisted of Agricultural
Demonstrators. They were technical specialists in all main types of
production; they represented a pool of technical knowledge which could be
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drawn on when advising and training the farmers. The field service could
be approached by those interested in new techniques and willing to try new
things. It was service institution, available to those who wanted its services.
The Field Service was not a large organization, and the AD covered a
large area. In terms of farming household numbers per AD, capacity was
not adjusted to the mobilization of all the potential clients, but only a few.
Besides, in most areas, the AD was not easily accessible - only in later
years has he been provided with transport, in order to move around in his
large area, and thus early on he was not easy to reach for those living far
off and with few transportation means. He served the few, and for this the
organization sufficed.
4.2.2 Demands for a mass oriented agricultural development
Poverty problems in the rural areas increasingly became more pressing
during the seventies, and the MOA was by most leaders seen as a ministry
which would have to contribute to their solution. In the National
Development Plan 1979 - 1985, agricultural development for the poor was
given higher priori ty than before (Selolwane 1986). It was recognized that
the modern sector could not absorb either the poor farers in the rual
areas nor the increasing numbers in the labour force. What was left as a
labour absorbing mechanism for the foreseeable future was agriculture, as
stated in NDP V (MFDP 1979: 133).
The background for these changes was complex. One reason was the
problems caused by Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) for small holders
of cattle. The TGLP reform led to increased shortage of grazing land due
to the allocation of large tracts of such land to large cattle owners. The
perception among people of TGLP as favouring the wealthy farmers was
as important as the actual favouring of the same group. Selolwane refers to
the simple fact that by the late seventies, research had documented the
seriousness and magnitude of rural poverty.
The agricultural sector as such was under pressure from within; the
dismal prospects for the poor majority was and still is an important cause
for urban migration, by the plan described as "rapid" (p 133). (See also
Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 52). The scale of urbanization was reflected
in the low recruitment of farmers to agriculture; Øygard refers to research
showing that 65 per cent of farmers were over 44 years old, and only 7 per
cent were under the age of 35. In the total population 65 per cent are below
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30 (Øygard 1986: 6).25 The pressure on the towns was problematic in
several respects, and it should be noted that it was also a significant
political challenge for the BDP (Botswana Democratic Pary) regime as
their electoral strength was located in the rural areas. The BNF (Botswana
N ational Front) had not completely captured the towns, but the towns were
still the constituencies where BNF had at least to some extent overwon its
limitation as a Bangwaketse part only, and it has won seats in the towns,
for instance in Gaborone in 1984.
The economy had shown a steady growth throughout the seventies due
to mineral exploitation and the modem sector of the economy had greatly
benefited from it. Thus the relative povert of the rual majority had
increased and become more visibly contrasted to the new wealth of the
urban centres. The problem, as referred to in chapter 3, was that the job
creation in the modem sector could not absorb the rural poor. It could not
even absorb the population growth (Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 49). The
picture emerging from the data is one of a traditional agricultural sector
increasingly lagging behind other sectors. At the same time, the internal
pressure in the sector stemming from the skewed distribution of resources
and population growth made the situation worse.
Donor attitudes at this time were characterized by an increasing emphasis
on food production and agricultural development, and this trend most likely
influenced thinking in Botswana as well. Besides, important donors in
Botswana, like NORAD and SIDA, had developed a strong emphasis on
alleviation of poverty.
Both the political leadership and the donor community thus posed the
demand to the MOA that agricultural development policies had to be
changed so as to benefit the poorer farmers better. Expatriates working in
Botswana at the time increasingly were concemed with equity and the
influence of these individuals might have contributed too (Picard 1987).
Agriculture was not an easy solution to poverty, still, these problems
were to a considerable extent put on the MOA agenda, and the most
notable outcome was first ALDEP and later ARAP.
25 These numbers should be treated with caution, as Batswana men of ten marr and
establish a rural family base relatively late in their life cyc1es. The numbers stil show
some tendency.
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4.2.3 Respanse to demands for new policy goals
The relative weightof various voices demanding a more effective and
broad based development effort towards the traditional agriculture is hard
to assess, but it is clear that MOA faced new demands to broaden
modemization, especially in order to maintain political stability. It is also
a safe statement to say that this represented a quite basic change for the
ministry. Furhermore, it was the first time that the ministry faced a
situation where its basic policy objectives were determned from outside the
civil service. Finally, it was difficult to respond based on the
institutionalized problem structures and models of action.
By the early eighties, MOA had stared responding to political demands
for increased emphasis on the poorer sections of farmers, those with few or
no cattle and a below subsistence arable production.
MOA's response was to develop a complex and ambitious strategy for
arable development. In spite of this sector's low potential and previous
problems of activating farmers here, this was selected as the key area.
There were several reasons for this.
In MOA's perspective, improved incomes for the poor within agriculture
through production increases would mainly have to come from arable
farming. Even if it was already then clearly perceived even outside the
MOA that this was not a very promising strategy (Faàland and Isaksen
1983), it was never the less what the MOA saw as the only available
option. To do something else would require a basic restructuring of the very
basic policies of MOA and of its main success since independence - the
large scale cattle production and the TGLP. But the MOA did not attempt
anything like that, it stuck to its established problem structures and applied
well known models of action.
The distribution of resources, notably cattle, was seen as adequate. This
implied that there was little scope left for expansion of production within
livestock. In fact, farmers were seen as too oriented towards cattle, and
ARAP for instance was justified as an attempt to divert the attention from
cattle to arable farming (MFDP 1985a). MOA thus emphasised that
expansion of production had to come from other sectors than cattle. In
practice, the main option that was left was arable farming.26
Massive poverty alleviation objectives solved within arable farming
would also have beneficial effects on one of MOA's major concerns,
26 There are also other products, like horticuIture, poultry and the like, but these require
capital, new skils and implements to such an extent that they are not suited for a mass
approach.
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namely the low national food self -sufficiency. The overall framework for
MOA's response was thus a National Food Strategy (NFS) that had national
and household self -sufficiency in basic food as its overall objective. The
means was to increase arable production among all households (MFD P
1985a). The emphasis on national production volumes is elaborated upon
in a National Food Strategy policy document. This exercise was stared in
1983, and in 1985 a policy document was worked out in cooperation with
the Rural Development Unit, MFDP.27 The total production of food grains
averages 50 000 metric tons, or about 25 per cent of the domestic
requirements of 200 000 metric tons. Under the drought in the early
eighties production levels plummeted to 7 000 metric tons (MOA 1985A:
2). Agricultural Statistics (MOA 1987c: 12) show total crop production in
the non-drought year 1981 to be 58 000 tons, while in the drought years of
1983 and 1984 it had sunk to 15 800 tons and 8 600 tons, respectively.
Compared with Opschoor's (1983: 160-161) estimates of up to 90 per cent
self-sufficiency in 1930 under non-drought conditions, self-sufficiency
degrees had surely deteriorated.28 The high imports needed required
foreign exchange reserves, and in particular, it increased dependence on the
apartheid regime in Republic of South Africa from where food imports
emanated. Thus, the National Food Strategy (NFS) document, which
presented ALDEP and ARAP and the rationale for these programmes
emphasised the contribution these programmes could make to national self-
sufficiency and set high goals for them in terms of national production
volum e (MFDP 1985: 46-47).
A variety of programmes were seen as essential elements in the National
Food Strategy (NFS). The two key programmes in the NFS were ARAP
and ALDEP. In addition, there were a varety of infrastructure investments
notably for marketing of increased output, pest control and strengthening
of marketing institutions. Also pricing was changed and increased
significantly. A range of specialized programmes for development of new
forms of production, like poultry, horticulture and fodder production were
initiated, but these programmes required capital and expertise that made
them an option only for a minority of farers. Although it was not a MOA
programme, an investment assistance programme, F AP (Financial
Assistance Prograrnme) was also seen in the NFS context. The F AP gave
27 This unit coordinated the policyelements of several other ministries, not least the
Ministry of Agriculture which is naturally a key ministry in this respect.
28 90 per cent seems somewhat high, but at least the two percentages give an indication of
developments.
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a subsidy in cash to those who invested rather large sums of money in
productive enterprises, including agricultural enterprises.
The NFS represents MOA's linking of the new, politically decided
objectives to previous problem structures and objectives. The NFS had food
self -sufficiency as its overall goal, binding together a whole range of
programmes. The means would be increased household arable production
for consumption and sale. This, in combination with the establishment of
some 50 huge, irigated farms in the Pandamatenga area should boost
national production totals, self-sufficiency in food should be established at
all leveis.
The rhetoric of the NFS was ambitious, and the MOA must have known
that it was not realistic, as they readily admitted a few years later, in the
sector policy document of 1991 (MOA 1991). As Picard reports for
ALDEP, one of the programmes envisaged to contribute to the NFS
objectives, MOA had very limited expectations to its ability to create
employment and incomes in the rual areas (1987: 260). The mini stry did
not object to new policy goals, but adjusted it own concerns to suit the new
goal formulations.
The mass oriented, productive programmes of the NFS were ALDEP and
ARAP. ALDEP was launched in 1982, for the poorest farmers, and ARAP
came later, for the medium scale farers. ALDEP and ARAP were both
directed towards arable development.
The problem analysis in ALDEP parallels the extension model. Small
scale faring was seen as lacking methods and implements to improve
yields, and fields were too smalL. ALDEP attempted to introduce row
planters and other implements, in order to improve yields, it encouraged
farmers to purchase draft animals in order to facilitate timely ploughing and
because use of row planters and similar equipment need draft power. It
aimed at field expansions, through fencing and destumping subsidies. These
are the same aims as the extension effort had too. As Opschoor writes,
ALDEP tried to do what 50 years of extension had been unable to
encourage the small scale farmers to (1983: 174). The promoted expertise
and implements were as before, although some smaller changes were made,
for instance, agricultural research had designed equipment that better suited
the physical conditions for arable farming. What was new was first, that
ALDEP not only advised, promoted and encouraged, it also paid parts of
the investments needed, and provided credit for the rest. Another major
innovation was that it was targeted towards one specific group.
Thus, the specific means in the models of action had changed, but they
remained dependent on the two core assumptions of re source access and
potential for productivity increases. However, the subsidies were provided
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only on the condition that farmers paid some of the investment, and took
par in extension training for using the new input in an effective way
(Purcell 1982).
The design is of ten described as a long term one - the idea was that
ALDEP should gradually build a re source base for the poor farmers, and
this would be done slowly so as not to exceed managerial and financial
capacities. It was realized, that from the very difficult situation the target
group members were in, changes could not be achieved over night.
As pointed out by Harvey and Lewis, the ALDEP packages did not
increase productivity so much that arable faring could compete with, for
instance, employment as unskilled labour (1990: 101-103). Selolwane
argues that even with the substantial subsidy, the increased output would
not be enough to cover the farers' own investment costs (1986). Or, as
Opschoor notes with reference to ALDEP, in order to increase productivity
2.5 to 3 times, farmers would have to increase their costs as much as
twelve times, and still accept risks (1983: 173). In addition, the field sizes
would have to triple. This leads to the conclusion that ALDEP did not
promise to increase production volumes enough to provide a basis for
continued annual investments in arable farming, and it did not improve
productivity on small farms enough to make arable faring worthwhile
when compared to other options.
Already in the early eighties, when ALDEP was launched, there was
scepticism towards ALDEP in particular (Opschoor 1983) and the arable
development ambitions in general (Faaland and Isaksen 1983). Also the
MOA's own assessments on what could be achieved by ALDEP were
modest, according to Picard (1987: 260). However, within the problem
structures that are outlined above, ALDEP was what MOA could offer as
a response to the poor. It was long term, gradual build-up of resources and
expertise, to be guided by extension. It was realized that from a very low
staring point, things would have to develop slowly, so as not to transcend
the managerial and financial capacities of farmers (Selolwane 1986). Some
of the poor farmers might have been able to use the opportunity provided,
but it seems clear that MOA had more realistic ambitions than politicians
on this. Nevertheless, an improved opportunity was provided for the poorest
farmers, even if it was not expected by the MOA that the majority of poor
farmers would be interested.
4.3 The initiative and design of ARAP
The initiative for ARAP was a result of discussions mainly inside Division
of Planning and Statistics (P&S). The P&S also had informal discussions
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with the Rural Development Unit of MFDP. RDU is a quite high ranking
policy developing unit, that is of ten involved in key policy decisions.
Exactly the date and the form of the initiative is difficult to assess. But it
is clear that when the proposal was presented in 1985 it had been under
elaboration, i.e. discussion and planning, for several years. That is, since
1982/83.
In 1982 ALDEP was ready for implementation and planning capacities
were freed and available for new tasks. ALDEP was launched after
prolonged preparation. It was a programme targeted towards the poorest
section of farmers, which was new in MOA policy planning (Interviews,
MOA officiais). It was a more generous programme, offering transfer of
resources for specific investments in arable faring. It is questionable
whether it is correct that the medium scale farers did not benefit
(Selolwane 1986; Picard 1987), but it was directed mainly to the very poor
farmers, defined as those with less than 40 heads of cattle. Thus, it was
perceived that the poor farmers had got an improved assistance from
government. The wealthy farers were also rather well assisted. First, the
TGLP of the seventies benefited the wealthy farers. According to Picard
this was part of the background for offering ALDEP, which should
compensate for the negative effects TGLP had on the poorest farmers
(1987). In addition, an investment subsidy programme for productive
activities was launched in 1982, The Financial Assistance Programme
(F AP). This programme subsidised investments if the investor could also
provide substantial resources for investment himself. The wealthy rual
households could therefore be considered as well catered for.
The group that had not yet benefited from new and more generous
programmes, policy makers perceived, was the medium scale farmer group.
In the document on the National Food Strategy this group is estimated to
account for 15 000 farming households, with more than 40 cattle and a crop
production only for subsistence (MFDP 1985c: 12). This group was also
understood as having a potential for commercialization.
Given the understanding of the social justice value frequently referred to,
it is not surprising that MOA civil servants regarded it as most unfortunate
that the new and more generous assistance policies were not available for
medium-scale farmers. Those civil servants interviewed about the initiation
of ARAP stressed this point. In his presentation of ARAP in the National
Assembly in September 1985, the Minister of Agriculture stated that:
...it has become apparent that there was a large group of farmers engaged
in rainfed arable production who were not covered by either ALDEP or
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FAP. It was therefore necessary to design a package programme that
would be directed towards this group of farmers (p. 3).
4.4 The design of ARP
The criticism of ALDEP had led to focus on the inappropriateness of
ALDEP technology and methods, and ARAP is an interesting effort seen
in that light.
The medium scale farmers who were still not attended to had already
adopted some of the improved methods of arable faring, and as medium
scale cattle holders, they also had the draft power needed to plough, use
row planters, harows and the like. They were seen as having a potential for
commercial farming, and the idea behind ARAP was that they needed only
one final push to pass the threshold into commercial arable farming.
Commercial arable farming meant production with improved methods and
equipment on large fields, around ten hectares. The medium scale farmers
knew better than others the methods needed, they had the draft power, what
was needed was the final support to enable them to pass the threshold for
economies of scale. ARAP tried to maximize the productivity increases that
could be achieved by established and quite well-known methods by
encouraging increased field sizes.
ARAP was a bold effort, uncertain but worth a serious try. It was
planned as a one time, massive attempt to expand the fields of the medium
scale farmers up to ten hectares. It seemed as if these improved methods
and equipment could be applied at large fields, productivity would increase
so much that arable farming would be a viable option for farers, so
productive that risks would be worthwhile.
What ARAP was planned to do was to finance the clearing and fencing
of more land, and to give the final push by giving a substantial grant for
ploughing expanded fields. Furthermore, seeds were provided and fertilizers
for three hectares. If farmers could pass the 10 hectare limit, the
productivity might increase so much as to make arable farming attractive.
However, it did not reduce risks, and the key problem was whether ARAP
made the risk worthwhile to such an extent that farmers would spend
resources this way on their own.
In essence, the MOA's proposal for a new programme represented an
ambition to commercialize a group of farers with the potential to become
commercial producers of crops. This would also fulfil objectives of national
production volumes and social justice. The means aimed at extensive and
intensive production modernization in combination, trying to increase
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productivity by means of improved methods combined with economies of
large scale.
In principle, the means are of the same type as those us ed in ALDEP, Le.
the provision of input factors that the farming systems themselves did not
generate on sufficient scale. The idea was that the transfer of all these
inputs at the magnitude proposed would make farers producers of a
surlus, and motivate them to re-invest the profits of the crops in continued
arable faring for new profit in the years after ARAP was phased out.
ARAP should only give the decisive push into commercial production of
crops. Compared to ALDEP or any other programme, ARAP was much
more generous, it did not ask any contribution from the farer in terms of
money or obligation. The grants should cover the costs or more of doing
the operations required, but only once.
4.4.1 The components
In mid 1985 a project proposal for ARAP was presented.29 ARAP
contained several assistance components; all farers in the target group
could receive assistance once from each component. Most components were
to be limited by an upper limit of 10 hectares. Inc1uded in the proposal
were provision of seeds, grants for destumping fields, ploughing grants and
assistance for fencing of fields. Limited to 3 hectares only was provision
of fertilizers. One component gave assistance for community water supplies
development, and a Crop Protection Unit was to be established.
As noted above, the bias is definitely towards extensive modemization,
although fertilizers in particular, and to some extent destumping and
fencing, can be seen as means for intensive modemization.
Ploughing subsidy and seed provision were used as encouragement to
expand field sizes, as are also destumping and fencing. Destumping eases
ploughing and other use of mechanical equipment, and fencing facilitates
cultivation of new fields, that of ten are in the grazing areas and in need of
protection.
The emphasis on extensive modernization reflects the exclusion of
ecological problem perceptions. Environmentalists stress that preserving the
ecological foundation for agriculture requires more intensive and
29 This presentation is based on the description given in the NFS document, published in
August 1985, and thus written not long before that. The summer 1985 is also the time
when the politicalleadership intervened in the planning of ARAP and changed it. Thus,
guided by the interviews, I interpret the NFS presentation as MOA's ARAP proposal,
which was later changed (MFDP 1985:16)
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conservationist methods of agriculture. Eskeli is an exponent for these
points of view.30 Re argues in his report (1989: v) in favour of
constraining the destumping, and he states that
... policies should stress the role of conservation and improved farming
practices in sustaining production and improving productivity
The amounts of cash involved are not specified in the NFS document, but
they were, according to interviews, decided upon already.31 They were set
to P50 per hectare ploughed with own or hied draft power, P50 for each
hectare destumped (cleared) land, and a 85 per cent subsidy of costs for
fencing. Seeds and fertilizers were to be distributed free.32 With an
exception for fencing, these grants in all probability covered all real costs
for ploughing and fencing even if labour or a tractor was hired.
The programme was proposed to be in operation for five years. The
ploughing, seeds and fertilizer components were meant to be available only
for one year, or two at most. The five year time frame was only for
destumping and fencing. The core idea was to pay farers once to plough,
plant and fertilize a large field and hope that these rather progressive
farers would get so much out of it that they continued on the same scale.
The once-off principle can also be explained by the wish to avoid a long
lasting drainage on financial and personnei resources, but the main idea was
that one final assistance would be enough. The changes promoted by ARAP
were mainly of a quantitative nature, not a change in the qualities of arable
farming. The changes should therefore not be hindered by managerial
shortages or gaps in farmers ' technological expertise. The point was to
make them realize the economies of scale.
The two key assumptions formulated above, concerning adequate
resource basis and ability to risk enough to realize economies of scale apply
also for ARAP, but there are some additional assumptions in this paricular
30 He has evaluated ARAP's destumping component with special emphasis on ecological
effects, and he has previously worked in forestry projects in Botswana.
31 I have no indications that they were not all the time, from the first proposal, set in the
same way.
32 The crop protection component, Le. the establishment of a technical unit to counter these
problems, differs from the rest of ARAP in that it is not an assistance to the production
of the individual farmer. Interview data indicate that the MOA already had resources
granted from a donor for this purpose, and the project was linked to the ARAP proposal.
I wi1leave out this component in the remaining analysis, but note that imp1ementation
of crop protection campaigns when needs arise, as they did in the mid eighties, invo1ves
the field service personnei who became responsible for the ARAP implementation.
71
design that are worth pointing to. First, it was assumed that the clients had
already adopted the improved methods - only fertilizers were introduced
as this was less used. Secondly, it was assumed that assistance once only
would be sufficient. This implied that the resource situation would be good
enough among farers to continue in large scale arable faring on their
own. The once-off assistance was expected to make a critical difference.
Included here is the assumption that the target group had access to draft
power. Thirdly, it was assumed that the farers wanted such an expansion
if it was offered. There was an upper limit of ten hectares, there was no
lower limit saying that only farmers who increased field sizes to over a
certain level would benefit. Furthermore, there were no requirements about
using all or most components combined, which was a basic idea. It was
assumed that farers would see that as rational on their own, or when
guided by extension.
4.5 Participation in the planning process
In the above, I have discussed the initiation and design of ARAP and linked
it to MOA problem structures. I have shown that there are elements of
continuity in the problem structures but also that there are some innovations
regarding the design of components. In a complex organization like the
Ministry of Agriculture there are many sub-problem structures, I.e, various
specialized parts of the ministry maintain specialized elements of the
overall MOA problem structure. ARAP would affect other programmes and
premises. How was ARAP coordinated towards this? In the theoretical
perspective adopted, these questions concern the organizing of the planning
process. Who were the actors, and what premises and interests did they
promote or ignore? That is, how were various sub-problem structures linked
together? I argue that the planning process was very centralized. I will
show that important premises and interests were left outside.
4.5.1 Norms for project p lann ing
The interview material suggests the normal organization of a planning
process as follows. When an initiative is taken, the Planning Officer (PO)
in P&S responsible for the policy area in question receives the case, and
organizes a reference group. 33 Participation vares, but at least the PO and
33 The POs in Planning and Statistics have divisions of work. Two of them are responsible
for evaluations. One is responsible for arable agriculture, one is responsible for livestock
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some representative for the implementing unit in MOA take par. Of ten also
others, for instance the Rural Sociology Unit (RSU) are included. This
reference group coordinates the planning, and presents a proposal to the
head of Division of Planning and Statistics (P&S) and then to the
Permanent Secretar (PS) or his deputy (DPS) and the minister. The
Planning Officers Manual (MFDP 1986: chp. 4) - which is a detailed
manual about how to plan projects - presents norms for the planning
which stress the role of the implementing unit. The implementing unit is
supposed to initiate projects and to make preliminar drafts. The
responsible Planning Officer is supposed to assist in this work, to ensure
that the Project Memos are of standard professional quality. The need to
consult those who would be affected and to seek advice is strongly
emphasized. Compared to the norms in the Planning Officers Manual, the
MOA routines are thus somewhat more centralized, but the desirability of
wide participation, and in particular the participation of the unit that will
be in charge of the programme in question is strongly emphasised.
ALDEP is commonly referred to as a case where there was wide
planning and consultation, while at the same time, ALDEP did not seem to
benefit very much from this correct planning procedure in terms of policy
design when compared to ARA P . On the other hand, ARAP might have
benefited from the ALDEP experience and from the information that was
collected for the planning of ALDEP. ARAP was planned in a more
centralized process. A significant difference between the two programmes
that probably stems from the centralized nature of the planning of ARAP,
is that ARAP proved to lead to negative side effects, and inappropriate
adjustments to important problems.
4.5.2 Interests and premises left aside
As elaborated in chapter 1, looking for problem structures that shape public
policies means to focus on the actual problem structures of decision-makers,
and a focus on the linking together of varous sub-problem structures in a
specialized and complex organization. This section concerns the latter.
Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on interview material, from
informants representing these units or the P&S.
and for conservation. Stil another is responsible for Drought Relief, poultry and dairy
farming. (Interviews, MOA officials)
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As ARAP turned out to include destumping of large fields, it naturally
raised questions of soil conservation and preservation of scarce wood land
resources (see above). In MOA there is a Division of Land Utilization
under the Director of Agricultural Field Services (see appendix 3). The
division includes a Forestry Unit (FU) and a Soil Conservation Unit
(SCU).34 These units were not engaged in planning ARAP at all. This is
striking, because ARAP has significant environmental effects. As noted by
Eskeli (1989: 78), Forestry Unit personnei recognized the potentially
adverse effects of ARAP, but remained passive.
Women's issues are relatively new as a premise to be considered in
developmental policies (NORAD 1989). The Women's Affairs Unit in the
Ministry of Home Affairs is supposed to be consulted on programmes
affecting women. As women are doing most of the work in arable
agriculture (NORAD 1989), it is noteworthy that this was not involved in
the case of ARAP. Consideration of women's problems can be seen as a
mere normative demand, but in the case of agricultural policies it should
be obvious that the problems facing female-headed households are of such
significance for the ability of farming households to profit from
programmes, that design and implementation have to take women's
situation into account if the programme is going to be effective. The
female-headed households have some constraints other households do not
have.
Furthermore, the implementing agency is especially mentioned in the
planning officers' manual (MFDP 1986), and is not only to be consulted,
but also to play a central role in initiation and planning of projects. In
initiating the ARAP project and deciding on how problems should be
addressed, the Department of Agricultural Field Services, through its
Division of Crop Production (DCP), would be the relevant implementing
unit to consult. This did not happen, until at a very late stage in the
process. MOA civil servants at lower levels described ARAP as imposed
from the top echelons in the MOA hierarchy. The experience and insights
in the sector's problems, generated through the units' monitoring of day to
day implementation of arable programmes were not taken cognizance of in
the planning of ARAP. Only in the final stages, when preparng for
implementation, was the Field Service consulted on the practical aspects
(see ch. 6).
34 These are not the only units in the administration working on environmental issues, but
they are probably some of the most obvious ones to be engaged in a programme like
ARAP. The Soil Conservation Officer, for instance, participated in the initial stages of
planning ALDEP Gnterview, SCV).
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Even if the organization units specializing in the issues mentioned had
played a part in the planning process, that does not necessarly mean that
the outcome would have been different, but it might have been. At any rate,
the centralization of the planning is noteworthy.35 Some programmes, most
notably ALDEP, are closely related to ARAP. In the project memos
presenting ARAP, coordination with ALDEP is a stated goal. But there are
no signs of consultation with the ALDEP coordinator. ALDEP was severely
affected by ARAP's taking the bulk of implementation capacity. There was
no attempt to mediate between the se two major claims on implementing
capacity.
ARA P was, according to informants in MOA, planned and designed
mainly in P&S. Interview data suggest that the process was rather informal.
The Chief Agricultural Economist, who is the head of the planning division,
was responsible for the case. His interactions with others were of a rather
informal nature. Interactions and discussions of both the initiative and the
design of solutions were quite widespread in the P&S, according to higher
level MOA officiaIs. The programme proposal was also discussed with
officials in RDU in MFDP,36 but ARAP was made by the MOA top leveL,
especially in P&S, without much interaction with others.
The centralization of policy planning and design also meant that possible
channels for the articulation of farmers ' interests were closed. This is the
more important as farmers' interest organizations are not developed as
national entities, and are unable to contribute in policy-making interactions
with central administration representatives. The Field Service might be a
potential channel, but as noted above, these parts of MOA were not active
paricipants in the process. Applied research conducted by MOA's Rural
Sociology Unit (RSU) generated a lot of research material for use in
developing ALDEP.37 RSU is, as the case of ARAP shows, not routinely
linked to all projects. RSU is also so small that its capacity would not have
allowed that. RSU seems to be given quite wide discretion regarding its
own work priorities, but the information resulting from the research is not
necessarly considered by decision makers (Interview, RSU officer). The
absence of research units is noteworthy also conceming the absence of
input from MOA'.s technical research department on production
35 Even if these specialized units were not systematica1Iy integrated in the design and
planning of ARAP, this does not mean that the interaction were non-existent. There
might have been some informal contacts.
36 The involvement of RDU is somewhat uncertain, only one informant refers to it.
37 MOA is not the only ministry with its own applied research unit. For instance, MLGL
has a similar unit, Applied Research Unit.
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techniques; the Department of Agricultural Research. Seen against the
background of the prominence attached to research in all NDPs, it is
puzzling that this department was not more effectively consulted.
The districts should also be mentioned. The ARAP programme would be
a major development effort in the districts. It would by its effects on land
use influence physical planning in the districts, and a programme for
agricultural development would be implemented in districts with quite
different conditions for agriculture. Moreover, in other cases, districts are
consulted on major policy initiatives. In ARAP this did not occur.
The low degree of mobilization of organizational resources in the case
of ARAP is a major explanation for many of the negative side effects that
ARAP later prove d to cause, as will be discussed in chapter 7.
4.5.3 Same centralizing factars
How can a tendency towards a centralized participation structure of the
planning proeess be explained? I will suggest, based on fragmentar
interview data, that the explanation includes both characteristics of the top
level of MOA, especially Division of Planning and Statistics (P&S), and
features of the specialized units.
P&S has a powerful role within the MOA because of its formal powers.
All projects, and most amendments to existing projects, have to be accepted
by that division, which makes a recommendation to the PS and to the
Minister. According to Planning Officers (POs) these recommendations are
usually accepted. The responsible PO in P&S normally decides who is to
be represented in the reference group for a project (Interviews, MOA
officials) . The Planning Officers Manual that contains a detailed
prescription of appropriate planning procedures clearly assigns a central role
to line ministries' planning units (MFDP 1986).38 Still, 'the implementing
or specialist unit is also assigned a central role, especially in initiation of
projects.
In addition to the strong formal power of the P&S, we also find an
ambition to influence project planning at least as much as the formal rules
prescribe, maybe a bit more. Officials in P&S were asked in the interviews
how they perceived their own and the P&S's role in the planning of
projects. Their answers emphasised that they were in charge of the
38 This Manual is according to MOA POs adhered to. It gives a very detailed description
of all the detail ed steps that should be taken in a line ministry when projects are
prepared.
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planning. They did not define their own role as one of providing only
professional assistance to the technical units responsible for varous kinds
of programmes. POs perceived technical units as somewhat passive in the
planning process, and they regarded this as a problem. The P&S's ambition
seems to be to include the technical units in the paricipation structure for
project elaboration, and at the same time make the final considerations and
decisions itself. One informant defined the ideal cooperation and
consultation between P&S and the implementing and research units as
hearng ideas about how problems could be solved. The other units should
give inputs to be processed and decided upon in P&S. Once a formal
proposal was made by P&S, the same MOA informant claimed,
consultation was over. This contrasts with, for instance, the Norwegian
equivalent of consultation, the hearng. The hearing institution is to send the
elaborated proposal to interested paries in order to hear their opinions. The
underlying assumption is that there are of ten conflicting interests, and that
compromises should be reached.
P&S officials express the view that the low participation of technical
units and research units in project planning is a problem. These concems,
especially regarding DAFS, se em to be genuine. In 1989 P&S had plans for
giving a PO an assignment to find ways to activate especially DAFS better.
But, it was justified in terms of generating ideas. P&S seem to want to
maintain its controlover projects, but they realize that they need ideas
coming from others.
The above discussion suggests that the low participation from technical
units is to a considerable degree their choice. This is not very surprising,
seen in the light of what seems to be a very dominant P&S. Participation
combined with rather low influence is problematic in most organizations.
The various technical units tend to define their role as pure implementors,
or as autonomous specialists on limited domains. Based on thorough
interviews with four Field Service officiaIs, it is suggested that this group
of officials regard themselves more as implementors than as paricipants in
policy making and project design. It is illustrative that when asked about
what the ideas and reasons for policies were, they referred to the top level
of the ministry. It is also clear that they do not initiate projects very of ten.
When giving examples about what they cooperated with higher levels
about, they mentioned relatively technical matters. Data do not allow firm
and representative conclusions about this, but it seems that Field Service
officers regard themselves as loyal implementors of directives from higher
leveis. As the implementors of programmes DAFS also has a potentially
quite influential position. But as the development of ARAP indicates,
DAFS is loyal to directives from higher leveIs.
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I.
Cooperation across formal divisions of work seems to be rare. The
Forestry Unit and Soil Conservation Unit are quite good examples of this
restricted role. The officers in these units seem to regard themselves as
technical specialists with a responsibility only for a limited area of
specialist concems. They don't engage very much in providing
environmental premises to projects that are not strictly environmental. The
ecological problems are approached by specialists in special programrnes.
The Forestry Units work, as described by one of the units officers, is to
implement forestry projects: For instance, to organize the production of new
trees to be planted by villagers, to organize the planting of woodlots in
localities throughout Botswana, to regulate the commercial utilization of
forests where such resources exist. The point is that concentrating on these
activities also leaves the Forestry Unit outside the major agricultural
projects affecting forestry problems. ARAP is an example of this.
Conservation is also taken care of in separate projects. In his paper about
soil conservation, Veenendaal (year unknown) stresses the need to link
the se units doser to the large programmes instead of preserving
environment al issues for specialist programmes under specialist units.39
The emerging picture is one of a ministry with tendencies of
fragmentation. Even if the MOA is probably a very controlled ministry, in
which hierarchical chains of command function, it also seems to be
characterized by negative coordination, I.e. the avoidance of interaction and
cooperation, apart from obeying orders. As the MOA has gradually
intervened more substantially in the rural economy and as the complexity
of the organization grows, this will increasingly become a problem of
effective policy making.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, some general elements of the MOA's problem structure
before policies tumed towards mass approaches have been outlined. It has
been argued that the problem structure and models of action of the MOA
were largely applied also for new purposes, forced onto the MOA from the
outside.
In this chapter I have discussed the Ministry of Agriculture' s elaboration
of a programme proposal according to these lines, and argued that the
problems of the old approach concerning poorer farmers basically remain,
39 The preparation of a National Conservation Strategy might be an improvement in this
respect. The strategy was at the time of field work under elaboration.
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but with a possible exception for at least some of the medium scale
farmers. ARAP was an intensified and bold attempt to achieve an objective
that has proved very difficult to achieve, namely the commercialization of
arable farming.
The planning and design processes were centralized to the higher levels
of MOA, and important premises were left outside. The consequences this
proved to have is one of the topics in chapter 7.
Even if ARAP, as presented in mid 1985, was a completely planned
programme, it was still not finally decided. It was forwarded to the political
leadership, who saw ARAP as auseful programme, but for different
purposes. Which is the next topic.
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5. The planning of ARAP: The Ministry of
Agriculture and powerful actors in the
environment
5.1 Introduction
Powerful actors in the environment inc1ude the political authorities, the
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and the donors. In
this chapter their ability to influence ARAP, and the consequences of it,
will be discussed. The main issue will be the role of the political
leadership. It proved most decisive.
As shown in chapter 4, the MOA (Ministry of Agriculture) programmes
included in the National Food Strategy (NFS), among these ARAP, were
responses to new demands from the outside about overall policy objectives.
When the political authorities intervened in the planning of ARAP, they did
so in a very decisive way, giving directives also about how policy goals
should be fulfilled. The administration reacted with loyal obedience, but
also with some adjustments.
The ARAP proposal that had been forwarded by the MOA was a bold
and uncertain one, based on many assumptions, and adjusted to the
situation of one group that the MOA perceived had a commercial potential.
Still, the assumptions were uncertain also when considering this group.
ARAP was one component of many in a national strategy. The various
programmes in the strategy (NFS) were targeted, because one realized that
different groups had to be approached differently. The political
interventions destroyed this comprehensive approach. Instead of different
offers to different groups, as a result of the political intervention, all groups
were in practice confronted with ARAP. The assumptions of ARA P
definitely did not hold when applied as widely as the political authorities
decided upon.
5.2 The role of the political authorities
The initiative and design of ARAP was, as outlined in chapter 4, an
administrative process. Moreover, it was limited to the small group of
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leading policy makers in MOA, with consultations only with Rural
Development Unit (RDU) in MFDP. The political authorities activated
themselves at a rather late stage, but with important consequences. As a
project proposal was ready in mid 1985, the Minister of Agriculture gave
new direction to ARAP. What was a generous, bold once-off support to a
limited group that could utilize the assistance to make a decisive jump into
the group of commercialized farers was now made available to all farmers
throughout Botswana. Furthermore, the programme was by MOA designed
as a once-off, massive transfer of resources, but anual Cabinet decisions
repeated the once-off transfer every year from 1985/86 to 1989/90.
5.2.1 Consequences for AR
The consequences of the political intervention for the content and aim of
the programme were that it became a programme for modemizing the
arable sub-sector in general, and not just the part of it that comprised the
medium scale farmers. The minister's decision crushed MOA's targeted
strategy, as represented in the NFS. Because ARAP offered more
assistance, had less client requirements, and was related to felt needs, it
would obviously out-compete other efforts very quickly. Which it did.
Besides, ARAP took more or less all the implementing capacity.
The arable development approach for the poorest farers is, as discussed
in chapter 3 and 4, a problematic one. The promoted faring practices
would not solve the productivity problems, except when combined with
economies of scale. In this is the inadequacy of ALDEP, and the potential
of ARAP, because ARAP aimed at passing the economy of scale threshold.
In doing so, it was based on some assumptions, that some better off farmers
might fulfiL. These are mentioned above, and relate to their relatively strong
resource base. They would, after the once off assistance have draft power,
resources to risk, adoption of improved methods, and an interest in
expanding field sizes. None of these aims could be expected to be fulfilled
by the poorest farmers.
The new groups which were included, i.e. the poorest farmers, were to
a large extent without cattle, and thus without their own draft power as well
as without resources that could be risked. They were also only to a very
limited extent among those who had adopted improved methods.
To the extent that ARAP was a viable endeavour, it was so because it
was directed towards a group of farmers - medium scale - with an
already quite diversified economic basis. Considering the expansion of
ARAP's target group, the majority of its members did not have this
diversified agricultural basis.
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The Project Memo (MOA 1985a) states that ARAP is meant to reduce
dependence on livestock. This do es not mean exactly the same for the two
groups of farmers. For the medium scale farers, ARAP aimed at
improving their already varied and diversified economic basis. For the poor
ones, it aims in reality at making them able to stay in agriculture without
really solving their problems, and to do this in away that would not require
changes in basic modemization policies.
MOA was sceptical to the effectiveness of applying the once-off and
massive support approach for the poorer farers. One major grant would
not solve their problem, and if the poor farers should be persuaded to try
the ARAP effort, it was perceived that this would be a waste of resources.
To use this massive assistance approach for a long time was out of the
question in MOA's view, because it would create dependence and destroy
the farmers ' incentives, as informants put it.
On the other hand, MOA did not expect many poor farmers to use
ARAP, at least if one is to take the financial estimates seriously. They
include expected costs for the various components and imply that only a
minority of all eligible farmers would apply for assistance. The offer MOA
provided in ARA P was a combined, massive effort for those who really
wanted to try. And it was not thought of, it seems, that ARAP could be
used for other purposes by those farers who did not want to try the way
MOA envisaged.
In the years to come, the political leadership decided every year to repeat
the programme. That is, in the originally decided programme, approved
after the new guidelines for eligibility, assistance should be given once for
each component, over a few years. Repeating this meant that every year it
was decided that all farmers would in the coming season be eligible for all
the assistance components regardless of whether they had received support
previously or not. Thus, the once-off principle was dropped, and instead a
practice of massive, annual grants became operational for 5 years.
As this pattern materialized, scepticism increased in MOA, until in 1989,
at the time of the field work for this report, hardly anyone in the ministry
was really willing to defend the programme and argue in favour of it. The
problems of the effectiveness of the ARAP approach when applied to all
farmers became obvious. Moreover, the demands on implementing capacity
became so large that all other programmes were seriously hindered by it
(See chapter 6).
A programme which in principle would make 70 000 farmers able to
destump 10 hectares each would naturally have consequences for the
environment and for land use in the rual areas. As noted in chapter 4,
MOA's own expertise on these issues remained passive. The Land Use
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Officer in the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, (MLGL) reacted
however. MLGL has the coordinating responsibility for land use planning.
Some kind of agreement was reached, whereby local Land Boards under
MLGL should limit the allocation of new land, so that destumping would
be done mainly on allocated, but still not destumped land.
The changes in the target group definition made ARAP a masterly
instrument to generate support to the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party)
from both rural socio-economic elites and from the poor rual majority. The
expansion of the target group also meant the inclusion of the large
proportion of farers without their own draft power. ARAP paid for hired
draft power as well as the use of the farers' own draft animals. This
meant that ARAP would create a large market for draft power hiring. Those
with draft power to sell would benefit. The tractor owners, a small group
of large scale farmers and cattle owners, could expect to benefit. And the
group of BDP MPs defended not least this interest when supporting the
minister, since they were large cattle owners and tractor owners themselves.
At the same time, by its design of providing farers with assistance that
is visible, and responding to felt needs (lack of resources of varous kinds),
ARAP would obviously become a very popular programme among the
majority of farmers. The political authorities in this case took care of both
the political interests of generating support from the majority, while at the
same time they could support the local elites. Thus, after the political
intervention, ARA P emerged as a programme for intensive modemization
for all groups, and it was at the same time an effective measure to secure
the political support from all major rual groups because, unlike TGLP and
ALDEP it was a modernization programme for all, and it was the most
generous ever.
The minister' s intervention put the process under time pressure. The fact
that the minister took an interest himself might have speeded it all up. He
took such an interest that he is labelled as the man behind ARAP by some.
An additional explanation is that the drought crisis gradually became an
argument in favour of ARAP. ARAP was promoted as a recovery measure
(MOA 1985a). According to informants, it is a general principle that
drought related efforts should have priority, and this might explain why
ARAP, after several years of steady elaboration, came under time pressure.
The reference to the drought has to be seen as a tactical argument, but it
makes some sense to argue that in an attempt to rebuild agriculture after the
disaster, agriculture should also be improved. On the other hand, the
drought was not yet over and a recovery was premature at this time. Relief
was needed more, and for this there already was an operative and effective
programme under implementation. Holm and Morgan published in 1985 an
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article describing Botswana' s relief and recovery system as the most
effective in all Africa. In the Aide Memoir of March 1985, there are no
suggestions for improved measures for relief and recovery. Aide Memoirs
are written routinely by an inter-ministerial working group, which regularly
assesses the need for relief and recovery measures.
MOA did not resist the changes that were introduced, but tried to adjust
ARAP as best as it could. Informants expressed the view that nothing could
be done when the political authorities intervened. Furthermore, some
informants stated with some resignation, that it happened quite of ten that
political authorities intervened like this. MOA's re action was rather to make
adjustments to the proposal on some points. The Deparment of Agricultural
Field Services was consulted on how the programme could now be
implemented. It was decided that ARAP had to be implemented over a
somewhat longer period of time, in order to reach those farmers interested.
It seems that the components which were finally decided on to be
implemented over two years were originally meant to be done in one year.
Later on, as noted, the programme was re-Iaunched and so all components
were available repeatedly for 5 years.
The weeding and row planting components were not a part of MOA's
original idea for medium scale farers. These came in as a result of the
expansion of the target group. The poorer farmers did not use these
improved methods, even if they had been advocated through extension and
ALDEP for a long time. Only a minority, the medium scale farmers, used
these methods (Farngton 1987). This was an attempt to adjust the
programme to the poor farmers known to abstain from new methods. It
made ARAP a more intensive modernization promoting programme.
5.2.2 The politicalleadership
The minister acted when the proposal was put forward in mid-1985. The
major impact was the expansion of the target group, and in the years
following the launching in 1985, the political authorities repeated ARAP
year by year. The minister acted, not only as head of the ministry, but also
as a representative of the political authorities. He mobilized the support of
the Cabinet, and he also had the support of BDP's MPs (Interviews, civil
servants and observers).
Regarding the question of the minister and his supporters' motives, the
answers are complex. The general reasons for the modemization of small
scale arable farming is mentioned above, with special reference to the long
lasting stagnation of agriculture. As modemization and new wealth had
be come highly visible and economic growth in Botswana was one of the
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highest in Africa, the backwardness of traditional agriculture became more
pressingly felt. These and other factors led to the formulation of new policy
objectives in the late seventies. The new objectives emphasized that more
had to be done to alleviate rual poverty. This in its tur led to ALDEP and
F AP (Financial Assistance Policy) and the NFS strategy in general.
The results of ALDEP especially did not show up immediately, and in
ARAP, it was perceived, the rationale was laid for even stronger means
than the long term, step by step measures applied in ALDEP. Farers had
shown little enthusiasm for ALDEP, Httle had changed. In fact, at this time
both ALDEP (Opschoor 1983), and the arable development strategy in
general had come under criticism (Faaland and Isaksen 1983). Finally, as
it became evident that ALDEP was insufficient, and as this perception was
voiced by critics, the BDP suffered a set-back in the 1984 general elections.
The rationale in the minister' s intervention was to use the thus far most
radical programme design to solve pressing problems. The minister's view
on agricultural policies was of importance. He expressed his scepticism
regarding ALDEP, because this programme in his view helped the poor
farmers only to continue in agriculture, but without giving them any real
opportunity to become producers of a surplus above subsistence leveIs.
ARAP, on the other hand had higher ambitions - and more important -
stronger incentives and a shorter time perspective, aiming at reaching
objectives within a few years. The minister considered that this exceptional
opportunity should be given to all, including the small farmers.
It seems clear that the minister's own political position played an
important role as well. Re is described by observers as powerful and
ambitious, probably the next president.40 Re became Minister of
Agriculture in 1985. Taking over the responsibility for agriculture meant
taking over the responsibility for one of the most problematic sectors of the
economy, and he needed to show ability to act and achieve results.
These political directives were not just a question of the minister's
opinions and attitudes. Re had support in a broad coalition of political
forces. Data indicate that large farmers, i.e. the cattle owners among MP' s
and possibly among civil servants, had been waiting for something that
could benefit this group as well. In fact, MPs have maintained their support
to ARAP also in later years when most others have begun to express doubt
and criticism. The political leadership obviously must have seen the
proposed ARAP as an opportunity to regain support, especially if it could
be adjusted to reach the majority of the electorate. It would be popular
40 The corruption scandals in 1992 that led to his resignation have drastically changed these
prospects.
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among ordinar farmers, as it was directed towards familiar problems
experienced. At the same time, it would give the large farmers large
incomes as contractors for ploughing. The 100 per cent subsidy and the
procedures of giving assistance in cash for most of the components also
made ARA P attractive.
In his discussion of Drought Relief, Holm argues that the relief efforts
are regarded by politicians as well suited to gain popularty, mainly because
of their character of being a help to the needy in very visible form. He
notes that the Cabinet has been pressing the administration in order to
spend even more money on relief efforts for this reason (1985: 476).
Furher, he states that
The (BDP) has recently come to see drought relief as a very effective
means of reinforcing its rural support, the principal source of its majority.
ARAP was similar to relief efforts in that it was designed as direct, non-
committing transfer of resources, which was attractive also in the political
leadershi p' s perspecti ve.
The political demands on the MOA of the late seventies to take on a
more active role in alleviating rural poverty represent a contraction
(Jacobsen 1967); the political authorities intervened as administrative
performance did not support basic goals. In the case of ARAP, the
contraction went farther, interfering also in what means the MOA should
apply.
5.3 ARAP appraised in MFDP
5.3.1 MFDP and its role in project planning
In short, any proposed programme from a line ministry has to be sent to
MFDP's Division of Economic Affairs (DEA), and if relevant, it also goes
to RDU and the Rural Development Council, which is a high level inter-
ministerial committee. According to the interview material this is a very
powerful body, where problems can be presented and acted upon quickly,
as the ministerial top leaders are represented there. In the DEA, POs
evaluate the programmes from line ministries. The POs are specialized,
each PO is responsible for the evaluation of programmes from one or in
some cases two ministries. The PO gives a recommendation to higher levels
in DEA, and the programme or project is also assessed in the Macro
Econoffic Unit. Final decisions are reached by the MFDP leadership giving
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a recommendation to Cabinet or making a decision itself.41 As noted in
chapter 3, the assessments made in MFDP can in principle be quite vared,
but key issues are the feasibility and viability of projects. Furhermore,
there is an assessment whether the projects are well prepared and all
necessar considerations made. The appraisals also try to keep projects
within the framework of policy guidelines, and simply stop or modify
projects that are not well prepared. Especially in interviews with MFDP
officials, the importance of ensuring that all projects are planned according
to a certain techncal standard is emphasized.
5.3.2 Administrative views on the AR proposal
The MFDP's attitude towards ARAP was one of scepticism in several
respects. As the medium scale project idea was outlined and argued for in
the National Food Strategy document, prepared by MFDP's Rural
Development Unit in cooperation with line ministries, MFDP accepted the
idea of a major, short term effort in favour of the medium scale farmers in
order to commercialize their arable production. One additional reason was
that ARAP would not imply long lasting recurrent costs.
The scepticism in MFDP concerned theapplication of the ARAP concept
to all farmers. MFDP was not convinced that the use of so much money
would pay off in lasting achievements, I.e. there was doubt concerning the
viability of the project in financial terms. The ARAP expenses would also
go beyond the financial ceilings decided upon for MOA programmes for
the plan period (interviews, MFDP civil servants). Secondly, MFDP was
sceptical about MOA's ability to implement such a large programme. This
was a quite reasonable argument, as the field service was overloaded with
work already before ARAP was launched.
However, ARAP was presented to MFDP as a programme with political
clearance, and as a programme under time pressure. This put MFDP in a
difficult position, in which it could not exercise its normal powers. The
ordinar procedure was not followed, according to informants in MOA and
MFDP. The issue was discussed and decided with MOA in meetings where
higher level civil servants in MFDP and MOA were engaged from the
beginning. A recommendation was written after these discussions
(Interviews, MFDP and MOA civil servants).
41 Projects al 
ready accepted in the NDP, do not have to go all the way to Cabinet when a
proposal is presented in the plan period, Le. the concrete design of the ideas presented
for a programme in NDP is decided in MPDP and line ministries.
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Realizing that the programme concept in its new form could not be
countered, MFDP focused on practical problems of implementation, trying
to reduce the size of the programme. In the discussions between the
delegations from the ministries, MOA argued that they could implement it,
and refused to revise it. Faced with this attitude and political backing for
it, MFDP gave in, hoping to be able to improve ARAP in due course,
which has not happened (Interview, MFDP official).
One explanation for MOA's rejection of MFDP protests might be that the
former ministry felt it was of some symbolic importance to be able to resist
MFDP demands. Another, more likely reason is that MOA was loyal to the
political leadership of the ministry, and to the strong political coalition
behind the Ministry' s political leadership. Likewise, the normally rather
strong MFDP had to accept that ARAP was for all practical purposes
already decided upon, even if its leaders clearly saw the programme as
unjustified by normal criteria. This is illustrated not least by the
justification that was given for it. As ARAP was accepted, the drought
recovery aspect of its objectives became more central. One official stated
that this aspect was stressed in the MFDP recommendation to Cabinet for
formal decision, because it was about the only thing that could justify the
huge amounts of money to be spent. The programme could not be justified
in terms of modernization, as MFDP officials saw. it. Thus, ARAP was
decided as a combined modernization and recovery measure.
The recovery aspect is puzzling. The minister stated in September 1985,
when presenting ARAP to the National Assembly, that ARAP aimed at
increasing production and that it would also be a recovery measure. But in
September, nobody could know whether the drought was over, as the
season had not stared yet. It is as if the launching of ARAP was based on
the premise that the drought would end even if nobody knew whether it
would actually end. The reference to the drought was mainly a tactical
argument to justify a quite risky and not very promising modemization
programme. It was risky in the sense that the bulk of MOA's money and
implementation capacity would be spent on a programme which was so
large that it might cause a breakdown in the Field Service, and that might
very well not bring lasting results that could justify the huge spending.
5.4 Donors
Donors represent a powerful group of actors in Botswana, controlling
resources and expertise. The influence of the donor community in policy
making processes is one important element in any analysis of agricultural
policies. In the case of ARAP, NORAD decided to sponsor the programme,
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and NORAD us ed this as an opportunity to commit MOA to policy
principles seen as important in NORAD.
Even if ARAP demanded financial resources beyond MOA's financial
ceiling for the plan period, MFDP could finance it domestically -
Botswana had the reserves to do so. However, donors were approached, and
in december 1985 a formal request for financial assistance was presented
to NORAD. Even if NORAD cared a substantial par of the financial
burden, this has not given NORAD much influence over ARA P nor over
general agricultural policies. This is explained by the way NORAD was
activated by MFDP.
Before a formal request was presented, informal contacts had been made
with potential donors for ARAP. Interviews (MOA and MFDP officiais)
suggest that in addition to NORAD, also the African Development Bank
was approached. ADB later decided not to engage. Why was NORAD
approached?42 It seems to have been registered by MFDP that NORAD
was interested in an engagement in agriculture, a field in which NORAD
had not been active in Botswana previously. Granberg and Parkinson
indicate that the background for this interest in agriculture were new policy
signals from Oslo. NORAD was formally approached because it was
perceived by MFDP as interested, which they prove d to be. Before the
formal request, some documentation about ARAP was informally handed
over to NORAD. After receiving the request for support, NORAD
commissioned a study of the agricultural sector with special reference to
ARAP (Øygard et aL. 1986).43 The team expressed some doubts about
ARAP, and did not explicitly conclude about the programme. But the
fencing and destumping components were seen to be justified, and financial
support for these components was recommended (Øygard et aL. 1986).
Furthermore, the team recommended action to improve field staff
capabilities, to support women oriented efforts and to engage in projects for
environmental conservation in the sector. This also became NORAD policy,
according to the contents of the Sector Agreement. The NORAD assistance
was not a support for ARAP as such. Acceptance of some parts of ARAP
and some preferences in NORAD's general policy were combined, and
presented to MFDP.
42 In this analysis Crop Protection has been left out as this is a project of a somewhat
different kind than the ARAP in general. However, in the case of crop protection, also
other donors have been involved (MOA 1987; 68).
43 The team consisted of one norwegian, Øygard, one dutch researcher, Arntzen and one
Motswana researcher, Selolwane.
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A Sector Agreement was concluded in 1987. The Agreement was for five
years, and had NOK 50 mill as the ceiling for total expenditure. NORAD
agreed to pay for destumping and fencing (Granberg and Parkinson 1988:
237). NORAD also agreed to support projects for extension staff training
and infrastructure development of the field service. Both the se are projects
generated by Botswana and they suited NORAD's pteferences. The MFDP
representatives, who negotiated the Agreement with assistance from MOA
civil servants on their side accepted an obligation to give higher priority to
women' s issues and to environmental problems in agriculture. Thus
NORAD entered a bargain; it committed itself to support parts of ARAP
and in return got an agreement from Botswana to engage in problems
regarded as important by NORAD, especially women's issues. Women's
issues had definitely not been a central concern in MOA policy (Interview,
MOA higher level civil servants; W AU civil servants). And as argued
above, environmental considerations in arable agriculture are
organizationally located as special concerns to be dealt with in isolation
from the main production related projects like ARAP.
MOA has not followed up the obligation to consider women' s problems,
according to both NORAD and MOA officiaIs. The environmental
problems will be considered in the coming National Conservation Strategy
which is still not finally decided upon due to political conflicts. It is
doubtful whether the sector agreement with NORAD has made any
difference in this respect. And it thus seems that NORAD struck a bargain
which did not give substantial contributions to NORAD's objectives for
their involvement in traditional agriculture.
The reason for NORAD's lack of influence is that when Botswana
authorities consider a single project, they have the reserves to pay for it
themselves. They are not dependent on donor funding in the specific case,
although donors' contribution to the governmental total expenditure are
substantial. The dependence on aid is large on a macro level, i.e. donors are
main financiers of investments. But the dependence is not necessarly
effective at the level of single projects, because Botswana has the reserves
to go on with at least some of the project donors do not approve of. If
donors will support it, that is an advantage, if they do not, the project can
still materialize without problems. This is so both because of Botswana' s
own financial strength, but also because MFD P has been adept at using this
freedom of action. Thus, the financial resources NORAD could provide did
not give NORAD any substantial influence.
Based on the case of ARAP, it should be suggested as an hypothesis, that
even if the macro statistics show a very strong power positions for donor,
this power does not always materialize. Whether donors do affect public
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policy depends on the tactical capabilities of both the donor and of the
Batswana counterpar.
5.5 Summary
The central points made in this chapter are first, that the politicalleadership
took quite a strong interest in ARAP. The programme looked more radical
and decisive, compared to the slow working and much criticized ALDEP.
The political intervention was thus a contraction (Jacobsen 1967) that aimed
at ensuring that the MOA would fulfil the goals that ALDEP obviously
could not ful fil; development of the traditional, small scale agriculture. The
ARAP programme was also seen as a very useful means to mobilize
political support for the regime.
The political leadership decided that the ARAP support should be given
to groups that the support was not designed to help. Even if the MOA
clearly saw the problem in this, they reacted obediently and did not object
to the changes.
The low influence exercised by the donor is a bit surrising - a very
common assumption is that donors are very powerful. Most likely, in many
cases they are, but in this case it seems fair to say that NORAD was out-
manoeuvred. Looking at national totals of donor aid gives a picture of an
overall donor power position. The transformation of this macro or overall
power position to influence on specific project is a problem that needs
further study in Botswana.
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6. The implementation of ARAP
6.1 Introduction
In September 1985, ARAP was finally decided upon and ready for
implementation. Analysis of public policy has to take account of how the
policy might be transformed during the implementation. As discussed in
chapter 1, this is first, a question of policy makers' control with the
implementing organizations, I.e., the ability to guide the actions of
implementing organizations. Secondly, it is a question of how the
implementing organization is able to mobilize the target groups for change.
In this chapter I will first present the implementing organization.
Secondly, I will show that ARAP became the very dominant programme
implemented under the MOA, and discuss some reasons for this sudden
change. Within a year ARAP became the dominant activity of the field
staff. Good or bad, it shows the ability of the leadership at the apex of the
political-administrative system to guide the implementing organization and
to have its initiatives acted upon. Next we will show how ARAP prove d to
have a substantial mobilization capacity but a rather low capacity to control
whether the mobilized target group used the assistance in away that
contributed to the fulfilment of the programme's objectives. The
consequence was that farers did not use ARAP as the major and
comprehensive commercialization effort it was envisaged to be, but used
it rather selectively adjusted to their own preferences. Most farmers took
the ARAP assistance as a subsidy to maintain established production levels
and systems, and the major change for the majority was limited to an
increase in the field sizes; this could not alone trigger off the big leaps in
production that were envisioned.
6.2 The implementing organization
The implementing organization refers to the managers of ARAP in the
Ministry of Agriculture headquarters, and to the organization reaching down
to the regional, district and local leveIs.
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6.2.1 Centrallevel implementing structure
The responsible department in MOA is the Deparment of Agricultural
Field Services (DAFS). In DAFS, there is a Division for Crop Production
which is the implementing unit. It is headed by the Chief Crop Production
Officer. Under him a position of ARAP coordinator was established when
ARAP was decided, and an agronomist was hired for the job from another
position in MOA.
The ARAP coordinator has a small staff of techncal assistants. It seems
that the relationship between the ARAP coordinator and the rest of MOA,
especially the Chief Crop Production Officer, is a relatively close one.
There are few or none formal cooperative set-ups. They seem to cooperate
informally as needs arse. (Interviews MOA civil servants). Apar from
ARAP, only ALDEP has a coordinator who works on monitoring and
managing one programme only. The normal organization is that one
specialized unit handle several projects related to the same field. For
instance, there are varous horticultural projects under the horticultural
section. The specialized units are permanent and they are supposed to
identify problems within the field they are responsible for. Problems are
approached both through specific programmes and through the ordinary
extension activities done by field staff.
The ARAP coordinator is only responsible for the management of ARAP.
However, he is an administrator, and he is not in a formal position to
influence the programme significantly. He runs the programme from day
to day. He is responsible for supplies needed in the field and he provides
technical assistance to field personneI about how ARAP should be
operationalized. He receives routine reports from field staff and produces
statistics and regular reports about the activities going on under the
programme. The powers delegated to him se em to be quite small.
Modifications and changes of the programme must be recommended to
higher levels in the Ministry ,of ten they have to go to the very apex of
MOA, at least when they imply financial matters. The ARAP coordinator
seems to fit the description of DAFS personneI as loyal implementors given
in chapter 4.
The reasons for the establishment of the position of a special coordinator
were, first, that the workload would be so big for the central level manager,
that one person would have to be employed with that only. Secondly, the
organizational solution of a coordinator probably secures access to scarce
implementing capacity. The ARAP coordinator deals directly with field
staff at the regional and district leve!, which in turn interacts with the local
ADs. So do the varous specialized implementing units - each of them
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relates to the field staff to get capacity and priori ty for their programme or
in most cases, programmes.
6.2.2 The jield service
The Field Service is a structure that is quite specialized at the middle and
top of its hierarchy leve Is, and is linked to the clientele mainly through the
Agricultural Demonstrator (AD) who has to perform a multi -specialist role,
responding to demands from the specialized structure.
Each AD is responsible for agricultural field services in an Agricultural
Extension Area that can comprise as much as 2000 farming households.
The average is 364 faring households (Eskeli 1989: 36). There are 225
Agricultural Extension Are as . The size of the Agricultural Extension Areas
(AEA) both in terms of geography and number of farming households
contributes to the general work overload on ADs - especially as transport
facilities are of ten lacking. A large number of AD's positions are vacant,
as much as one-fourth (Granberg and Parkinson 1988).
The ADs' superiors are at the district level; the principal superiors are the
District Agricultural Officer and the District Agricultural Supervisor (DAO
and DAS). On the regionallevel there is the Regional Agricultural Officer,
RAO (Eskeli 1989). The final level is the central ministry, the DAFS (see
above). This four level structure is the core structure. All programmes
implemented by field service go through this structure.44 The civil servants
mentioned are not specialized to work in only one field within MOA's
responsibility, but they are responsible for almost all sub-sectors under the
MOA.
In addition to this core structure, there are a number of specialists,
notably at the central and regionalleveL. They work in only limited fields
under MOA. The Crop Production Officer at the regional level was
important for the implementation of ARAP, but there are also a number of
others, for instance, the staffing of the Southem Region comprises Ranch
Extension Officers, Animal Production Officers, one officer for smallstock
and one for General Duties, one Poultry Officer, and Land Use officers
(MOA 1981), in addition to the RAO and the Crop Production Officer.
The varous implementing units in DAFS in Gaborone interact primarily
with the RAO and the relevant regional level specialist, and to some extent
with the District Agricultural Officer. But basically, the regional level
specialists are the links to the implementors at the local and district level.
44 The Department of Veterinary ServIces has its own implementing structure.
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At this leveL, specialization is limited, and all demands are concentrated in
the DAO and the AD.
From higher hierarchical leveIs, the AD faces a lot of demands. He is
expected to implement a large number of programmes and the specialized
units in centrallevel of MOA present their projects to the AD through the.
specialized field service at the regional level. In addition there are the
demands to do general extension, and most specialized units probably also
want their tasks to be worked on through extension as well as through
programmes. The coordination of all this seems to be left to the AD and his
attempts to plan and make priority choices regarding how to use his time.
The ADs' tasks are thus twofold. First, they implement the regular
extension service of providing advice, training, demonstration and
information to farers. Secondly, the ADs are in charge of the
implementation of the various development programmes.45
This Field Service structure is manned by experts in agricultural
production techniques and farming systems. Data are lacking on the exact
content of their professional training, but for the lower leveIs, the emphasis
is on methods and techniques for various kinds of production (Interview
DAFS civil servant). Field staff are allowed to take further education and
gradually planning and economics seem to be included. But basically, the
field staff officers seem to be technical experts in agricultural production
(Interviews, DAFS civil servants).
The Field Service is also a career structure; most high level civil servants
advance gradually.46 The control of the careers of subordinates is a
powerful factor in securing discipline and loyalty in the service. According
to the description of this system of advancement given by one informant,
it is based on superiors formal and regular evaluations of subordinates.
Advancements are to a large extent based on superiors' appraisals of
subordinate field staff. Advancement usually also requires further education
and the DAO decides which of his ADs are going to get the opportunity.
This system might explain why the Field Service, as shown by the example
of ARAP, seems to be a quite disciplined organization also under severe
workload pressures like those caused by ARAP.
A distinction between an implementing organization' s ability to mobilize
and to control the clientele is applied here. By mobilization is meant the
ability to create an interactive relationship with the clientele at all. By
45 The description of basic structural aspects outlined here, is based on an interpretation of
organization char and more important, on iiterviews with DAFS civil servants.
46 For instance, quite a number of the informants I interviewed had previously worked in
field service on regional district or even local leveL.
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control is meant the ability to use this interaction in order to influence the
clientele to change behaviour in desired direction. For many years, the Field
Service concentrated on extension. The target group were the progressive
farers, who in most cases happened to be the wealthiest ones.
The offer to the clientele was advice, training, and demonstrations of new
methods, seed vareties and implements. This offer was relevant and
attractive for those who had resources, who could risk some of these
resources and who could risk so large an amount of resources that it would
facilitate large scale arable faring, utilizing both intensive and extensive
modemization in combination.
The mobilization capacity was very low, because few farers had a
rational interest in this. But it was not an objective to mobilize many
farers. The field staff thus remained a rather passive service institution for
those interested, and the field staff remained quite small, and did not have
any capacity for interaction with huge numbers of clients. This
corresponded to the model of action of reaching the progressive farmers, in
order to make them the pilots and examples for the rest.
The control potential was better. The farers who wanted the extension
services were in need of a good that only the AD had, namely knowledge
and advice. According to his professional knowledge, the AD could
influence his "pupil" to adopt the required practises and make the necessar
investments for arable farming. Under ALDEP control increased, it was
strictly defined what type of assistance a farmer could get, and there were
eligibility criteria, including some amount of investment. The subsidy
would not be given to those unable to fulfil these rather specific eligibility
rules. An innovation in the case of ALDEP, at least when considering
assistance to arable faring, was the application of standardized rules.
Previously, much more was left to the AD's discretion and technical
knowledge.
6.3 Implementing ARAP
A precondition for effective assistance to virtually all farmers over several
years was substantial implementation capacity. Below will be documented
the magnitude of the administrative requirements ARAP implied, and the
extent to which field staff obeyed new directives and changed their
priorities. Next will be shown the huge mobilization of farmers that was
achieved by ARAP. However, the ability to control the farmers was small
and the result of this was that ARAP developed into a rather purposeless
transfer of resources to most farmers. ARAP mobilized those interested as
planned, but it also mobilized a much larger group of farmers for whom
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ARAP was an attractive good for reasons not thought of by designers. This
problem was a new one - MOA had never previously had the problem
that the mobilization was too large and vared, and it is therefore not
surrising that its staff neither planned for that possibility nor were able to
respond to this problem as implementation developed. The service
organization proved to have problems regulating the access to a good when
the demand was large and experience of distribution in such a situation was
not far developed.
6.3.1 Workload and changed priorities
Effective implementation of ARAP required a large proportion of
implementing capacities. This implied that it was necessary to order the
field staff to leave aside many other tasks that they routinely worked on,
were familiar with and had interests, tradition and skill for. The quick
response in the Field Service to the new tasks is remarkable, and has
several reasons.
The workload caused by ARAP was substantial. The farers, when
applying for assistance, had to follow certain procedures. They will not be
discussed in detail, but some aspects of them indicate the magnitude of the
workload ARAP put on the Field Service. Payment for work done on the
fields, Le. ploughing, row planting and weeding was transferred in cash to
the farmer, or in the case of hired tractor ploughing, to the contractor, after
an application form had been sent to the AD. The field officer then had to
control that the work was actually done, before confirming and sending the
application to the district level for payment. Payment for destumping also
had to be verified by the AD and sent to the district level for final
approval. As the amount of cash was calculated per hectare, verification
also meant measurement of field sizes. Seeds and fertilizers were distributed
to the districts and the farers had to pick up these goods themselves.
However, records had to be kept by field staff over who had received seeds
and fertilizers (Eskeli 1989). The water development component required
even more time consuming routines. However, this component was not
much used. Probably partly because it required a lot of effort.
This work is administration, not extension. The development of proper
routines for handling of applications and controlon farm sites, application
of guidelines of eligibility and record keeping were tasks for which the
field staff was not trained, making these tasks more time consuming. A
control in the AEAs in 1986 also revealed shortcomings in record keeping,
according to the ARAP coordinator's annual report (MOA 1986b). The
Annual Report for the Crop Production Division in 1987 also stated that
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ADs were not well qualified for all these administrative tasks (MOA
1987b). Rashem also pointed this out in his evaluation (1987).
The implementation of ARAP was mainly regulated by general rules.
Some were formulated as guidelines when implementation started, and
additional rules, to clarfy problems, were added each year when the orders
to repeat the programme were sent. Hardly any discretion was left to the
AD under ARAP. It is also worth noting that the AD was not allowed to
decide that a farer should not have the assistance - the rules were
formed as rights with very vague eligibility criteria, so that there were no
ceilings on numbers of beneficiares and few, if any, groups were left
outside. Under the extension model, the AD had discretion on this. Under
ALDEP, there were stricter eligibility criteria that regulated access and
ceilings on how many farmers to assist. In ARAP this was not the case.
In his evaluation of ARAP, based on data from 1988, Eskeli collected
answers from field staff about workload. 80 per cent of the ADs answered
that ARAP took from 70 to 100 per cent of their time (Eskeli 1989: 45).47
Rashem (1987) also reports that in the AEAs he has examined, ADs were
fully occupied with administration of ARAP, and he writes that DA Os were
us ing much of their capacity on supply tasks, while the DASs were fully
employed as payment officers.48 When this happens in an already
overloaded implementing structure, it means that field staff experience a
profound change in their priorities. From a situation in which a large
number of programmes and some extension were the dominant activities,
ARAP alone became the dominant activity of the Field Service. The huge
administrative demands caused by ARAP are also illustrated by the
strengthening of the field service, implemented from 1986, when 400 Field
Assistants were added to the 200 ADs to administer ARAP. In addition,
c1erks were hired to assist in the district level payment administration. And
still, as Eskeli's material shows, ADs were mainly occupied with ARAP.
The changes brought about by ARAP in the Field Service were thus
profound and gave rise to a new, rule-applying organization whereas the
organization's tradition was that of a professional service organization.
The situation at the time ARA P was launched was thus that the
implementing organization was already quite overloaded, and it is
significant that within a short period of time, the Field Service changed its
47 It should be noted that these answers were collected after the AD's had got the Field
Assistants to assist them in administering ARAP.
48 These percentages are regarded only as approximations. A frequently criticized field
service might exaggerate the demands made on it to justify some of the failure in
performance they are accused of.
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tasks dramatically from extension and advice within many smaller
programmes, to a large scale rule regulated administration of aresource
transfer, which was what ARAP developed into. The priorities of the Field
Service were drastically changed. ADs had to give top priority to ARAP
and leave most other tasks aside, i.e. ignore them to a large extent.
The reasons for this drastic change of field staff activities are several. As
noted above, at the time ARAP was launched, the position of an ARAP
coordinator was created. A special coordinator signalizes the importance of
a programme, and the coordinator can concentrate fully on getting his
single programme implemented. This is significant in a situation where
implementing capacities are undoubtedly scarce. There are no central level
coordinating mechanisms giving varous programrnes priority or stopping
programmes because there is not the implementation capacity for it. Rather,
a specialized structure with many parts each trying to promote their
programme raises many demands on the same overloaded implementing
structure at regional and lower leveIs. In this situation of competition, a
strong manager of ARAP might increase the chances of getting the
programme through. The establishment of a special unit for ARAP was
significant in this respect.
However, the single most decisive reason for the huge workload was the
effective mobilization of farmers.
6.3.2 Effective mobilization
A major reason for the huge workload caused by ARAP was the effective
mobilization of farmers. An information campaign was launched at an early
stage. Field staff was briefe d on the new programme by the ARAP
coordinator and other Crop Production Division personneI (Interviews MOA
civil servants). Moreover, farers all over Botswana were informed about
the new programme. The ARAP coordinator was of course active in this
campaign, and so were other civil servants in DAFS. Furthermore, the
minister himself took part in several information meetings which were
broadcasted on radio. Both politicians and civil servants were instructed to
inform about ARAP whenever they were on duty in the districts. The
information campaign activities were of ten held at kgotla meetings.49
49 It is noteworthy that in a situation of time pressure under which the information
campaign was conducted, the Vil age Development Committees were in many cases not
activated as they usually are. The civil servants coming to a vilage instead cooperated
with the vilage headman to secure the attendance of farmers (Interview MOA civil
servants)
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It seems that the campaign was successful. Both Farington and Eskeli
report that most people knew something about the programme in the
districts they examined. This is of ten what fails when implementing
agricultural programmes. Most farmers were informed about the new
programme, and although data are not available on how ARAP was
presented, it daes not require much imagination to expect that the
government' s generosity was emphasized. The 100 per cent coverage of
costs probably made it relatively easy to mobilize interest for ARAP.
Another reason was that ARAP had components focusing on the problems
farers experienced, such as lack of draft power and the high risk
associated with the use of scarce resources for arable farming.
The ARAP components focused on symptoms, Le. experienced scarcities.
The farmers are those who experience these scarcities, and it would
probably not be difficult for them to see the use they could make of ARAP.
As long as ARAP was operational, it met a formidable demand. The
demand was high from the first season and in the coming years it increased.
ADs met demands from higher hierarchical levels to concentrate on ARAP,
but the most significant pressure probably came from farers. Informants
say that there were incidents of violence against field staff for not providing
. ARAP assistance quickly enough to all interested farers. The programme
was in principle open to 70 000 farmers, and as the interest for ARAP
assistance became manifest, so large a proportion of the 70 000 wanted
assistance that ARAP surely reached a larger target group than any
agricul tural programme had ever done before. In 1986/87 ploughing
assistance alone was given to 56 000 appliers (see below), which is a
number to be seen in relation to the number of AEA's with one AD each
and very little administrative support. ALDEP, by comparison assisted 5961
farmers in 1985/86, which was a peak that far (MOA 1988e).
6.3.3 Access to ARA assistance
In the above section it has been shown that ARAP reached more or less all
farmers, after some years. The first season ARAP was operational,
1985/1986, it reached an impressive number of farmers. In 85/86 18 000
received ploughing assistance, in 86/87, 56 000, in 87/88, 95 000.50 The
50 This number obviously reflects a lot of cheating, there are not 95 000 farmng
households in Botswana. According to the Agricultural Statistics from 1988, nearly 70
000 farmers planted crops in 1987-88. However, the number given reflects the wide use
of ARAP, covering most farmers.
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other components showasimilar increase, but at a lower rate - only
ploughing and seeds reached the large majority of farmers (MOA 1988a).
As ARAP was repeated over several years, this meant that some farmers
would receive assistance several times, while others would receive it fewer
times. Those farers able to utilize ARAP already the first year would
have benefited more times than the others. The better-off farers were the
ones who first took advantage of ARAP. Rashem reports that in 1987, a
large number of the poorer farers had still not been reached by ARAP
(Rashem 1987). This is also in accordance with what was indicated in the
interview materiaL. But Rashem's sample is too small to draw any firm
conclusions. The ARAP annual reports give, for each component except
seeds and fertilizer, both number of beneficiares and number of hectares
covered. It should be stressed that these numbers are regarded as rough
approximations. But acreage divided by the num ber of beneficiaries shows
that average field size ploughed under ARAP was around 7 hectares in
85/86, then it fell to 5 and then to 4 the following seasons, because
gradually the smaller farmers were reached.
One explanation for the long time it took to reach the smaller farmers
Hes in the policy of ARAP to let the farmers themselves take the initiative.
Taking an initiative is not only something that better-off farmers are more
us ed to doing, it is also something that requires time and resources. Another
explanation is that ARAP was similar to the Drought Relief programmes
(DR). Some ADs understood ARAP as a new form of relief for the larger
farmers, while DR could be used for the smaller ones (Farngton 1987).
Finally, especially the poorer farmers hire draft power, and they hire
tractors. Tractor owners are reluctant to plough on un-destumped fields, and
the poorer farmers have less of their land destumped than better-off farmers
(MFDP 1985a). Destumping under ARAP was not much used in 1985/86,
but reached huge proportions the following years, which probably opened
up more fields for tractor ploughing, and thus made ARAP' s draft power
assistance more available also to poor farers. As noted in chapter 3, the
rainfall frequency makes it crucial to plough and plant when the rain
comes. This means that in the periods when ploughing can be done, there
are too many farmers in need of tractors. The tractor-owning farmers are
relatively few, and for them, it is rational to plough as large fields as
possible, which means that the better-off farmers can arrange tractor
ploughing first. The poor farmers have to wait, and have less chances to get
timely ploughing. The lack of tractors is reinforced by the intensive use of
them in these periods, causing mechanical breakdowns. The tradi tional way
of ploughing, by spans of cattle, might be expected to ease this problem,
Le. that when no tractors are accessible, a farmer can use his own cattle, or
101
hire somebody else's. But cattle owners are reluctant to use their cattle for
this purpose if they can avoid it. U se of animals for ploughing of ten means
bringing them from grazing lands far away to the fields and this is costly.
The general conclusion is that the medium and large scale farers were
able to utilize ARAP at once, the smaller farers were not. In the original
once-off design, this was less important, but when ARAP became repeated
annually, it resulted in a much larger transfer of resources to those who
benefited already the first or the second season ARAP was operational.
6.3.4 IneJfective control
In the above it has been shown that implementation capacity was
effectively directed to the new programme, and this process was intensified
by the second precondition for effective implementation, the effective
mobilization of farmers bringing about a substantial demand for ARAP
assistance. However, the ability to exercise controlover the farers in the
transactions that followed failed. Partly, because of the lack of capacity to
follow up the provision of assistance, but also because ARA P did not
contain sufficient provisions for such control, a control that prove d to be
needed as ARA P proved relevant for other farmer interests than envisaged.
This is a basic reason why ARAP became not only a major thrust to
increase arable production on a sustainable basis for those farmers able to
do that, but also, for the majority, a general transfer of resources to the
farming population, subsidizing its arable production at the various levels
different groups already operated on, and with an element of expansion of
field sizes as the only, and insufficient, change.
The heavy workload caused by the administration of ARA P had serious
consequences. Both for other activities, as I will show in the next chapter,
and for ARAP itself. Regarding the latter, it meant that the extension -
advice and training - that was intended to guide the ARAP assistance had
to be left out like extension in general. Thus ADs were without their only
remaining possibility to guide and control the use of the assistance.
The intended target group for ARAP is in a sense unc1ear, it was in
principle open to all farmers who were interested - the problem was that
there prove d to be many reasons for being interested. The concept of the
whole programme was meant to be for those who would use all the support
it offered in a combined effort to increase production and productivity
decisively. This was MOA's original idea. When faced with farmers using
ARAP for different purposes, field staff had no opportunity to influence
who should be given the assistance. If a farer applied for payment for
farming work done, or asked for seeds or fertilizers, he had a right to
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receive this, according to the ARAP guidelines.51 The only condition for
receiving assistance was that the operations were actually done. There was
no discretion for field staff regarding whether to give assistance or not.
In some cases eligibility criteria were unclear. For instance whether
farmers cultivating a borrowed field were eligible, or what constituted a
household (Farngton 1987). But apar from that, ARAP was open to all
as a matter of right. ALDEP had quo tas or targets of how many farers to
give assistance each year, which at least gave some possibility to prevent
unwanted use of the ALDEP assistance. There were no such provisions in
ARAP. If ARAP had aimed at the limited number of progressive, medium
scale farers and had linked the provision of assistance to
extension/training which the progressive farers had traditionally received,
this would have been a smaller problem. But when ARAP was open for all
and all were interested it made field staff unable to do anything but give
out as much as possible.
It should be noted that the Field Service is just that, a service
organization in the sense that it was established to provide information and
extension to those who wanted it. The tasks of regulating and allocating
resources were not what this organization was used to do, as shown above.
When they faced a huge demand for their services, field staff might have
been more inclined to adjust to demands because of their service tradition.
Given the decision to provide an individual farer with assistance, the
AD had very limited opportunity to influence what kind of assistance. If the
farmer did not want anything else than seeds it was difficult for the AD to
make sure that seeds were used in combination with the other components
and used rationally, Le. in away that fulfilled the stated objectives. The
contents of each decision of implementation was not left to the AD's
professional knowledge, nor could he demand that certain obligations
should be caried OUt.52 Thus, small farmers could for instance have ten
hectares ploughed and planted even if the AD could foresee that the
farming household had no chance to tend or harest such a big field. Or,
a farmer could plough 4 hectares as previously, and drop method
improvements if he wished so. The AD's powerful role as the expert was
no longer relevant and he was not given any discretionar powers enabling
him to influence the contents of assistance.
51 Here one should note what is discussed above, namely that it was probably not equally
easy for all sections of the eligible farmers to initiate this.
52 ALDEP guidelines for 1985-86 inc1ude as a condition for eligibilty that the farmers
must agree to undertake improved crop management and to attend training courses
(MOA 1985; 2).
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In short, the design of ARAP assumed that farers were actually
interested in expanding field sizes as much as possible, and in improving
methods. This prove d not to be the case, except for the original target
group, for whom the programme was planned.
6.3.5 Effective mobilization and ineffective control. The
transformation of the bold modemizing attempt into a
general transfer of money
The huge mobilization and the inadequate control generate an image of a
programme that got out of hand. ARAP became a general and rather
purposeless transfer of substantial amounts of resources, mainly in cash.
Based on reports from field staff the ARAP coordinator each year
produced statistics on the progress of ARAP. In the ARAP annual report
from 1988, the figures were summed up for the three years ARAP had been
in operation (1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88), (MOA 1988a). These figures
show that the num ber of beneficiaries increased every year. Approximately
20 000 in 1985-86, between 50 and 60 000 in 1986-87 and more than 90
000 in 1987-88. For all three years ploughing and seeds were by far the
most frequently us ed components. Whereas the components of row planting
and weeding were used only by a minority. This is also the case for
fertilizers, but here the provision of fertilizers was meant to be limited to
a minority.53 The minority who received support subsidies for using
improved methods were, according to Farington (1987), those farmers who
had used these methods also previously. Thus, ARAP did not promote
intensive modernization very much; data suggest that it caused relatively
few to adopt improved methods they did not already use.
The extensive modemization, i.e. field size increases, fared better. Quite
a number of farmers de stump ed and fenced their fields; in Eskeli's survey,
all major groups of farmers were proportionally represented among those
who destumped their fields (1989). But even if field sizes increased, for
most farers these increases were not large enough to reach beyond the
confines of small scale farming. The number of beneficiares receiving
ploughing assistance and the number of hectares ploughed under this
assistance when compared show that the average ploughed field size
remained far below 10 hectares. The average field sizes increased, but
53 Enough fertilizers were provided to give out to a specific number of farmers on a so-
called first-come-first-serve basis.
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definitely not enough to pass the economy of scale threshold, and thus
bring about any basic change. In the normal year 1980-81, approximately
270 000 hectares were planted with crops. In 1987-88 the planted area was
367000 hectares (MOA 1989). However, the increase per farm in field size
was not that large. In 1987-88, when 67 300 farers planted 370 800
hectares, this produced an average field size of 5.5 hectares. About 60 per
cent of the farers still ploughed under 5 hectares in 1987-88 (MOA 1989).
These increases are not that large, since Øygard reports an ordinar average
of 4 hectares.54 These numbers exclude the possibility that field size
increases made farers into anything else than producers of crops for
subsistence needs. Most farers se em to have chosen strategically , i.e. they
used assistance to cultivate on a somewhat increased field size and with the
type of input and method they had used previously. This is not to deny that
the increases in total cultivated area were impressive, even if the numbers
should be read with caution.55 But this was not a large scale
modemization or recovery by modemization. And it is an illustration of
how unpromising arable farming in Botswana is that even these increases
were not sufficient, and they were far below what ARAP in reality aimed
at.
This pattern emerged from the statistics for both the drought years of
1985-86 and 1986-87, and from the non-drought year 1987-88. As long as
there was a drought, this subsidy, of roughly spe aking established
production levels had the function of a drought relief with expansive
elements. However, when the rain came back, the pattern of how farers
utilized ARAP was the same.
Needless to say, this was not the intention of the assistance. ARAP was
meant to instigate both intensive and extensive modernization in a once-off
concentrated effort to push arable production up to a commercial and viable
level. The majority of farmers simply had different interests. In these
average numbers, we can by all probability include quite a number of
medium scale farmers who did use ARAP as intended, but it is difficult to
obtain data to measure this, and assess whether they actually increased
productivity on labour and costs sufficiently to sustain the achievements.
As most observers and some civil servants point out, ARAP did much
good both as an actual relief and as a transfer of needed money. But it did
not solve any basic problems of the sector, even if it took so much of MOA
resources for 5 years. In the executive summar of the evaluations cared
out by Farrington and Rashem it is somewhat ironically stated that
54 It has to be stressed that these numbers are very rough approximations.
55 Reporting on ARAP might for instance have improved registration of cultivated fields.
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There might be other appropriate ways of transferrng income (MOA
1988c).
The argument that ARAP was meant to be a relief programme by MOA is
not evidenced by the data material for this thesis. It was too expensive, and
there was a relief programme already. The aide memoir written in early
1985, contained no hints that the Drought Relief might need to be
strengthened (see chapter 5).56 The function of drought relief stems from
the context of drought, not from decision makers' intention. Since 1979
there had been a drought relief programme implemented. This programme,
coordinated by MFDP and implemented by several line ministries included
food distribution, short term employment schemes,57 water supplies and
drlling and an agricultural relief. Agricultural relief was implemented by
MOA, and included purchase of cattle, distribution of free seeds, a subsidy
for ploughing for those who could not plough on their own and a
destumping subsidy. Holm describes the se efforts (1985) and he argues that
Botswana' s drought relief is the best Africa has seen thus far. His aricle
has the title Coping with Drought in Botswana: an African Success. Still,
even this successful programme was quickly surassed by ARAP. DR
ploughing, and partly seeds distribution and destumping, became less used
as ARAP introduced similar components that were more generous, and
which also allowed relief for larger fields. It tumed out to be a very
expensive form of relief.
It can be questioned whether DR was sufficient to keep farmers engaged
in agriculture, but there are no evidence that there was a perceived need for
a strengthened relief.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter we have shown that ARAP was implemented by an already
overloaded field service. However, this staff reacted surrisingly effectively
and quickly changed their work tasks completely. The reasons for this,
apar from hierarchical authority, was the huge interest ARAP generated
among farers, and the huge demand for ARA P services.
56 Aide memoirs are written regularly and asses the situation and possible needs for
drought relief of various types.
57 Labour Based Relief Programmes. On the locallevel, projects, very of ten infrastructure
projects are identified, and money is granted for the hiring of people outside the
agricultural season for a minimum wage.
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All farmers were eligible for assistance, even if the MOA did not
originally plan it to be so. The political authorities ensured this change. The
widely varing categories of farers eligible meant that ARAP intervened
in a varety of living situations and thus, a varety of farmers' interests. The
large interest for ARAP was in reality made up of quite many different
interests, and only some farmers responded according to the rationality
ARAP assumed farers would have. MOA's original intention was to
support only this minority though ARAP.
ARAP had few provisions to control the situation. The only possibility
might have been regular extension and advice, which there was no capacity
left for. ARAP was therefore used for many different purposes, and the
most common purose was to use ARAP as a subsidy for a roughly
unchanged arable faring, with the exception of field expansions.
This pattem materialized rather early; the political authorities'
contribution in later years was to prolong the life of a programme that did
not have the intended effects on modemization. In the next chapter, we
shall examine the effects of ARAP more closely.
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7. Some effects of ARAP
7.1 Introduction
The staring point for this chapter is the conclusion reached in chapter 6
that ARA P became a very massive transfer of resources to Batswana
farers and that it was all rather ineffective as the programme's intentions
are concemed. It is still too early to reach conclusions about all the effects
ARAP has had on rural Botswana, but in as far as data allow it, some
effects will be discussed. It has been argued in chapter 6 that ARAP
became a general transfer of resources. Further evidence will be offered for
the conclusion that ARAP did not basically change the situation of farmers
as it was intended to but to state that ARAP became rather ineffective in
relation to the formal objectives of the programme of course does not mean
that ARAP did not have effects for the clientele.
In Jacobsen's model of policy making (1967), an important point is that
the administration's relationships to other actors have consequences for the
administration itself. When faced with new demands affecting its policy, an
organization will have to respond somehow, and this will of ten have effects
for the organization itself. Because of insufficient planning, ARAP led to
several unintended and partly negative side-effects. These effects will be
outlined, as they illustrate the problems emanating from the inability to
draw on the expertise and knowledge of the Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA).
7.2 Effects for the clIentele
7.2.1 Sustainability
The sustainability element in ARAP is crucial. It refers to whether positive
achievements can be upheld after the programme was phased out. As noted,
the programme resulted in increased field sizes, and in increased national
production totals. I have also argued, based on literature on how much field
sizes and methods needed to improve, that the productivity increases
brought by ARAP were insufficient to make arable farming competitive
with livestock and off-farm employment (Opschoor 1983; Duggan 1983;
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Øygard et aL. 1986; Selolwane 1986). If ARAP increased productivity as
much as planned, then it could be expected that farmers would reinvest
their profit in arable faring, which would mean that benefits could be
sustained.
In his evaluation of ARAP's destumping component, Eskeli (1989: 31)
collected survey data about how farmers used the money paid under ARAP
for destumping. Half of the respondents us ed it to hire labour to do the
destumping. 10 per cent used it for far equipment and consumption, and
only 7 per cent used it for far equipment only. This indicates that most
farmers did not spend the extra resources transferred by ARAP for
investments to improve their arable production. It is not very probable that
more farers will do so when ARAP ends and the resources to be
reinvested are those generated by the farer himself.
7.2.2 Effects for various groups
When applying one set of means on a diversified set of target groups, the
effects on the varous groups can be expected to differ. This is also the case
for the ARAP general transfer of resources to all farmers in Botswana.
A. The wealthy farmers. These are the farmers who have benefited most
from ARAP, because they are the group owning tractors. The broadening
of the t arge t group of ARAP so as to include the small farmers lacking
draft power opened up a big market for sale of draft power. Also farmers
owning cattle and thus able to plough for themselves to a large extent hire d
tractors (Farrngton 1987; Rashem 1987), as ploughing with cattle reduces
the animals' sales value (Solway 1986). This means that the market for
tractor ploughing was even greater.
It should also be noted that receiving ploughing assistance gives little
output to the tractor hiring farmer when inadequate rainfall causes loss of
harvest. For the tractor owner, in contras t, the income that tractor ploughing
gives him is of course more secure. In total, during the three seasons 1985-
86, 1986-87, and 1987-88 almost P60 million were paid for ploughing
under ARAP.58 A very large portion of this went to the tractor owners.
The wealthy farmers also used the ARAP assistance for their own arable
production. Eskeli found that farmers owning up to 150 cattle were using
the destumping component. And so were those with more than 150 cattle,
but the absolute numbers are very small here (1989: 12). The wealthy
58 Annual Statement of Accounts 1989.
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farers are a bit under-represented compared to their proportion in the
national farming population.
B. The medium scale farmers. According to Eskeli (1989), there is a
small minority of farers investing their money in far equipment. Thus
there is a small group willing to invest more in arable faring. There is
also a minority of ARAP beneficiaries, who durng all the seasons data are
available for, have used not only ploughing and seeds, but also row
planting, weeding and fertilizers. This indicates that there is a group who
uses many components for improving methods and inputs. Both Rashem
and Farington (1987) stated that in their samples, those who us ed these
method improving assistance components were those who had done so
previously. It is probable that this is the group of medium scale farers
who invest in arable agriculture.
These farers then, have stuck to the improved methods they had already
adopted, and they have expanded field sizes. This is what ARAP tried to
encourage. The only difference is that they have largely hired tractor
ploughing instead of us ing their own animals, and it remains to be seen
whether the expansions are so large that it will pass the threshold of
economies of scale.
If improved methods are used on ten hectares farers will get good
harests when the rain is sufficient. Another question is whether this will
make them producers of a surplus. Farmers cultivating crops using
improved methods, and who under ARAP do so on an increased area,
might produce a surlus. At least as long as ARAP pays for it. But this
raises the question of sustainability which is discussed above. Whether
these farmers actually passed the critical threshold of productivity and
whether they can take the risk to continue on this scale is difficult to say.
These farmers are cattle holders, and can in many cases plough
independently with their own animals, but they se em to have hired tractors
very of ten. As Solway reports, cattle owners are reluctant to use their
animals for draft power in any case, as this reduces their quality and the
price they can get on the abbatoir. Probably, for a number of cattle owners,
ARAP tractor hire subsidized their cattle rearing, and ARAP has thus freed
resources in several ways, enabling them to diversify their activities.
C. The poor farmers. These farmers have few or no cattle. And this is the
group which first drops out of arable production during a drought and thus
is most in need of generous drought relief to continue (Vierich and
Shepperd 1980).
ARAP encouraged this group to keep up some cultivation during the
drought, and to do so on somewhat larger fields. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
if this is enough to make them producers of a surplus of crops and even
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more doubtful whether this will be drought resistant in the longer run, as
argued in chapter 6. Even if maximum utilization of ARAP should result
in a surlus it would not be rational for these farmers to risk this surlus
on arable farming - the risk is too high, and continued arable farming
would, as suggested by Opschoor, increase costs 12 fold. Most of the
ARAP generated surlus would thus be consumed, and why should they
risk it all that way? We can speculate what would happen if a poor female
farer with only a few animals did plough 10 hectares. That is, if she hired
a tractor, weeded and row planted, used fertilizers and fenced her field, and
then harested all of it. In doing so she would probably have to hire some
labour, and none of the ARAP cash payment would end up in her pockets.
But she might have a good harest. How good? Would it allow her to pay
the tractor owner, the labour and the fertilizers herself the next year? It is
difficult to say, but it is not very likely. And if this should work once, as
soon as there was inadequate rainfall, she might be back where she started.
The rational thing to do if ARAP financing produced a crop large enough
so that some of it could be sold, would be to buy livestock. That is the
basic logic that ARAP did not change.
A lot of the work done in arable agriculture, paid for under ARAP, is
done by hire d labour. Destumping and weeding are such tasks. Many
female headed households are forced to hire labour, many wealthy farers
choose to do so. 49 per cent of destumpers used hired labour in their
destumping. The poor farmers have probably benefited from this. It seems
that they have used ploughing and seeds components to uphold a minimum
of arable production on their own fields, and durng the season they have
worked for others weeding and harvesting when the rain came back and
there was a harest. This rural informal labour m arket is important,
especially for the poorest sections of rural dwellers (Vierich and Shepperd
1980).
ARAP has probably undermined this group's access to resources in the
long run. As Solway writes, the commercialization of cattle undermines the
mafisa system (see above) and it also makes cattle owners less willing to
lend out their cattle in an informal exchange system as has been the
tradition. Several years of tractor ploughing have probably strengthened this
tendency. A system in decline is difficult to re-activate after several years
out of use. Thus ARAP has probably made small farmers more dependent
on continued governmental assistance to get the resources needed for arable
agriculture. Also Øygard warns against the increasing dependence on hired
tractor ploughing resulting from ARAP (Øygard et aL. 1986).
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7.3 Political effects
The political significance of ARAP was alluded to in chapter 1 and 5. The
question of how such programmes actually influence patterns of political
loyalty and support needs more empirical research. But some issues should
be mentioned.
First, ARAP is obviously a very popular programme. The adoption rate
for some of the components shows that. MOA personnel's perceptions are
also that ARAP has been popular. Second, the political intervention must
be seen against the background of a BDP set-back in late 1984, and as
linked to attempts to reg ai n lost ground. In the general elections of autumn
1989, BDP regained lost support, and it is areasonable hypothesis that
ARAP contributed to the recovery.
The original ambition of the political leadership was, in essence, to put
such emphasis on genuine modemization also for the poor farmers that
modemization would actually occur. From this there would also be political
stability gains. This proved not to be possible to combine as intended, but
that does not mean that there were no political gains.
For all practical purposes, ARAP functioned as general relief. A drought
relief when the drought was still a fact, and as relief also when the drought
was over. Not surrisingly, there has been a significant after-rationalization
for ARAP, saying that it was originally intended to be the relief it became.
As pointed out by Holm, the politicians use relief for what it is worth, and
the redefinition of ARAP into relief opened up new options for political
propaganda. Holm describes the interests of political leaders in drought
relief in general terms.
The politicians have made certain that they are regarded by the public as
playing a critical role in drought relief. The character of the action taken
every year is personally announced by the president in a special speech
to the nation (Holm 1985: 476).
This speech, the "Declaration on the Drought Recovery Programme" , from
April 1989, also refers to ARAP. In general, it is striking how ARAP
became after-rationalized as it turne d out to function as a relief. The official
justification of ARAP is to point to the drought crisis and to say that
Government reacted boldly to assist the common people.
It should be noted, that the decision to repeat the expensive ARAP
components for the 1989/90 season, after two post-drought harests in
1987/88 and 1988/89, is difficult to explain unless it is recognized that the
BDP Cabinet had the coming elections in minde It is true that the most
serious political defeat for the BDP in 1984 came in the urban areas,
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notably Gaborone, where both seats were lost to BNF. But as Nengwehkulu
points out, most urban dwellers have strong links to the rural economy;
they of ten have their family there, engaged in agriculture (Nengwehkulu,
unpublished) .
Of course, ARAP is also popular among rual tractor owners, because
they have earned substantial profits. And as noted, the MPs recruited from
this group are still supportive of ARAP (Interview, MOA civil servants).
The magnitude of the tractor ploughing subsidies was such that a transfer
of capital is a more appropriate term than a transfer of resources.
Thus, ARAP was, in spite of its low modernzation potential a very
useful programme from a political perspective, even if this was so in
another way than intended. This is not to say that ARAP decided the
elections in 1989, but ARAP surely contributed to BDP's rather good
resul t.
7.4 Some impacts on the field service
The heavy workload on field personneI led very quickly to serious
problems, including corrption, inability to control cheating, and inability
to meet demands quickly enough. A quick response to this was that
beginning in 1986/87 field assistants were hired for the season; in 86/87
400 were hired, later the number was increased to 460 (MOA 1987b).
These field assistants (FAs) are supposed to work solelyon ARAP. They
have eased burdens, although they had to be trained and supervised by the
AD they were working under. There were one or two FAs in every AEA.
The ARAP annual report for 1986/87 notes, however, that the additional
400 F As were not enough to make the workload manageable.
The F As might very well be come permanent. ADs have expressed wishes
that they should be so, but MFDP civil servants are worred about this as
it would be contrar to policies of keeping recurrent administrative costs
down. It is unclear what will happen to the F As when ARA P is phased out.
However, this issue seems to be a par of a more general, increased
concern about the low implementing capacities of field staff. Projects for
improving living quarters and office buildings in the districts have been
stared. When the field work for this study was carred out the MOA was
planning an internal project to activate field staff more in policy-making
processes. It seems reasonable to suggest that the implementing pressures
of ARA P have contributed to a better understanding of problems in the
Field Service, and that this has contributed to a strengthening of this
organization.
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When implementors in a centralized, career controlling organization are
overloaded with work from higher leveis, an expected response would be
some kind of resistance or resignation. Eskeli' s surey indicates that this
has not happened, they "maintain morale", as he puts it (1989). Of course
this is difficult to measure, but absence of resistance or resignation is
consistent with the impressive achievements of ARAP, in terms of farers
reached and administrative tasks cared out. However, ARAP has bred
corrption, not a large problem in Botswana previously. Its magnitude is
difficult to assess, but the ARAP coordinator regarded it a serious problem,
as do other MOA officers. (Interviews, MOA officials 1989). It remains to
be seen what effects this will have in the long run.
The Field Service changed in terms of what types of operations it
performed. The major task became administration of re source allocation to
an extent not experienced earlier. The expert and extension model was
deactivated and administration and application of rules for mass processing
of client cases became dominant features. The Field Service under ARAP
has mobilized farers, but at the same time the field staff themselves are
strictly controlled as the blue-print elements of implementation are
outstanding. This means that the Department of Agricultural Field Services
(DAFS) has developed expertise and routines to perform tasks of mass rule
processing.
7.5 Unintended effects
In chapter 4 it is shown that MOA centrallevel planners of ARAP did not
mobilize the different parts of the organization to make adjustments of the
project during its implementation. Such adjustment was needed in order to
avoid that ARAP would have negative effects on various sub-goals under
the MOA's responsibility. In this section, some consequences will be
indicated.
The MOA evaluation states that ARAP might have environmental
drawbacks in a longer term, especially related to the destumping component
(1988c: 9). It recommends a limit on how many hectares each farer can
destump, and more emphasis on measures to reduce the potential for
environmental damages.
56% of the area destumped under ARAP has been woodland (Eskeli
1989: 72). And the removing of trees, especially in densely populated areas,
creates firewood supply problems. The varation between districts
conceming how many people who experience fuel wood problems is large,
varing from 78% to 15% (Eskeli 1989).
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Expansion of the arable fields, encouraged by ARAP, means a
strengthening of the tendency to move arable fields to the mixed faring -
grazing land areas. This will in many cases mean a move westward, into
more fragile areas. The emerging mixed farming also has its problems as
it means extra costs, Le. fencing, and it requires transport to remote
locations or hiring of labour. This will hit the poor farers harder than the
better-off ones.
Arable fields in Botswana are generally vulnerable to eros ion and the
poor soils soon get exhausted. The remedy has traditionally been to move
to another allocated field. This is increasingly becoming more difficult, as
suitable land near the settlements is getting scarce. This is one of the
reasons why environmentalists recommend more intensive use of arable
fields combined with conservation measures. The lack of conservation
measures and the fact that expansionist components have dominated over
the improved technology components are weaknesses in ARAP. Eskeli
surveys the erosion problems, and finds them emerging on a large
proportion of the fields examined, especially those that have been in use for
several years. Larger fields are more vulnerable to erosion than smaller .
fields, and ARAP might thus worsen things, as the average field size is 4.5
ha., while ARAP pays for cultivation of ten hectares, and in many cases
thus increases field sizes.
In order to avoid erosion, fields mus t be located properly, and it is an
open question whether Land Boards have been able to manage the location
issues of the large scale destumping, 70 000 hectares under ARAP, of these
40 000 hectares virgin land (Eskeli 1989). This comes in addition to the
destumping under the Drought Relief (DR). In total 120 000 hectares have
been destumped in the 1980s (Eskeli 1989).
In summary, ARAP is accelerating some tendencies that are potentially
dangerous for the ecological basis for the rural population, and this might
hit the poorer farmers more than the better-off farers. As noted above
overgrazing is the most serious environmental problem. ARAP's effects on
the cattle production are difficult to assess. But a plausible hypothesis is
that ARAP transfers have reduced the necessity for farers to sell cattle
when crops and rual employment dis appe ar. Thus, ARAP might have
increased pressure on the grazing lands during the drought.
As shown in chapter 6, ARAP inflicted a very heavy workload on field
staff. This was one of the consequences of the political intervention and
affected other programmes which were supposed to be implemented by the
Field Service. Considering ALDEP beneficiares, the numbers showa peak
in 1985-86, the first season ARAP was operational. But in that year ARAP
did not reach the proportions it achieved in the following years, and in
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1986-87, ALDEP had a reduction to 4800 beneficiares, and in 1987-88 it
was the same (MOA 1988e). The plan, however, was to increase ALDEP
activities. MOA officials all state that ARAP seriously hindered other
programmes, but it is difficult to find exact data on this. What is most
strongly pointed out is that the ordinar extension suffered - it more or
less ceased (Farngton 1987).
ARAP was a very powerful intervention in agriculture, and the
consequences for environment have been discussed above. There is also the
question whether ARAP has diverted farers' efforts away from more
viable activities like cattle rearng. The MOA Planing Officers express to
the fact that some livestock projects suffered because all farmers were busy
doing ARAP activities.
ARAP applied the same design in all districts. However, conditions for
agriculture var between districts in ways which make ARAP less suited
in some districts than in others. In some districts the types of seed used are
not available from ARAP (Rashem 1987). In districts of dens e vegetation,
destumping is so costly that the ARAP subsidy does not cover all costs. In
other districts, it is the reverse (Eskeli 1989).
The magnitude of ARAP was bound to have significant effects on land
use. Land use planning has been a priority in later years. Under the
auspices of MLGL, the Districts plan land use. The effects of ARAP on
these planning exercises and the realization of the plans might very well
prove to be problematic. The point regarding district varations is that the
Districts could have made a contribution to the planning, as they are said
to have done in the case of ALDEP. In the case of ARAP, planners on
MOA top level failed to achieve this.
7.6 Summary
It has to be stressed that this chapter is neither a complete presentation of
possible and relevant aspects of the impacts of ARA P , nor an attempt to
conclude firmly on the issues raised. In chapter 6, it was documented that,
for the majority of farmers, ARAP did not lead to changed farming
production or production leveis. However, for a minority, most likely the
original target group, it did. In this chapter, the sustainability of these
achievements is questioned.
A programme of the size of ARAP, not surrisingly, had political effects
as well as repercussions on the administration itself. The after-
rationalization of ARAP portrays it as an effective response to the drought
crisis, even if this was not the reason why ARAP was initiated, designed
the way it was, nor decided upon.
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This chapter has also presented some side effects that are mainly
explained by the inadequate planning process, in which important
considerations and expertise were excluded.
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8. Conclusions and discussion
8.1 Introduction
The topic for this analysis has been ARAP, and the reasons why ARAP
became an ineffective agricultural modernzation programme. In this
chapter, the case study of ARAP will be summed up in briefe
Basic features of ARAP is in this report explained by the interplay
between features of the administration, the politicalleadership, the donor
and the clientele. In the literature which addresses the question of what
explains public policy in Botswana, this analytical model is not that widely
used. More common is a ruling elite model. This model, which explains
public policy by the interests, intentions and power of a small ruling elite
can be found in many varieties.
As the wide use of it indicates, the ruling elite model is a fruitful one,
that deserves continued attention. However, the case study of ARAP reveals
some weaknesses of the ruling elite model, and this chapter will elaborate
on these. Finally, it will be indicated how the ruling elite model can be
improved on some points.
8.2 The case of ARAP - major conclusions
The process that shaped ARAP has been divided into the following sub-
phases: Initiation, design, political intervention and approval, approach of
donors, implementation, clientele response and finally after-rationalization.
The analytical framework outlined in chapter 1 guides attention to how
and with what effect main types of actors affected ARAP in these varous
stages.
The donor community, which is so of ten assumed to be a set of powerful
actors, was in this case represented by NORAD. NORAD proved to be a
rather powerless actor. Hs attempts to shape ARAP were limited, and they
were not successful. ARAP was mainly a product of forces and actors of
Botswana itself.
The political authorities played an important role by generating pressure
on the agricultural administration to come up with more active devices for
development in the rual areas. To define this activity as the provision of
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clear political goals would be an exaggeration, it was rather a request to do
something. This demand was strengthened by general ideas of basic needs
and poverty alleviation in the donor community as well.
The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) had to respond to this pressure in
one way or another. The policies and programmes that the ministry had
been running for some 20 years had prove d incapable of mobilizing the
large majority of farers for basic change. The ministry had, by supporting
the wealthiest strata, achieved very much in the livestock sector but without
inc1uding the poorer majority in the progress. MOA had also achieved some
progress in large scale arable faring; a small number of farers did
produce substantial harests.
The ministerial response to the pressures was to rely on arable faring
as the production form in which tö generate surplus and income for the
poor. It was the least promising sector generally speaking. The choice is
explained by basic values of justice, profitability and large scale farming
held by the ministry. These beliefs and values precluded the option of
reorganizing the livestock sector in such away that more people could
make a living out of it. Furthermore, in an approach focusing on the
sector's needs and development, arable farming was perceived as an
important sub-sector which needed improvement.
Within a strategy of arable development, the MOA response included
some innovations as regards means. The development efforts were designed
in different ways for different socio-economic groups, cash subsidies were
included to encourage farmers to modemize production and some
technological improvements had been designed to be promoted by the
arable development programmes. But basically, the MOA drew on its old
models of action. The production systems promoted by the MOA were still
of a kind that would mainly pay off for wealthy farers able to risk enough
resources to obtain large scale productivity benefits.
Not surprisingly, the first major programme of the MOA response -
ALDEP - proved to have a low ability to mobilize farmers. MOA started
to implement ALDEP in the early eighties, but it soon became clear that
ALDEP was unable solve the basic problems that arable farming is rational
only when combined with other activities and when operated on a large
scale. The scale of arable farming is determined by the strength of other
activities (livestock, employment). Small scale arable farming could not be
the main base for a rural living if based on the promoted farming systems.
ARAP was planned as a complementar programme to ALDEP, aimed
at somewhat quicker and more concentrated assistance to better off farmers
that could be helped into commercial farming rather quickly, if the
assistance was decisi ve enough.
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Even if the programmes offered, ALDEP and ARAP, were not very
promising in terms of general poverty alleviation in the rural areas, it
should be emphasised that ARAP might have had a potential to function as
the final and decisive support for farers very dose to aresource level
enabling commercial large scale farming. Both ALDEP and ARAP were
more interventionist programmes than the previous extension service for
arable development had been; they aimed at helping more farers and to
do so more directly by means of subsidies. And they were quite massive
ventures, thus having significant effects for the rual economy. Massive
interventions require coordination with other activities in order to be
effective, that is, to maxmize gains and to minimize costs. In the case of
ARAP, the MOA proved incapable of engaging in a process of broad
paricipation of various specialists and people working on issues that would
be influenced by ARAP, for instance, environment al issues as well as other
MOA programmes, even ALDEP. This is an important factor explaining the
negative side effects of the ARAP programme.
ALDEP was implemented in 1982, and ARAP was forwarded for
political approval by mid 1985. At this point in time, ALDEP had already
come under criticism and many observers realized the very limited potential
of ALDEP in developing agriculture to the commercial extent envisaged.
The ministry' s response to the political demands seemed inappropriate,
undermining basic interests of the political leadership. This was an
important reason why the political leadership activated itself again, and
interfered in arable development policy in aquite decisive way. The core
of the political intervention was to make ARAP the centre piece of arable
development in general. A programme designed for one limited group of
farers became an offer to all farmers.
In MOA's view, this expansion was unwise. The poor farmers, in MOA's
view would most like ly not be able to transform their very minimal
production into viable commercial farming after such a once-off massive
support. If poorer farers started using ARAP, it would be waste of
resources, and the poorer farers might become dependent. On the other
hand, exactly because this offer was not made for the poorer farers, MOA
did not expect many of them to apply for the ARAP support at alL. The
political intervention was accepted and included, with minor adjustments
in case farers from the added groups should want to try it.
ARAP was implemented in late 1985, and it proved to mobilize more or
less all Batswana farers. Most other MOA programmes were seriously
curailed by the dominance ARAP very quickly got. However, ARAP did
not become an incentive for change and development. Instead, it became
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a subsidy of existing arable farming patterns. Farmers simply us ed ARAP
in different ways than intended.
In short, the politicians' expectation of massive arable commercialization
was unrealistic, the MOA's expectations were incorrect as they mainly
expected ARAP to be irelevant for many farers. The farers prove d both
wrong and used ARAP as a certainly quite welcome subsidy, a subsidy that
hardly induced the intended changes. This farers' response was partly
facilitated by the specific design of ARAP and by traits of the
implementing field staff organization and traditions.
And finally, as this farer response became evident, the politicalleaders
not surprisingly saw that ARAP happened to be very popular, and
prolonged ARAP to be operational until the next National Assembly
election was won. An after-rationalization took place, framing ARAP as the
helping hand from the leadership to their followers in a time of drought and
crisis. Which ARAP certainly was, without having been intended to
function that way.
The primary problematic of this report is to explain why ARAP tumed
out as an ineffective modernization effort. Emphasis has been placed on the
role that organizational variables play, in particular the importance of
routinized ways of thinking about problems, goals and possible solutions
in administrative organization. It is a very common finding in Africa that
political goals are transformed into something else when the administration
operationalizes the goals into specific development projects and
programmes. Very of ten however, the explanation for this is sought in the
bureaucrats' political views and in their attempts to control the political
power of the state. This model is not contested here, but the analysis of
ARAP hopefully illustrate that when political demands and goals are
transformed in governmental bureaucracies, the reason is not always
bureaucratic conspiracy and illegitimate power ambitions. The
professionalism and the organizational routinization of specific ways of
perceiving things, and the routinization of means that can only solve well-
known problems are factors that might have as significant explanatory
power as the hypothesis about the bureaucratic conspiracy.
The study of ARAP also illustrates the importance of government -
clientele interaction. A significant factor for explaining why ARAP finally
became a rather puroseless transfer of money, is the farmers ' way of
relating to ARAP. Hyden (1983) argues that a basic problem is how to
mobilize the rural population. ARAP shows very clearly that to mobilize
a target group is only one condition for achieving the goals of public
policy. Of importance is also what the mobilization is about, whether it is
a mobilization based on the clientele' s sharing of the goals of the
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programme or, as in the case of ARAP, the target groups mobilize on a
different basis. Even well-designed public policy means are rough
instruments, and the outcome of using them in a complex socio-economic
structure is not easily predicted.
8.3 Alternative explanations
In the Introduction, two alternative explanations are put forward. They
represent the essence of what seemed to be common opinions at the time
of fieldwork (1989) on why ARAP had developed the way it had. Theyare
briefly mentioned in this analysis, as an illustration of ideas and ways of
thinking among varous observers in Botswana. These ideas are varants of
ruling elite models, and as these two explanations are meant to illustrate,
this theory permeates much of what is said and written about Botswana
politics. Like the ruling elite model, the two explanations capture some
truths but they are insufficient as explanations for ARAP.
The first alternative explanation that some observers seemed to hold was
that ARAP went wrong because it was planned by the MOA planners in a
hurr, and that they should have defined and planned ARAP more
cautiously and consulted more.
This model captures some truth in as far as coordination was far too
limited. But otherwise, it is difficult to argue that ARAP was poorly
planned. It was a continuation of the ALDEP process, and ARAP itself was
under planning and elaboration in the MOA for about two years. For the
purposes it had originally, ARAP was well planned. That the political
leadership when it approved of the programme also changed the target
group is not a problem of poor planning. Furthermore, ARAP was a logical
extension of the expertise, values and traditions of the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the major problems relate to the appropriateness ~f this
problem structure and corresponding models of action, and not to planning
deficiencies. What was important in the case of ARAP was that the
planners in the MOA were not the only decision makers. Also the political
leadership were active as decision makers. These two groups of decision
makers did not agree on what they should try to achieve nor how to do it.
The sec ond explanation of why ARAP tumed out as an inefficient
modemizing programme states that it was not meant to be a modemization
programme in the first place, and that it was intended to be the drought
relief it developed into. Even if it is true that ARA P functioned as a relief,
and also that the political leaders in particular have found this quite
attractive, it is not a valid explanation of why ARAP developed this way,
as I have shown in the above chapters. What is interesting about this
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explanation is that it assumes ruling elite rationality and control, even when
a ruling elite action is under shar criticism, as long as the reverse is not
evidenced. This supports the impression that the model of a powerful and
rational ruling elite is a quite dominant one in Botswana.
These two explanations both suggest that the critical factor is the
performance and choices of a single, small group of decision makers, and
the source of this approach is elite theory. The elite theory is more or less
explicitly applied quite of ten when Botswana politics are debated, and it is
also prominent in scientific debate. In the next section Picard's (1980:
1987) ruling elite theory of Botswana will be outlined, and some problems
of this theory will be discussed.
Some models are very formalized and precise, facilitating the derivation
of very precise hypotheses. Of ten, such models also have very high
ambitions to be of general validity. Models of this type are open to tests by
critical cases, cases that cannot be consistent with all models in question.
The models that are discussed here are not suited for this kind of testing.
Picard explicitly regards his mod el as valid and useful for the situation that
he faced in his empirical analysis, and thus he has no absolute ambition of
general validity for his model.
Theoretical models are here seen as devices that direct attention to some
elements in the empirical reality, assuming they are important. Other
elements are assumed to be of less importance, and are thus not included
in the model. Attention is directed by the inclusion of concepts, and by the
definition of them (Allison 1971; Roness 1979). In this chapter, therefore,
the ambition is to show that the ruling elite framework is a poor tool for
empirical analysis because it directs attention in such away that potentially
important factors are ignored, and the factors included in the model get an
overestimated importance. The question is not whether the ruling elite
model is right or wrong. The ruling elite model captures important aspects
of reality. The question is rather which model gives us the best guidance
and directs attention to important factors, and furthermore, which model
gives the most useful guidance to the understanding of the conceptualized
phenomena. It will be argued that in cases like ARAP, the ruling elite
model is a poor analytical tool, it ignores several important factors and it
gives a too general understanding of important issues.
An attempt to criticize the ruling elite model of Picard based on the
findings in the case of ARAP requires that ARAP is a case that Picard s
model is applicable for, on its own premises. As will be outlined in the
next section, Picard applies his ruling elite model to explain only major
public policies in Botswana. This limitation stems from the assumption that
a ruling elite will be most decisive when its interests are at stake - which
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is the case in paricular when major, sector dominating programmes are on
the agenda. The programmes Picard discusses are such major policies, and
so was ARAP. Furthermore, ARAP is obviously important to ruling elite
interests so that ARA P makes a good case for problematizing the usefulness
of the ruling elite model.
This does not mean that Picard claims to explain ARAP. But the model
Picard elaborates represent very well common ways of explaining policies
in Botswana, and the ambition is to show that this model is not good
enough for that purse in the case of ARAP. To design this as a criticism
of Picard is mainly done for reasons of c1arty.
8.4 Ruling elite models in Botswana
The ruling elite concept is influential in many analyses of Botswana
policies, see for instance Isaksen (1981), Parson (1987) and Holm and
Molutsi (eds. 1989). However, the most consistent formulation of the model
can be found in Louis Picards works (1980; 1987), drawing heavily on
G.L. Gunderson's work (1970), which is a c1assic study of Botswana
politics. Gunderson applied the concept of the "Administrative State", a
state of a-political, bureaucratic dominance exercised by an integrated
ruling elite of senior civil servants and political leaders that are not
controlled by any segment of society. Picard elaborates on this model.
Picard soverall ambition is to examine the formation and evolution of
Botswana' s state structures. He presents a general description of political
power in Botswana. Re goes on to examine public policy and its
relationship to the political and bureaucratic structures of the state.
Furthermore, he wants to examine who benefits from this policy (1987: 3).
Referring to the debate over how to conceptualize the nature and function
of the state, Picard concludes that this cannot be decided a priori, but is an
empirical question of context and historical phase (1987: 8-10). His own
conceptualization of the Botswana state is to identify a ruling elite of top
civil servants and political leaders.
Picards overall discussion of political power is not the issue here. In this
chapter, attention is limited to Picards application of the ruling elite
concept to explain specific cases of public policy, whom the policies
benefit and why they turn out to affect interests the way they do. Picards
writings seem to allow such a distinction. He presents the analysis of the
forming of some major rural development programmes separately, drawing
on his general description of political power (1987).
Picard defines the ruling elite as the holders of top level political and
administrative positions. The embryo of the present day ruling elite is the
124
small group of educated men who formed the BDP regime in the early
sixties, a regime which included an alliance with the administrative
leadership.
The relationship between the two sections of the ruling elite is one where
the administrative elite in practice does most of the policy making not only
in terms of means but also in terms of objectives (1987: 13,17). This is
emphasised by Gunderson (1970), and Picard makes the same point. The
importance of the administrative section of the ruling elite does not stem
from a victory in some struggle for power; it is mainly a practical solution,
facilitated by agreement on goals and means in the ruling elite in general.
The political elite's main task is to mobilize electoral support for this
bureaucratically defined policy. In addition, the political elite does give
some input to the planning and implementation of policies such as timing
relative to election time and how things should most wisely be announced.
The adjustments to political needs that are made are not presented by
Picard as perverting or undermining the public policy of development in
any way. Rather, the political input eases policies by providing a specific
type of expertise; how to get acceptance for public policy, or how public
policy can best be presented to have political effects as well. The
relationship is perhaps best described as smooth division of work between
the two elite sections. In Picard's framework, the administrative-political
distinction is not applied to point to possible conflicts; nothing is said that
suggests that these two types of positions are potential sources of diverging
attitudes. They serve more as a practical operational definition of the ruling
elite, and as an indication of various types of expertise needed. The main
integrating factor of the ruling elite is its common interests. Other
dimensions that might hold a poten ti al for conflict are largely ignored in the
ruling elite model.
The next question, then, is what determnes the integrated ruling elite' s
choices and political objectives. The ruling elite's strategies in the rual
development sector are explicitly related to the ruling elite members' own
economic interests and interests for staying in power. Considering the latter,
provision of welfare services has be en important for maintenance of
electoral support, and increasingly, agricultural development and drought
relief efforts serve this function as well. Considering self -enrchment, this
has taken the form of favouring large scale cattle ownership and developing
infrastructure to support this. The ruling elite members benefit from this as
they own large herds of cattle. The heavy investments in mining have paid
off in terms of revenues for the government and has allowed spending for
these various purposes, as well as spending on good government salaries.
These interests are very widely defined, and Picard seems to assume that
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the ruling elite is able to reach consensual and effective decisions on how
to maintain their position and interests.
Still, Picard opens up for some sources of conflict in the ruling elite.
Different values and ideological orientation can have effects on attitudes.
In paricular, Picard points to the young and idealistic expatriates. But these
young and idealistic expatriates are only at the outer fringe of the ruling
elite. Their differing values seem to be related to the fact that they are
young and inexperienced about how things work in Botswana. The more
experienced expatriates are treated as a par of the administrative elite. But
in theory, education and national background are included as a potential
source of differing political attitudes in the ruing elite.
The varables that Picard introduces to the explanation of the ruling elite
choices are their socio-economic interests, social valuesand education,
interests being the dominant force. Influenced by these forces that stem
from outside the govemmental apparatus, the ruling elite applies the state
as an arena for action.
This ruling elite is the determining factor in policy making processes;
other actors are largely absent in the analysis. Hs relationship to the
expanding state apparatus is instrumental, and the state is explicitly
understood as a mechanism by which the dominant elite acts (1987: 16-17).
As an instrument, the state apparatus is rather passive, and has little
influence on the tasks that it is us ed to fulfiL.
Picard indicates that the instrument has hs imperfections. He mentions
lack of expertise and implementing capacity. He also refers to inadequate
role expectations in the bureaucracy, and to the absence of entrepreneural
effort and attitude in it (1987: 14-15). It is unclear what effects these latter
imperfections have, and in his empirical discussion of rual development
policy, these imperfections are largely absent. These indications do not
modify his handling of the administrative organizations as a sufficiently
effective instrument. They are pointed out in the introduction and then
largely left aside.
The rual population is given a limited set of options in Picard s
framework. They have a power as electors, and this power is by the ruling
elite perceived to be reaL, and important to attend to. In terms of
implementation, the rural population might also abstain from participating
in the programmes, but on the other hand, the ruling elite has a substantial
capacity to manipulate the rual population. There are no mechanisms for
peasant influence except for voting, or abstaining from participation in
public policy implementation.
However, the ruling elite is constrained in its choices. Drawing on the
dependency school, Picard emphasises that the ruling elite is constrained by
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international capitalism in general, and by the Republic of South Africa in
particular. These constraints are quite narow - Botswana suits the
description of a dependent country. The ruling elite is thus in search of
areas for autonomous power wielding, a residual found in the rual
development sector (1987: 273). In fact, Picard states that he looks for
areas where the ruling elite is not constrained. This should imply a search
for possible constraints, but the constraints of bureaucracy and clientele
choice and action as paricipants in public policy implementation are hardly
touched upon.
Picard also makes it a central point that the ruling elite is autonomous
relative to its own socio-economic class origin. The ruling elite originates
from the wealthy cattle owners, but it is not the representative of this social
group as it is not dependent on it (1987: 11). The socio-economic elite
apart from the section of it that is also the ruling elite, includes the
traditional nobility. The ruling elite has proved capable of countering the
wishes of this group.
Picard goes on in detail to examine the formation of two major rural
development programmes (TGLP and ARDP), and the actor who initiates,
coordinates, plans, decides and controls the implementation of these policies
is the ruling elite. These programmes are main political initiatives,
controlled by the ruling elite in internaL, harmonious cooperation.59 Like
ARAP, they are main occurrences of public policy in which the ruling elite
had interests at stake, and this determined their high level of activity and
thus the policy outcome.
Summing up this section, the independent varables of Picard' s model are
the ruling elite's interests, its ability to act upon the pursuit of these
interests, its controlover bure aucracy , local elites and farmers, and its
ability to come up with agreed ideas and solutions. His findings describe
an effective and supreme ruling elite. It is supreme by not having serious
competitors for influence. It is effective by being supreme, by having
agreed-upon interests, by being able to agree on how to pursue these
interests and by being able to have its policies implemented.
The data from the ARAP analysis, when seen in the light of Picard s
model, shows a ruling elite that was not effective the way it intended to be,
and a ruling elite which did not control all phases of the policy making
process, other influences were important.
59 TGLP and ARD P (Accelerated Rural Development Programme) were major programmes
that Picard discusses in detail, and he explains them by ruling elite activity in all major
phases.
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8.5 Problems of the ruling elite model
8.5.1 Politization of policy making?
Contrasted to Picard's findings of an effective elite which rules supremely
is the case of ARAP where the actors who would equal Picard' s elite had
problems to agree on what interest was at stake and how it should be
pursued. The political-administrative leadership did not agree on objectives,
and the outcome of their various intentions and actions produced an
outcome nobody had intended. Furhermore, in the case of ARAP, the
influence from non-elite actors is important in varous ways. This is
summed up in section 8.2.
Some might argue that ARAP was a special case, not typical for the
workings of the political-administrative system. It remains to come to a
conclusion on this issue, but the re are some indications that the differences
represent a trend away from the situation Picard describes.
The factors complicating the image of elite supremacy and effectiveness
might be related to processes of institutionalization which se em to have
become more important in Botswana in recent years. The administration has
grown in size and complexity (see chapter 3). Moreover, the Botswana civil
service has increasingly obtained a very good reputation for efficiency and
good management (Raphaeli et aL. 1984). It has achieved much since
independence and it has professionalised significantly. These factors, and
the factor of time and rather continuous, incremental development and
growth of the administration make it areasonable hypothesis that the
Botswana civil service has grown in strength and self-confidence.
The peaceful and consensual cooperation among elite members that
Picard describes relates to the fact that political institutionalization was very
weak at the time of independence. It has to be remembered that the BDP
started out as a very poorly developed organization; Gunderson talks of the
new men, around 100 in number who took power in 1966 without having
fought for it, without any political project of their own, and who simply
gathered under the BDP heading (1970). They have stayed in power for 25
years, and an institutional development of both the pary and of political
leadership could be expected during this time. Molutsi points to increased
self -confidence and willingness to play an independent role in policy
making among up and coming politicians (1989: 125-126). The case of
ARAP probably reflects this tendency of a changed political leadership, that
acts according to its own rationality, problem understanding and values that
do not always coincide with the administrative considerations of a civil
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service that has also grown stronger, more experienced and displays
increasing self -confidence.
Finally, the policies and programmes have become more complex and
interventionistic over the years, complicating both the administrative
apparatus and the planning and implementation process.
However, whether ARAP reflects a general tendency or is an exceptional
case, it shows that the possibilities for more complex processes than those
found by Picard cannot be ruled out. The analytical framework we apply
for analyzing public policy have to acknowledge this. We need models that
are capable of detecting varous actors and influences and which can
analyze and explain problems of defining goals and means, and problems
of unintended outcomes. The analytical model applied in this analysis is
capable; it is designed with that as one of its purses. It will be argued
that Picard s ruling elite model is not suited to analyze this type of
processes.
8.5.2 The focus of the ruling elite made L
The ruling elite model is based on assumptions which the ARAP case prove
to be problematic. These are assumptions that constrain attention, and that
make Picards model ignorant of important factors. The case of ARAP
illustrates that these factors might be of relevance to explain how public
policy develops in ways that benefit some and not others. The ruling elite
model lacks concepts to analyze some of these important factors as the
model ignores them to quite some extent. Furthermore, some of these
assumptions make the model misleading. By ignoring important problems
or by treating them arificially, the model will, in cases like ARAP, have
a tendency to exaggerate elite effectiveness and supremacy, thus giving us
a misleading image of political power in Botswana.
There are some assumptions in Picard' s model that makes the ruling elite
more dominant in terms of influence over public policy than it proved to
be in the case of ARAP. First, there is insufficient recognition of the
influence on public policy that target groups might exercise. In Picard s
model, the choice for the target groups is to participate or to remain
passive. But participation itself can take many forms and it can leave
openings for target groups' strategic action, changing public policy
drastically. The ARAP case shows this very clearly. By their use of a
modernization programme, farmers made ARAP a drought relief
programme instead. The difference is important. Furthermore, this sort of
influence will in its turn be influenced by the implementing agency. Its
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traditions, routines and role definitions might facilitate or prohibit target
group choice and influence.
Secondly, Picard makes the explicit assumption that the state apparatus
at medium and lower levels is an instrument for those in hierarchical
control of it. He also illustrates this control by showing how lower level
opposition towards TGLP was easily overrled. But hierarchical control
does not always ensure the instrumental use of the resources and
competence of an administrative apparatus. Hierarchical control can reject
active opposition, but it cannot always ensure active cooperation,
coordination and innovative contributions. Especially in programmes of
massive interventions like ARAP, efficient action requires coordination with
and adjustments to the many premises that will be affected. If that does not
happen, the costs of a programme might be higher than the benefits. This
is an influence, perhaps it could be labelled a negative influence of
isolation. But it might be important (Crozier 1964), and it is difficult to
label the administrative apparatus instrumental if it is reluctant to be
mobilized and has the option of remaining passive in some quarters. In the
case of ARAP, the se problems were significant.
Influences of clientele and administration are largely left out in Picard s
work. Because the administrative leadership is included in the ruling elite,
the cooperation of the administrative apparatus is taken for granted, which
is not always a realistic assumption. Some programmes do not depend on
target group participation and response. Others do, and in such cases the
forms and rationalities of various responses in interplay with the
implementing agency have to considered.
Analyzing public policy in a ruling elite framework would have problems
if one was faced with facts like this. By assuming their insignificance, the
ruling elite modeloffers no concepts or hypotheses about these issues.
Furthermore, applying the ruling elite model more rigidly, according to its
own logic, might also lead to a situation where such issues were not
revealed at all. If the model do es not look for it, it might see only ruling
elite influence whereas in reality, ruling elite influences were not the only
ones.
There are some assumptions that make the ruling elite look more
effective than it was in the case of ARAP. First, the supremacy that the
model will tend to ascribe to the ruling elite means that there will be found
few external constraints undermining ruling elite choices.
Secondly, Picards model comes very close to implicitly assuming that
the outcome of ruling elite processes are intentional and relatively rational
choices of how to understand and solve a problem. Whether the ruling elite
members actually agree on problem definitions and solutions, and whether
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the outcomes of decision making processes reflect rational, agreed choices
are questions not investigated in Picard s model. The actual processes of
clarfying interests, of solving possible contradictions of interests, and of
development and choice of means are not given much attention. These
intemal elite processes go on in a black box, and are not examined. The
ruling elite model instead focuses on how the output suits the assumed
input; the ruling elite interests. A public policy is explained by assuming
rational choice of policy output when the output suits the ruling elite
interests.6o This assumption is illustrated by Picards treatment of differing
views expressed by varous members of the ruling elite in the case of
TGLP (1987). They are interpreted as being the gradual elaboration of
ruling elite decision making, which might well be the case, but it cannot be
assumed. It can also reflect conflict, or indecisiveness that is not necessarly
solved in the end.
The case of ARAP shows that the MOA ruling elite members and the
political elite members did not agree on what problem ARAP should solve.
ARAP was nobody' s rational choice. This is related to the fact that the
agricultural administration did not have the routine solutions ready for
solving the problems posed by the political leadership, and thus avoided
that objective. Both ALDEP as well as ARAP are instances where the
agricultural administration had problems adjusting to new goals. The
professional knowledge, standard understanding of problems and routine
solutions represented a limited arsenal of govemmental action (Allison
1971; March and Olsen 1989). If the arsenal of means is limited, it is also
problematic to assume that choices of means will be effective and rational.
The outcome of this process was a policy that nobody had intended; it was
rather a mixture of different intentions that undermned each other to quite
an extent.
If we want to explain public policy, and the explanation cannot be
assumed to be rational choice of the ruling elite, we need concepts to
analyze the internal ruling elite processes. How problems are seen
differently, how solutions are chosen, what happens when there is no
readily available solution to a problem. The ruling elite model does not
provide us with many such concepts.
If the ruling elite decisions are assumed to be intentionally effective
pursuit of ruling elite interests, and there is no examination of how this
60 The ruling elite analysis of Picard of considers outputs at various stages, and does not
simply assume on the basis of the final decision, but what is behind the decisions of
various stages is not investigated empirically, but assumed to be rationaL.
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process actually develops, the effectiveness of ruling elite decisions is only
tested by the criterion of whether they really suit ruling elite interests.
Most outcomes would suit ruling elite interests as Picard defines them.
These interests are political acquiescence in the rural areas and thus
electoral support, and the ruling elite's own socio-economic benefit. Any
modernzation programme can be said to fit these interests. Any
modernzation failure can be seen as not really a modemization effort, but
as a political project, that benefitted some whose support was needed.
Whatever comes out of the black box, looks rational in relation to ruling
elite interests, if that is what we are looking for.
Of course, an analyst using a ruling elite framework would not apply it
as ngidly as suggested here. But these indications of the logic of a ruling
elite model, what it focuses on and what it ignores, show that not only is
the ruling elite modellikely to overlook important factors, factors that the
model has poor concepts to analyze, if they should be revealed. But there
is also a risk that by focusing on elite interests and output of elite
processes, ignoring other actors and in the end asking whether the elite
benefited in some way or the other, the ruling elite will look more supreme
and effective than what it really is.
8.6 Ruling elites and institutions
The case study of ARAP has pointed out some problems of using the ruling
elite model for explaining public policy. In situations of many actors, with
differing interests and approaches to problems, the ruling elite model is not
a very promising model in its present form. It might be argued that the
ruling elite model should be abolished for the explanation of public policy.
To state that a model is useless compared to another model, requires that
the two models should be applied on many different cases. Thus, this
section will assume that the ruling elite model has an important contribution
to make, and will point to some aspects of expanding the ruling elite model
in ways which adapt it to the problems pointed out in the above.
As argued by Gran et aL. (1990), the elite concept is auseful analytical
concept, if distinguished from the classic elite theory. But the elite should
be seen as potentially complex and marked by conflicts, and the varety of
dimensions along which conflicts can occur needs to be c1arified. The
ruling elite needs to be seen in the context of the broader political-
administrative system in general, focusing on how this system influences
various ruling elite members' perspectives and world views. Next, the
ruling elite influences public policy within the constraints imposed by
administrative capabilities and approaches. In the formulation of Gran et aL.,
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we should "study the (ruling elite's) "decision room" and the opportunity
situation in that room" (1990: 64).
Members of the ruling elite, as Picard defines them, have their ruling
elite member role in common. This role gives them, as outlined by Picard,
distinct interests and they develop strategies to pursue their interests, not
least in the field of public policy. But they have other roles as well. They
belong to institutions that are likely to influence their values, world views,
problem understanding and attitudes on how to solve problems. This is
what is included in the concepts of problem structure and model of action.
As institutions have differing tasks and expertise, institutionalization
processes will provide institutions with distinct problem structures and
models of action. On some points they counter each other, when issues
affecting several institutions arse, like ARAP. These characteristics of
administrative and political institutions also influence the leaders of them,
who form the ruling elite according to Picard. In fact, inter-institutional
relationships are to a considerable extent relationships involving leaders of
institutions. Thus, institutional belonging - and the specific influence this
has on ruling elite members - is an important dimension in the analysis
of ruling elite processes, perhaps one of the most important ones (Putnam
1976: 122).
The conflict or cooperation patterns that arse among leaders who are
also institutional representatives can be quite complex. Ministries and
political institutions are potentially heterogenous categories and they may
form complex patterns, that also involve militar organizations, interest
organizations, donors and the like. These might all be seen as ruling elite
members. It is an oversimplification to reduce the dynamics of these
patterns of ruling elite conflict or coalition to mere self-interest and struggle
for power and resources.
What can be called institutional complexity will create tensions, and the
case of ARAP is an example of one kind of tension: political -
administrative tension. There might be other types as weii.61
The subject of the difficult balance between political and administrative
issues is a prominent one in the literature. There is a common, and to quite
an extent valid argument that the balance might become tilted so much
towards one end that it is obviously destructive for all interests. Hyden' s
argument is that too of ten, political leaders intervene too strongly in
administrative affairs, affairs that administrators and donors consider
61 One interesting relationship would be that between Ministiy of Finance and Development
llanning and the line ministries or the MFDP and its relation to political leadership.
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technical and professional considerations not to be dealt with by politicians
(1983).
But technical and professional considerations are very of ten still political,
and what is framed as the technically possible might of ten hide choices
about what is desirable. Consequently, the political and the administrative
domains are not easy to distinguish, and there is political power hidden in
defining this balance, as well as a dynamic potential. As pointed out by
Jacobsen (1967), there is no objective distinction between what is political
and what is administrative and technical. Instead, the setting of this
distinction in varous situations should be seen as a varable, and one which
can explain dynamics of political processes.
Complex, institutionalized organizations are not neutral instruments that
can be used for any purpose (Allison 1971; March and Olsen 1989).
Leaving as ide the problems of shortage of personneI, money and
equipment, this is important in several respects.
Institutionalized professional approaches of ten contain political choices
and values, and a change of policy objectives might require administrative
change as well, both in the organization's professional expertise and in its
structure. If changes are required in what is by civil servants considered as
professional issues, the civil service will of ten be resistant to such changes
required from the outside. What is emphasised by, for instance, Jacobsen
is that this is of ten related to firm views on what is professionally sound
and correct. This problem will be seen in the relationship between political
leaders and the leaders of the administration under pressure (see above).
But even if the leadership of an institution should accept that changes
were needed in the organization, it does not follow that the administrative
organization can change over night to solve new problems with means that
have to be developed for this purpose. Organizational change and
innovation will involve more than the leadership of an organization. The
variety of specialized units and deparments somehow has to be involved
in innovation, learning and criticism. In the case of ARAP, even very
incremental adjustments and coordination efforts to mobilize specialized
units within the MOA failed, hierarchical command is not always sufficient
to activate an organization in rather open leaming processes.
Institutionalized organizations can and do of course change, it is also quite
possible for leaders to trigger processes of change. But to steer processes
of change is difficult (March and Olsen 1989).
If it is correct that policy changes ofte n require organizational change as
well, and if it is recognized that these changes are difficult to obtain, this
also means that the ruling elite is not a very flexible one.
134
The case of ARAP also suggests that interventionist public policy that is
not based on the clientele's interests, rationalities and values is difficult to
implement in away that leads to the desired changes in clientele behaviour.
One of Jacobsen's points is that development of problem structures and
models of action, and thus specific policy suiting new clientele interests,
can be difficult unless there is a basic identification with the clientele in
question, leading to a sensitivity towards the needs it has. What are the
conditions for such an identification? Gran et aL. point to social
mobilization that also inc1udes the generation of new leaders, that have a
different social identification, conducive to policy changes and who are
allowed to enter the state apparatus (1990).
An implication of the notion of political choices implied by professional
approaches, i.e. problem structures and models of action, is that the analysis
of how ruling elite interests are ensured by means of public policy requires
a focus on how these interests are institutionalized in the administrative
organizations, so that they do not need to be acted consciously upon by the
ruling elite members. Consider, for instance, the ide a that the existence of
large cattle owners is a major achievement and that it is a rational and
desirable way of organizing the livestock sector. Naturally, this favours the
wealthy cattle owners, and therefore also the ruling elite members
themselves. But it is too simple to explain this by ruling elite actions.
Rather, this interest is ensured by having be come institutionalized as a
professional and technically correct understanding of livestock production.
The points made in this section do not solve all problems of the ruling
elite model, but they suggest some possible contributions to an adaption of
ruling elite perspectives to a reality of policy making that is increasingly
becoming more complex in terms of both actors, world views and solutions.
8.7 The aftermath of ARAP
As the quotations in the Introduction indicate, the conclusion of more or
less all observers, and of the MOA as well, is that ARAP did not achieve
its purpose, and that it was aspending that could not be justified in
development terms.
The interpretation of the ARAP experience seems to be that development
of the small scale farmers cannot be achieved by available policy means,
and the MOA is to some extent retreating from the role it rather reluctantly
accepted as a key actor in fighting poverty problems. In the sector policy
document of early 1991, there are no signals indicating new programmes
of this type under planning. Instead, a return to the extension and research
model is advocated, and increased research efforts are signalized.
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The MOA has changed in several respects after its ARAP experience.
The increases in implementing capacity have been mentioned above, as
well as the change in expertise. The Field Service is now an organization
much more capable of administering mass programmes also in terms of
experience and expertise.
The policy of returning to research and extension does not necessarly
mean areturn also to the elitist approach that previously dominated.
Intensified research efforts are justified by the need for technology that can
be relevant also for small scale farming (MOA 1991). Whether this will
turn out so, remains to be seen and it also remains to be seen whether such
a technology actually is a realistic option at all.
An interesting change is a reorganization of the MOA. Previously, the
Animal Production Division and the Crop Production Division were both
located in the Department of Agricultural Field Services, which
implemented ARAP. As noted in chapter 6, the amount of capacity taken
by ARAP also took capacity away from livestock projects. Now the Animal
Production Division has been transferred to the Department of Veterinary
Services (MOA 1989: 193). This department has its own field staff, and
relates only to livestock. The details of this reorganization are unclear, but
it seems that it will protect the livestock programmes against future political
interventions of the ARAP type which resulted in neglect of programmes
which the MOA saw as important.
A final question relates to how important modernization of agriculture
after all is, in political terms. The rationale be hind demands for a new
agricultural policy was political, to ensure that farmers saw themselves as
catered for by the regime. The modemization did not materialize, but a
tremendous subsidy and relief did, and the BDP did fare quite well in the
1989 elections. Relief might be a more rational strategy for the BDP
leadership than modernization. The organizational preconditions for that are
improved. The field staff has improved capacity and expertise to handle
large scale relief programmes, and the livestock development which is so
important for wealthy cattle owners is organizationally transferred so as to
be sheltered from such use of implementing capacity in the future.
The poor peasantry is increasingly becoming dependent on government
assistance, and the government machinery for meeting such needs is
improved. This can be a promising situation, because it might enable
Botswana to organize the absorbing of people into other sectors gradually,
while maintaining the rural sector for as lon g as needed to prevent
starvation and disintegration. But it might also be a problematic situation;
it could be tempting for a regime under pressure to maintain an obedient
rural socio-economic structure with its dependenee and poverty longer than
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what is needed, and it might be tempting to utilize the dependence for
illegitimate purposes.
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Appendix 1
Interview data
In this appendix the interview techniques and some problems will be
outlined in more detaiL.
1. Selection
In total, the interview data contain 45 interviews with 34 persons. The
names of them and their institutional affiliation can be found in appendix
2.
They were selected gradually , as my insight into the specialization and
hierarchy of the administration developed. The criteria for selection were:
1. As many as possible of those who had taken part in the planning and
implementation of ARAP, but as noted, I had to leave out implementors on
the regional and lower leveis. 2. As many as possible of those who had
their fields of responsibility influenced by ARAP, i.e. persons working with
environment, women's affairs, other programmes in arable production. 3.
Observers and the like who would know the workings of the political-
administrative system, and the workings of the rual economy.
The list of potential informants according to these criteria was gradually
made, by asking informants whom to contact about various issues, whom
they cooperated with, and about what. There is a risk in this strategy, that
important persons remain never discovered by me, but the Botswana central
level bureaucracy is relatively small, and organized in an orderly. Thus, the
chances of important persons being left out are small.
2. Access
Access is a problem on at least two leveis.
1. Willingness to be interviewed. Most persons I approached were willing
to let me have at least one interview. A few civil servants and politicians
of high ranking did refuse, and the civil servant who was Permanent
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Secretary in Ministry of Agriculture when ARAP was planned, refused to
be interviewed, although numerous attempts were made.
2. Openness. This is difficult to assess, but repeatedly, I found people to be
reluctant when it came to ARAP. ARAP was a very sensitive issue in
general, because it had be en politicized, and distorted into something that
civil servants seemed to find it difficult to defend or admit to be involved
in. An integrated par of the design for tbis study is to link planning and
implementation processes in the case of ARAP to models of actions,
routines and relations in general. The best way to get information about tbis
sensitive issue was to link it very closely to more general questions about
the organizations' tasks and relations. On the other hand, in some cases it
was not possible to ask as direct and detailed questions about ARAP as I
wanted, many informants answered very reluctantly the question about the
planning of ARAP, and of ten answers were vague and fragmented. Pressing
too far on a sensitive subject is difficult, and there are clear limits to what
can be achieved that way.
3. In Botswana as in many other developing countries, the civil servants are
overloaded with work. A natural implication of tbis is that they do not have
much spare time for researchers. From their point of view, they have better
things to do than to be interviewed. This sets limits on what can be
achieved in one interview, especially as information about the process
forming ARAP had to be elicited for in the rather cumbersome way
described above.
3. Interview technique
1. The preparations included an attempt to assess what kind of person I was
going to interview, what he might know, what he might dislike, what kind
of interests he would have, what his normal duties were, what institution
he belonged to and how that could affect him, and what professional
training he had. They also included a choice of themes, and the formulation
of questions, written down in a note book as an interview guide. The
interview guide, however, was only a broad structure of the interview.
Follow-up questions had to be made as the interview developed, and new
subjects which appeared could be followed up.
2. Most interviews had two basic components. The first was the
institutional context, focusing on models of actions and relations to other
persons and units. On this a fairly standardized guide gradually proved to
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work well, focusing on tasks, cooperation, previous experience, professional
training, problem worked on, projects implemented, goals for policies. In
order to get hold of aspects of values and problem structures, I also us ed
themes centred around the central concepts of self -sufficiency, social
justice, future prospects, government responsibility, farers and subsidies,
trying to make informants relate their own work to these values or goals.
The second, related to this context, was how the informant had related
to ARAP' s planning and implementation. Most informants were reluctant
to talk about this. Some were simply not willing to talk about it and told
me that very clearly. What worked best was to relate ARAP to the general
issues raised in the themes mentioned above; this gradually provided me
with pieces of information. There were also some who were more willing
to tell at least some things about ARAP fairly directly.
In addition to this, interviews were related to each other, as information
from one interview could give guidance in another, because it was
important to find the various points of view and perspectives across
organizational divisions.
3. The formulation of questions of course had to take into account the well
known problems, i.e. they had to be clear, they had to be formulated in
terms that the informants would think in, and they had to be open for
several answers. But in addition, a judgement had to be made about
whether a particular question would work or not. With some experience
these judgements became quite accurate.
4. I had planned to use tape recorder, but that soon prove d to be a bad
solution - informants were negative when asked. Besides, on sensitive
issues such as ARAP proved to be, it was unwise to use a tape recorder. So
when an interview was finished, the information existed only as notes in
my notebook, and the associations these noteswould give me for at least
some time after. Much of the data analysis had to be done immediately.
The report from the interview was usually written the same day.
Consequently, the evaluation of reliability, of how my way of
interviewing had influenced, how I should perceive what was said, and the
exclusion of things I was not sure I had understood had to be done at once,
and some of the interpretation was also done then.
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4. Interview technique and reliability
The way I caried out the interviewing will in most cases have influenced
the information I got. Some problems should be focused upon.
1. It is obvious that the informant' s perception of the interviewer influences
rus reaction to the questions. I was not an important person. This meant that
there were limits on the time I could ask for. On the other hand, this also
means that information was given without much pressure to be more
cooperative than the informant might wish to be. Such information is more
reliable than information given under some kind of pressure.
2. Detecting how concepts and values were defined and operationalized,
what was meant by concepts and words is problematic, especially when
going into areas which I knew little about in advance. The way I tried to
compensate, was to ask several questions, controlling if I got it right.
3. Another serious problem was that in a lot of cases the informant showed
interest in research as such, but not in administrative re se arch, with its
focus on the organizational aspects. It seemed to be more legitimate to do
research on how policies worked than research on how policies were made.
4. Interviews were kept inside the framework of some themes. And usually
it was no problem to control an interview. But it was important to be open
to frame themes somewhat differently, to respond to surrises, and to
follow up where relevant. The balanee between control and flexibility is not
an easy one, and some interviews had to be regarded as failures because of
this.
5. Even if it is difficult to describe, in most interviews an atmosphere of
communication, or lack of such, could be registered. I think it is legitimate
to take such things into consideration when interpreting data afterwards.
5. Representation of interview data in the analysis
As emphasised above, ARAP proved to be a very sensitive subject for most
informants. This I discovered very quickly, and I was not prepared for that.
It was hard to assess how sensitive and why, and consequently I took it
more and more for granted that it was sensitive simply because it was
political and because it had been criticized. Thus, I was careful to assure
informants that I did not have to quote them by name. Some did not
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believe me. Others said that on this specific issue, they did not want to be
quoted. Others said nothing, but on some points it seemed to be self -evident
that it was off the record. These various factors make it difficult to find a
consistent standard for the presentation of the interview data in the analysis.
I have decided to be restrictive, not naming anyone, even if this also hides
identities that are not necessar to hide. But it seems to be the best way,
especially because it is an important principle to respect the interests of
informants even if seen from the other side of the globe, fears of being
quoted might seem over-exaggerated.
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Appendix 2
List of persons interviewed
1. Ministry of Agriculture
Mr Mannathoko
Permanent Secretary
Mr Taukobong
Deputy Permanent Secretary
Mr Larsen
Division of Planning and Statistics
Mr Sigwele
Division of Planning and Statistics
Yvonne Merafe
Senior Rural Sociologist, Rural Sociology Unit
Elizabeth Muggeridge
Division of Planning and Statistics
Mr Mokgare
Division of Planning and Statistics
Mr Seleka
Division of Planning and Statistics
Mrs Tsimako
Rural Sociology Unit
Mr Memboa
Department of Agricultural Field Services
Mr K. Mmopi
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ALDEP Coordinator
Mr Mpathi
Division of Land Utilization
Mr Dick
Department of Cooperatives
Mr Morapedi
Department of Cooperatives
Mr Alidi
Forestry Unit
Mr Modise,
ARAP coordinator, Crop Protection Unit
Mr Montshiwa
ARAP coordinator, Crop Production Division
2. Ministry of Finanee and Development Planning
Dianna Callear
Rural Development Unit
Mr Salkin
Macro Economic Unit
Mrs Kgari
Division of Economic Affairs
Mr S Mokone
Rural Development Unit
3. Ministry of Local Government and Land
Mr Hunter
Coordinator Land U se Planning
Mrs Molamu
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Applied Research Unit
Mrs Bhebe
Department of Town and Regional Planning
4. Ministry of Home Affairs
Mrs Anderson
Women's Affairs Unit
5. NORAD
Mr Isaksen
Resident Representative
6. Consultants
Mr D. Cownie
Mr B. Egner
Mr P. Eskeli
7. Botswana National Front
Dr Kenneth Koma
MP, Leader of the Opposition
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Appendix 3
Organizational charts
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MINSTRY OF AGRICULTU, STRUCTURE 1985
1. Headauarers.
Minter
IPermanent Seceta
I
Deputy Perm ent Seceta
Division of Planng
and Statistics
Deparment of
Agrcultual
Field Servces
Deparment of
Agrcultural
Research.
,
,~
Deparment of
Veteriar
Servces
Source; National Development Plan 1985-91
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
Gaborone, 1985
Deparment of
Cooperative
Development
BotswanaÃgrcutu
College
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2. Deparment of Agrcultural Field Services.
Deparment of Agrcultural Field Seces
Direcor of Agrculturl Field Seces
L L,
Division of
Anmal Pruction
Division of Crop
Production
-Pandamatenga
Ptojec
'f
Regional
Officers
I
Division of
Land Utilization
Soil Surey
and Mapping
Irgation
Fisheries
I
Prcipal
Agr.
Officer
I
Agrcutu
Inormation
Forest Unit
,
Range Ecology
Unit
am Buidig
Carography
Soil Consrvation
Regional
Officers
I
Smallstock
Unit
Dair Unit
Arificial
Inmiation
ommunal Areas
Management Unit
Pig Husbandr Unit
Ranch Exension Unit
Regional
Officers
L,ni~trr.t~ff
--
--
--
Regional
Agrcultural officer
IDistrct
Agrcultural Officer
AgrcLtural
Demonstrtor
Source; Crop Production Division. Department of Agricultural Field Services
Annual Report 1987
Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone 1987
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